The effect of firm-level contracts on the structure of wages: evidence from matched employer-employee data

Revised: 2006-11

Roaming in the Mobile Internet: when coverage sharing agreements call for regulation

Revised: 2006-06

Consumer Expertise or Credit Risk? An empirical analysis of mortgage pricing

Loan mortgage interest rates are usually the result of a bank-customer negotiation process. Credit risk, consumer cross-buying potential, bundling, financial market competition and other features affecting the bargaining power of the parties could affect price. We argue that, since mortgage loan is a complex product, consumer expertise could be a relevant factor for mortgage pricing. Using data on mortgage loan prices for a sample of 1055 households for the year 2005 (Bank of Spain Survey of Household Finances, EFF-2005), and including credit risk, costs, potential capacity of the consumer to generate future business and bank competition variables, the regression results indicate that consumer expertise-related metrics are highly significant as predictors of mortgage loan prices. Other factors such as credit risk and consumer cross-buying potential do not have such a significant impact on mortgage prices. Our empirical results are affected by the credit conditions prior to the financial crisis and could shed some light on this issue.

Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior

This paper studies an allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or reject, and con ict is solved bilaterally between the rejector and the proposer. We allow the proposer to make sequential proposals over several periods. If responders are myopic maximizers (i.e. consider each period in isolation), the only equilibrium outcome is the serial rule of Arin and Feltkamp (2012) regardless of the order of moves. If all players are farsighted, the serial rule still arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if the order of moves is such that stronger players respond to the proposal after weaker ones.

The Relevance of Relative Position in Ultimatum Games

This paper investigates the effect of focal points and initial relative position in the outcome of a bargaining process. We conduct two on-line experiments. In the first experiment we attempt to replicate Güth, Huck and Müller's (2001) results about the relevance of equal splits. In our second experiment, we recover the choices of participants in forty mini-ultimatum games. This design allows us to test whether the equal split or any other distribution or set of distributions are salient. Our data provide no support for a focal-point explanation but we find support for an explanation based on relative position. Our results confirm that there is a norm against hyper-fair offers. Proposers are expected to behave selfishly when the unselfish distribution leads to a change in the initial relative position.

Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Hitzarmen kolektiboen ultraktibitatearen desagerpena

[EU]Lan erreforma indarrean sartu arte, hitzarmen kolektiboen negoziazioen porrotak, aurreko hitzarmenak indarraldia mantentzen jarraitzen zuela zekarren kontrako akordiorik egon ezean. Egun ordea, indarraldi hori urtebetera mugatu egiten da, eta hala, behin epe hori igarota eraginkortasuna galduko du, kontrako akordiorik ez badago, eta beraz, goragoko hitzarmena aplikatuko da (existitzen bada). Erreforma honek, hitzarmenen birnegoziazioa sustatzea eta lan baldintzen petrifikaziorik ez gertatzea du helburu. Baina, araudi berriak, interpretazio arazo ugari sortzen dituenez, lan honekin, eman daitezkeen erantzun posibleak landuko ditugu; eta auzitegiek zein irizpide jarraitu duten aztertuko da. Hitz gakoak: hitzarmen kolektiboa, ultraktibitatea, indarraldia, goragoko hitzarmen kolektiboa.

Enplegua eta Lan Harremanen aldaketak XXI.mendean.

[EU] Gradu amaierako lan honetan, XXI.mendeko Lan Erreforma adierazgarrienak kronologikoki erakusten dira, hauetako bakoitzean, hurrengo lau aldagai hauen analisiaren bitartez, hain zuzen, kontratazioak eta enplegua, langabezia, pentsioak eta negoziazio kolektiboa. Gainera, ELA, LAB, CCOO eta UGT sindikatuei elkarrizketa bat burutu zaie, erreformei buruzko iritzia jaso eta kolektibo bakoitzaren ezinegonak eta parekotasunak ezagutzeko helburuarekin. Era honetan, analisi zehatz honen bidez, XXI.mendean zehar enpleguan eta lan harremanetan emandako aldaketak islatzea da funtsezko xedea.

多对一供应链零售商驱动型收入共享契约下的生产决策

针对多对一供应链结构中零售商具有较强议价能力的特点,建立了零售商为主方、制造商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出在零售商提供契约条款的对称博弈中,制造商生产产品策略存在唯一最优解的证明;分析了零售商契约参数变量的决策问题;讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链同集中供应链决策的关系.通过仿真实验,分析验证了契约参数及产品的可替代性对供应链绩效的影响。

Układy zbiorowe pracy a prawo antymonopolowe Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych

