Acceptance of smartphone-based mobile shopping:mobile benefits, customer characteristics, perceived risk and the impact of application context

Despite their generally increasing use, the adoption of mobile shopping applications often differs across purchase contexts. In order to advance our understanding of smartphone-based mobile shopping acceptance, this study integrates and extends existing approaches from technology acceptance literature by examining two previously underexplored aspects. Firstly, the study examines the impact of different mobile and personal benefits (instant connectivity, contextual value and hedonic motivation), customer characteristics (habit) and risk facets (financial, performance, and security risk) as antecedents of mobile shopping acceptance. Secondly, it is assumed that several acceptance drivers differ in relevance subject to the perception of three mobile shopping characteristics (location sensitivity, time criticality, and extent of control), while other drivers are assumed to matter independent of the context. Based on a dataset of 410 smartphone shoppers, empirical results demonstrate that several acceptance predictors are associated with ease of use and usefulness, which in turn affect intentional and behavioral outcomes. Furthermore, the extent to which risks and benefits impact ease of use and usefulness is influenced by the three contextual characteristics. From a managerial perspective, results show which factors to consider in the development of mobile shopping applications and in which different application contexts they matter.

Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision

An early decision market is governed by rules that allow each student to apply to (at most) one college and require the student to attend this college if admitted. This market is ubiquitous in college admissions in the United States. We model this market as an extensive-form game of perfect information and study a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) that induces undominated Nash equilibria in every subgame (SPUE). Our main result shows that this game can be used to define a decentralized matching mechanism that weakly Pareto dominates student-proposing deferred acceptance.

Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision

An early decision market is governed by rules that allow each student to apply to (at most) one college and require the student to attend this college if admitted. This market is ubiquitous in college admissions in the United States. We model this market as an extensive-form game of perfect information and study a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) that induces undominated Nash equilibria in every subgame (SPUE). Our main result shows that this game can be used to define a decentralized matching mechanism that weakly Pareto dominates student-proposing deferred acceptance.