Insurance contract disclosure – an uncertain balance

This article canvasses recent case law adjudicating the uneasy disclosure balance between the interests of the insurer and the insured in the process of transacting an insurance contract. It examines also the consequences of non-disclosure and misrepresentation and whether the avowed legislative intent — that the liability of the insurer in respect of a claim is to be reduced to the amount that would place the insurer in the position it would have been had the non-disclosure or misrepresentation not occurred — is being achieved in practice. As there is no doubt as to who bears the onus of proof as to non-disclosure or misrepresentation it is surprising that insurers continue to flounder in this regard in relation to underwriting guidelines and adherence to them. The article reviews recent case law in this context and stresses that an insurer wishing to preserve its capacity to avoid liability on the basis that it would not have entered into a contract at all had the true situation been known to it must maintain detailed underwriting guidelines supported by consistent adherence to those guidelines. Recent case law also emphasises that the insurer must provide clear and cogent admissible evidence from appropriate personnel and officers of the company to discharge its onus.

Disability Standards for Education

This chapter of Higher Education and the Law considers the scope of the obligation of Australian Universities to make reasonable adjustments to facilities, procedures and curriculum, for students with disability. It reflects upon relevant case law to inform analysis of problematic aspects of that scope including, for example, the accommodation of students with problem behaviour flowing from disability and adjustment to assessment for students with disability.

Copyright, fair use and the Australian Constitution

There has been much debate over recent years about whether Australian copyright law should adopt a fair use doctrine. In this chapter we argue by pointing to the historical record that the incorporation of the term 'copyrights' in the Australian Constitution embeds a notion of balance and fair use in Australian law and that this should be taken into account when interpreting the Australian Copyright Act 1968. English case law in the 18th and 19th centuries developed a principle that copyright infringement did not occur where a person had made a fair use of a work. Fair use was generally established where the defendant had made a productive use that did more than alter the original work for the purpose of evading liability, and where the defendant had made an original contribution to the resulting work. Additionally, fairness was shown by a use that did not supersede or prejudice the market for the original work. At the time of including the copyright power in the Constitution, the UK Parliament’s understanding of “copyrights” included the notion of fair use as it had been developed in U.K. precedent. In this chapter we argue that the work “copyrights” in the Australia Constitution takes its definition from copyright in 1900 and as it has evolved since. Importantly, the word “copyrights” is infused with a particular meaning that incorporates the principle of copyright balance. The constitutional notion of copyright, therefore, is not that of an unlimited power to prevent all copying. Rather, copyright distinguishes between infringing copying and non-infringing copying and grants to the copyright owner only the power to control the former. Non-infringing copying includes well-accepted limitations on the copyright owner’s rights, including the copying of ideas, the copying of public domain works and the copying of insubstantial parts of copyrighted works. In this chapter we argue that non-infringing copying also includes copying to make a fair use of a work. The sections that distinguish infringing copying from non-infringing copying in the Copyright Act 1968 are sections 36(1) and 101(1), which define infringement as the doing, without licence, of an “act comprised in the copyright”. An infringing copy is an act comprised the copyright, whereas a non-infringing copy is not. We argue that space for fair uses of copyrighted works is built into the Copyright Act 1968 through these sections, because a fair use will not produce an infringing copy and so is not an act comprised in the copyright.

Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform

This Article examines the adverse impact theory of employment discrimination under Title VII. The author begins by discussing the development of adverse impact in the case law, and by scrutinizing its theoretical underpinnings. He demonstrates that Congress did not intend to mandate adoption of adverse impact theory when it established Title VII. The author then argues that the Courts have exceeded their authority under Title VII by embracing the theory of adverse impact. He concludes that the courts should therefore return to a narrower theory of employment discrimination, namely, a theory based on the legal concept of “intent.”

Identifying statutory encumbrances for seller disclosure

The standard land contracts in Queensland require a seller of land to disclose to a buyer not only registered encumbrances, but also statutory encumbrances affecting the land. Whether a statute creates a statutory encumbrance over the title to the property is therefore a key question for a seller when completing a contract. This article examines relevant case law and provides some guidelines for when a statute creates a statutory encumbrance that should be disclosed to a buyer as a defect in title.

