Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.

Essays in recursive equilibrium and market selection hypothesis

Este trabalho consiste em estudar modelos incluindo agentes com informação completa e incompleta sobre o ambiente econômico. Prova-se a existência de equilíbrio em que esses dois agentes coexistem e sob, algumas condições, obtêm-se que esse equilíbrio é recursivo e contínuo, ou seja, pode ser implementado por uma função contínua de transição que relaciona as variáveis de equilíbrio entre dois períodos consecutivos. Mostra-se, sob algumas hipóteses, que em equilíbrios recursivos contínuos, os agentes que cometem erros persistentes nas antecipações dos preços de equilíbrio são eliminados do mercado. Finalmente, exibimos diversos exemplos numéricos, no caso de mercados incompletos e informação completa, em que os agentes com expectativas racionais são eliminados do mercado. Usam-se métodos numéricos alternativos que possibilitam computar um equilíbrio em modelos com agentes heterogêneos.

Approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space

This paper shows existence of approximate recursive equilibrium with minimal state space in an environment of incomplete markets. We prove that the approximate recursive equilibrium implements an approximate sequential equilibrium which is always close to a Magill and Quinzii equilibrium without short sales for arbitrarily small errors. This implies that the competitive equilibrium can be implemented by using forecast statistics with minimal state space provided that agents will reduce errors in their estimates in the long run. We have also developed an alternative algorithm to compute the approximate recursive equilibrium with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents through a procedure of iterating functional equations and without using the rst order conditions of optimality.

Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

Forward-looking versus recursive-dynamic modeling in climate policy analysis: A comparison

This paper develops a multi-regional general equilibrium model for climate policy analysis based on the latest version of the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. We develop two versions so that we can solve the model either as a fully inter-temporal optimization problem (forward-looking, perfect foresight) or recursively. The standard EPPA model on which these models are based is solved recursively, and it is necessary to simplify some aspects of it to make inter-temporal solution possible. The forward-looking capability allows one to better address economic and policy issues such as borrowing and banking of GHG allowances, efficiency implications of environmental tax recycling, endogenous depletion of fossil resources, international capital flows, and optimal emissions abatement paths among others. To evaluate the solution approaches, we benchmark each version to the same macroeconomic path, and then compare the behavior of the two versions under a climate policy that restricts greenhouse gas emissions. We find that the energy sector and CO(2) price behavior are similar in both versions (in the recursive version of the model we force the inter-temporal theoretical efficiency result that abatement through time should be allocated such that the CO(2) price rises at the interest rate.) The main difference that arises is that the macroeconomic costs are substantially lower in the forward-looking version of the model, since it allows consumption shifting as an additional avenue of adjustment to the policy. On the other hand, the simplifications required for solving the model as an optimization problem, such as dropping the full vintaging of the capital stock and fewer explicit technological options, likely have effects on the results. Moreover, inter-temporal optimization with perfect foresight poorly represents the real economy where agents face high levels of uncertainty that likely lead to higher costs than if they knew the future with certainty. We conclude that while the forward-looking model has value for some problems, the recursive model produces similar behavior in the energy sector and provides greater flexibility in the details of the system that can be represented. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Recursive contracts

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contractingproblems involving incentive constraints. Under these constraints,the corresponding maximization (sup) problems fails to have arecursive solution. Our approach consists of studying the Lagrangian.We show that, under standard assumptions, the solution to theLagrangian is characterized by a recursive saddle point (infsup)functional equation, analogous to Bellman's equation. Our approachapplies to a large class of contractual problems. As examples, westudy the optimal policy in a model with intertemporal participationconstraints (which arise in models of default) and intertemporalcompetitive constraints (which arise in Ramsey equilibria).

Global attractivity in a recursive sequence

In this paper, we Study the invariant intervals, the globally attractivity of the two equilibrium points, and the oscillatory behavior of tile solutions of the difference equation x(n =) ax(n-1) - bx(n-2)/c + x(n-2), n = 1,2,......, where a, b. c > 0. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Global asymptotic stability in a rational recursive sequence

In this paper, we study the global stability of the difference equation x(n) = a + bx(n-1) + cx(n-1)(2)/d - x(n-2), n = 1,2,....., where a, b greater than or equal to 0 and c, d > 0. We show that one nonnegative equilibrium point of the equation is a global attractor with a basin that is determined by the parameters, and every positive Solution of the equation in the basin exponentially converges to the attractor. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

On the recursive sequence Xn = axn-1+bxn-2/c+dxn-1xn-2

In this Paper, we study the invariant intervals, the global attractivity of the equilibrium points, and the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the difference equation x(n) = ax(n-1) + bx(n-2) / c + dx(n-1)x(n-2), n =1, 2, ..., where a greater than or equal to 0, b, c, d > 0. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

Rational expectations and the service of public debt: a recursive approach

This paper uses dynamic programming to study the time consistency of optimal macroeconomic policy in economies with recurring public deficits. To this end, a general equilibrium recursive model introduced in Chang (1998) is extended to include govemment bonds and production. The original mode! presents a Sidrauski economy with money and transfers only, implying that the need for govemment fmancing through the inflation tax is minimal. The extended model introduces govemment expenditures and a deficit-financing scheme, analyzing the SargentWallace (1981) problem: recurring deficits may lead the govemment to default on part of its public debt through inflation. The methodology allows for the computation of the set of alI sustainable stabilization plans even when the govemment cannot pre-commit to an optimal inflation path. This is done through value function iterations, which can be done on a computeI. The parameters of the extended model are calibrated with Brazilian data, using as case study three Brazilian stabilization attempts: the Cruzado (1986), Collor (1990) and the Real (1994) plans. The calibration of the parameters of the extended model is straightforward, but its numerical solution proves unfeasible due to a dimensionality problem in the algorithm arising from limitations of available computer technology. However, a numerical solution using the original algorithm and some calibrated parameters is obtained. Results indicate that in the absence of govemment bonds or production only the Real Plan is sustainable in the long run. The numerical solution of the extended algorithm is left for future research.

A notion of subgame perfect nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game .

Isotone Recursive Methods for Overlapping Generation Models with Stochastic Nonclassical Production

Based on an order-theoretic approach, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence, characterization, and computation of Markovian equilibrium decision processes and stationary Markov equilibrium on minimal state spaces for a large class of stochastic overlapping generations models. In contrast to all previous work, we consider reduced-form stochastic production technologies that allow for a broad set of equilibrium distortions such as public policy distortions, social security, monetary equilibrium, and production nonconvexities. Our order-based methods are constructive, and we provide monotone iterative algorithms for computing extremal stationary Markov equilibrium decision processes and equilibrium invariant distributions, while avoiding many of the problems associated with the existence of indeterminacies that have been well-documented in previous work. We provide important results for existence of Markov equilibria for the case where capital income is not increasing in the aggregate stock. Finally, we conclude with examples common in macroeconomics such as models with fiat money and social security. We also show how some of our results extend to settings with unbounded state spaces.

Rumor Propagation Model: An Equilibrium Study

Compartmental epidemiological models have been developed since the 1920s and successfully applied to study the propagation of infectious diseases. Besides, due to their structure, in the 1960s an interesting version of these models was developed to clarify some aspects of rumor propagation, considering that spreading an infectious disease or disseminating information is analogous phenomena. Here, in an analogy with the SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Removed) epidemiological model, the ISS (Ignorant-Spreader-Stifler) rumor spreading model is studied. By using concepts from the Dynamical Systems Theory, stability of equilibrium points is established, according to propagation parameters and initial conditions. Some numerical experiments are conducted in order to validate the model.