Względy społeczne są silnie chronione w prawie Unii Europejskiej i Stanów Zjednoczonych. Ważnym elementem wskazanych systemów prawnych jest również prawo antymonopolowe, którego cel, najogólniej rzecz ujmując, stanowi zapewnienie właściwego funkcjonowania rynku. Kwestie socjalne nie mieszczą się w optyce prawa antymonopolowego. Może to prowadzić do powstania bardzo skomplikowanej sytuacji między prawem antymonopolowym a unormowaniami służącymi ochronie względów socjalnych. Istnieją obszary, na których te dwa zespoły norm są komplementarne, ale zauważyć należy również, że na pewnych płaszczyznach cele prawa pracy są odmienne, a nawet przeciwstawne wobec zadań stawianych przed prawem antymonopolowym. Sferę, w której powstanie konfliktów jest najbardziej prawdopodobne stanowią układy zbiorowe pracy. Zgodnie z unijnym i amerykańskim orzecznictwem prawo antymonopolowe nie może być wykorzystywane do uniemożliwienia osiągnięcia celów socjalnych chronionych przez prawo. Istnieją jednak przypadki, w których stosownie prawa antymonopolowego do układów zbiorowych pracy jest możliwe.

Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was not just about Iraq

Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally, if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject possible cooperation in the short run to improve their influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This need not be due to traditional relative gains concern. States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak negotiator will erode future bargaining power and subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve. This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in 2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world

Contemporary globalization has been marked by significant shifts in the organization and governance of global industries. In the 1970s and 1980s, one such shift was characterized by the emergence of buyer-driven and producer-driven commodity chains. In the early 2000s, a more differentiated typology of governance structures was introduced, which focused on new types of coordination in global value chains (GVCs). Today the organization of the global economy is entering another phase, with transformations that are reshaping the governance structures of both GVCs and global capitalism at various levels: (1) the end of the Washington Consensus and the rise of contending centers of economic and political power; (2) a combination of geographic consolidation and value chain concentration in the global supply base, which, in some cases, is shifting bargaining power from lead firms in GVCs to large suppliers in developing economies; (3) new patterns of strategic coordination among value chain actors; (4) a shift in the end markets of many GVCs accelerated by the economic crisis of 2008-09, which is redefining regional geographies of investment and trade; and (5) a diffusion of the GVC approach to major international donor agencies, which is prompting a reformulation of established development paradigms. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

The tithe: Public research university STEM faculty perspectives on sponsored research indirect costs

This study sought to understand the phenomenon of faculty involvement in indirect cost under-recovery. The focus of the study was on public research university STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) faculty, and their perspectives on, and behavior towards, a higher education fiscal policy. The explanatory scheme was derived from anthropological theory, and incorporated organizational culture, faculty socialization, and political bargaining models in the conceptual framework. This study drew on two key assumptions. The first assumption was that faculty understanding of, and behavior toward, indirect cost recovery represents values, beliefs, and choices drawn from the distinct professional socialization and distinct culture of faculty. The second assumption was that when faculty and institutional administrators are in conflict over indirect cost recovery, the resultant formal administrative decision comes about through political bargaining over critical resources. The research design was a single site, qualitative case study with a focus on learning the meaning of the phenomenon as understood by the informants. In this study the informants were tenured and tenure track research university faculty in the STEM fields who were highly successful at obtaining Federal sponsored research funds, with individual sponsored research portfolios of at least one million dollars. The data consisted of 11 informant interviews, bolstered by documentary evidence. The findings indicated that faculty socialization and organizational culture were the most dominant themes, while political bargaining emerged as significantly less prominent. Public research university STEM faculty are most concerned about the survival of their research programs and the discovery facilitated by their research programs. They resort to conjecture when confronted by the issue of indirect cost recovery. The findings direct institutional administrators to consider less emphasis on compliance and hierarchy when working with expert professionals such as science faculty. Instead a more effective focus might be on communication and clarity in budget processes and organizational decision-making, and a concentration on critical administrative support that can relieve faculty administrative burdens. For higher education researchers, the findings suggest that we need to create more sophisticated models to help us understand organizations dependent on expert professionals.

Trade unions, civil society organisations and health reforms

This article provides an analysis of resistance to neoliberalism and commodification in the public healthcare sector as seen from a trade union perspective. It uses recent research on social-movement unionism and new labour internationalism to structure a series of case studies examining resistance to different dimensions of healthcare commodification in four countries. The range of alliances trade unions are making do not fit tidily into one model, but give insights into the movement elements of trade unionism. This dimension must be strengthened, but can also be in tension with collective bargaining and other institutional processes. How to constantly reconcile these different positions is the future challenge facing trade unions.

Reward management: a critical text

This, the second edition, adopts a critical and theoretical perspective on remuneration policy and practices in the UK, from the decline of collective bargaining to the rise of more individualistic systems based on employee performance. It tackles the conceptual issues missing from existing texts in the field of HRM by critically examining the latest academic literature on the topic. [Taken from publisher's product description].