From Francovich to Köbler and beyond : The evolution of a State liability regime for the EC

The aim of this paper is to present the evolution of the Francovich doctrine within the European legal order. The first part deals with the gradual development of the ECJ's case law on State liability in damages for breach of EC law. Starting from the seminal Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur, the clarification of the criteria set by the Court is attempted with reference to subsequent case law, whereas issues concerning the extent and form of the compensation owned are also mentioned. The second part concerns one of the more recent developments in the field, namely State liability for breaches of Community law attributed to national judiciary. The Court's ruling in Köbler is examined in connection with two other recent judgments, namely Commission v. Italy of 2003 and Kühne & Heitz, as an attempt of the ECJ to reframe its relationships with national supreme courts and appropriate for itself the position of the Supreme Court in the European legal order. The implications on State liability claims by the ruling in Commission v. France of 1997 constitute the theme of the third part, where it is submitted that Member States can also be held liable for disregard of Community law by private individuals within their respected territories. To this extent, Schmidberger is viewed as a manifestation of this opinion, with fundamental rights acquiring a new dimension, being invoked by the States, contra the individuals as a shield to liability claims. Finally, the third part examines the relationship between the Francovich doctrine and the principle of legal certainty and concludes that the solutions employed by the ECJ have been both predictable and acceptable by the national legal orders. Keywords: State liability, damages, Francovich, Köbler, Schmidberger

Assignments of non-retail commercial leases: Some contentious issues

Assignment clauses in non-retail commercial leases are as infinitely varied as the circumstances in which disputes arise. Each clause must be individually interpreted as part of the lease in which it is embedded. Whilst the assignment of a lease is one of the most commonplace transactions between lessor and lessee, the case law reveals few unifying principles. This article seeks to cautiously identify a set of principles which should be in the mind of any lawyer when a dispute relating to an assignment arises. It concludes with a short checklist of matters which must be considered by such a person to encourage the application of principles in the first instance towards a resolution of the dispute.

Accountability for good faith in commercial dealing: The Carter v Boehm legacy 250 years on

In common law jurisdictions such as England, Australia, Canada and New Zealand good faith in contracting has long been recognised in specific areas of the law such as insurance law and franchising, and more recently the implied duties of good faith and mutual trust and convenience in employment contracts have generated a considerable volume of case law. Outside of these areas of law that may be characterised as being strongly‘relational’ in character,the courts in common law jurisdictions have been reluctant to embrace a more universal application of good faith in contracting and performance. However increasingly there are cases which support the proposition that there is a common law duty of good faith of general application to all commercial contracts. Most important in this context is the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Bhasin v Hrynew.1 However, this matter is by no means resolved in all common law jurisdictions. This article looks at the recent case law and literature and at various legislative incursions including statutes, codes of conduct and regulations impacting good faith in commercial dealings.

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.

El bien común como fundamento de la responsabilidad del estado

Resumen: Los doctrinarios, a la hora de fundamentar la responsabilidad del Estado, han esgrimido diversas teorías. En el presente trabajo nos proponemos plantear otra mirada al respecto, postulando el bien común como fundamento de la responsabilidad del Estado. Para ello, conceptualizamos el bien común para repasar las distintas respuestas que se han dado en torno al interrogante de por qué el Estado responde. Ello, a fin de demostrar que todas esas respuestas, en definitiva, se cimientan en el bien común. Finalmente, ahondamos en doctrina ius-administrativista, iusfilósofica y de orden jurisprudencial para sustentar nuestra opinión.

