多对一供应链零售商驱动型收入共享契约下的生产决策


Autoria(s): 周小明; 朱云龙; 朱珠; 申海
Data(s)

2009

Resumo

针对多对一供应链结构中零售商具有较强议价能力的特点,建立了零售商为主方、制造商为从方的Stackelberg主从对策模型;给出在零售商提供契约条款的对称博弈中,制造商生产产品策略存在唯一最优解的证明;分析了零售商契约参数变量的决策问题;讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链同集中供应链决策的关系.通过仿真实验,分析验证了契约参数及产品的可替代性对供应链绩效的影响。

Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power under the many-to-one supply chain structure,the Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers,is established.Then,proofs for the game between manufacturers producing strategies where a unique optimal symmetric Nash equilibrium exists are provided.Parameter decisions on the retailer s contracts are analyzed.The relationship of decisions between decentralized and centralized supply chain u...

国家科技计划项目(2007AA04Z189)

Identificador

http://ir.sia.ac.cn//handle/173321/5629

http://www.irgrid.ac.cn/handle/1471x/170264

Idioma(s)

中文

Palavras-Chave #Stackelberg主从对策 #多对一供应链 #收入共享契约 #生产决策
Tipo

期刊论文