Régimen jurídico de las lenguas y reconocimiento de la diversidad lingüística en el Tratado por el que se establece una Constitución para Europa

The territory of the European Union is made up of a rich and wide-ranging universe of languages, which is not circumscribed to the «State languages». The existence of multilingualism is one of Europe’s defining characteristics and it should remain so in the constantly evolving model of Europe’s political structure. Nonetheless, until now, the official use of languages has been limited to the «State languages» and has been based on a concept of state monolingualism that has led to a first level of hierarchization among the languages of Europe. This has affected the very concept of European language diversity. The draft of the treaty establishing a European Constitution contains various language-related references that can be grouped in two major categories: on the one hand, those references having to do the constitutional status of languages, and on the other, those regarding the recognition of European language diversity. Both issues are dealt with in this article. In analyzing the legal regime governing languages set forth in the draft of the constitutional treaty, we note that the draft is not based on the concept of the official status of languages. The language regulation contained in the draft of the constitutional treaty is limited in character. The constitutional language regime is based on the concept of Constitutional languages but the official status of languages is not governed by this rule. The European Constitution merely enunciates rights governing language use for European citizens vis-à-vis the languages of the Constitution and refers the regulation of the official status of languages to the Council, which is empowered to set and modify that status by unanimous decision. Because of its broad scope, this constitutes a regulatory reservation. In the final phase of the negotiation process a second level of constitutional recognition of languages would be introduced, linked to those that are official languages in the member states (Catalan, Basque, Galician, etc.). These languages, however, would be excluded from the right to petition; they would constitute a tertium genus, an intermediate category between the lan guages benefiting from the language rights recognized under the Constitution and those other languages for which no status is recognized in the European institutional context. The legal functionality of this second, intermediate category will depend on the development of standards, i.e., it will depend on the entrée provided such languages in future reforms of the institutional language regime. In a later section, the article reflects on European Union language policy with regard to regional or minority languages, concluding that the Union has not acted in accordance with defined language policy guidelines when it has been confronted, in the exercise of its powers, with regional or minority languages (or domestic legislation having to do with language demands). The Court of Justice has endeavoured to resolve on a case by case basis the conflicts raised between community freedoms and the normative measures that protect languages. Thus, using case law, the Court has set certain language boundaries for community freedoms. The article concludes by reflecting on the legal scope of the recognition of European language diversity referred to in Article II-82 of the European Constitution and the possible measures to implement the precept that might constitute the definition of a true European language policy on regional or minority languages. Such a policy has yet to be defined.

A responsabilidade extracontratual da Administração pública por atos omissivos

Trata-se de estudo dirigido à afirmação da natureza objetiva da responsabilidade objetiva da Administração Pública por atos omissivos. Defende-se a correta aplicação do artigo 37 parágrafo 6 da Constituição da República, em que se fora estabelecida a responsabilidade objetiva da Administração em todas as hipóteses em que esteja configurado nexo causal entre sua atuação, comissiva ou omissiva, e um dano injusto ocorrido. É novo o enfoque que norteia a reparação civil, não mais a atividade realizada pelo agente, mas as conseqüências sofridas pela vítima deste dano injusto. Exercitada na seara da responsabilidade civil do Estado, considerado em sentido lato, parece ainda mais lógica a mudança de enfoque mencionada, em razão do princípio norteador do seu dever de reparar, que é o da repartição eqüitativa dos encargos da Administração. De fato, sempre que a atividade administrativa estatal, exercida em benefício de toda a coletividade, gerar dano injusto a um particular específico, configurar-se-á sua responsabilidade de reparar este dano, já que, se é em nome da coletividade que se adotou a conduta geradora do dano, esta a idéia principal daquela diretriz enunciada. Daí por que a verificação da presença do elemento subjetivo culpa, em sede de responsabilidade do Poder Público, fora tornada inteiramente estranho ao exame. A correta leitura do artigo constitucional, com reconhecimento da responsabilidade objetiva do Estado nas hipóteses de ato comissivo e omissivo da Administração Pública, realiza, ainda, o princípio da solidariedade social, que implica preponderância do interesse da reparação da vítima lesada sobre o interesse do agente que realiza, comissiva ou omissivamente, o ato lesivo. Essa a legitimidade da teoria do risco administrativo adotada, a adoção de coerente verificação do nexo causal, com admissão da oposição de excludentes de responsabilidade. Ademais, entre a vítima e o autor do dano injusto, a primeira não obtém, em geral, beneficio algum com o fato ou a atividade de que se originou o dano. Se assim é, a configuração do dever de indenizar da Administração Pública dependerá, apenas, da comprovação, no caso concreto, de três pressupostos que se somam: a atuação do Estado, a configuração do dano injusto e o nexo de causalidade. Será referida a jurisprudência espanhola consagrada à regra de responsabilidade objetiva da Administração Pública por atos omissivos, com considerações acerca da resposta da Jurisprudência daquele país ao respectivo enunciado normativo. Buscou-se, desta forma, elencar-se os elementos básicos à compreensão do tema, e também os pressupostos essenciais à afirmação da natureza objetiva da responsabilidade da Administração Pública por atos omissivos, que são, primordialmente, a compreensão do fundamento da regra constitucional, a correta delimitação do conceito de omissão e de causalidade omissiva. Destacados os pressupostos necessários à correta compreensão do tema, conclui-se pela afirmação da natureza objetiva da responsabilidade da Administração Pública por dano injusto advindo de ato omissivo, desde que assim o seja, querendo-se significar, desta forma, que a responsabilidade mencionada não prescinde da configuração do nexo causal entre o comportamento omissivo ocorrido e o dano injusto que se quer reparar.

Autonomia da vontade, consensualismo e arbitragem: A extensão da cláusula compromissória a partes não-signatárias fundamentada na teoria dos grupos de sociedades. A prática da Corte Internacional de Arbitragem da Câmara de Comércio Internacional (CCI) e sua compatibilidade com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro

A prática da arbitragem comercial internacional tem se deparado, há pelos menos quatro décadas, com a problemática da extensão da cláusula compromissória a uma parte não-signatária, integrante do mesmo grupo de sociedades a que pertence uma das partes integrantes da convenção, em razão do comportamento adotado pela parte não-signatária nas fases de negociação do contrato, execução ou extinção. Nesse sentido, a prática da Corte Internacional de Arbitragem da Câmara de Comércio Internacional dos últimos trinta anos e reiteradas decisões judiciais em países de diferentes tradições jurídicas como a França, Suíça e Estados Unidos têm se manifestado favoravelmente a essa extensão subjetiva da convenção de arbitragem. O estudo da doutrina nacional e da jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça sobre os grupos de sociedades e seus efeitos, e a análise detida de diversos precedentes do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre a homologação de sentenças arbitrais estrangeiras, revelam a compatibilidade da referida prática arbitral internacional com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro.

Perfiles lingüísticos en la nueva oficina judicial: planificación lingüística en la administración de la Administración de Justicia

[ES]La adaptación de la Administración de Justicia al estatus de doble oficialidad lingüística exige la adopción de importantes medidas estructurales y organizativas que, hasta la fecha, no han resultado suficientemente efectivas. Este trabajo profundiza en los retos que en materia de lenguas se plantean a la Administración de Justicia, sobre la base del hilo conductor del sistema de planificación lingüística diseñado por la CAPV y su análisis desde la perspectiva de la jurisprudencia más reciente.

O novo perfil da culpa na responsabilidade civil: a culpa como critério para gradação da indenização

A presente tese propõe um estudo teórico dos perfis estrutural e funcional da culpa a partir do novo marco normativo introduzido no direito brasileiro pelo parágrafo único, do artigo 944 do Código Civil. Por meio de uma análise da disciplina normativa da culpa na seara da responsabilidade civil extracontratual, demonstra-se, neste trabalho que, a despeito do incremento das hipóteses de responsabilidade objetiva, a culpa ainda detém papel relevante no Direito Civil brasileiro. Além de atuar como fator de surgimento do dever de indenizar, a culpa também desempenha hoje a importante função de critério para fixação do valor da indenização. Os estudos realizados comprovam que esses diferentes papéis da culpa lhe imprimem contornos normativos distintos, não sendo mais possível hoje a adoção de uma teoria unitária para a descrição desse instituto jurídico. Ao contrário de seu perfil na esfera das regras de imputação de responsabilidade, onde é apreciada de forma abstrata e objetiva, no plano em que atua como critério de definição da extensão da indenização, a culpa assume feições concretas e pessoais. O estudo foi realizado mediante pesquisa bibliográfica, que compreendeu levantamento de doutrina, jurisprudência e legislação pertinentes.