7 resultados para Judicial Review
em Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte(UFRN)
Resumo:
The following study aims to verify in which hypothesis res judicata, when it comes of an unconstitutional decision, shall not prevail over Constitution. It displayed the characteristics of formal and material constitutional systems. It debated the concepts of existence, validity and efficacy of juridical rules and acts. It dissertated about the idea of Constitution s superiority and about the birth of the judicial review of constitutionality. It focused some contemporary models of this judicial review and its historical evolution in Brazil, showing its effects towards the current Constitution. It sustained that the decision given by Supremo Tribunal Federal during abstract control of rules must bind even legislative bodies, preventing them to produce the same rules previously declared unconstitutional. It held up that all parts of the decision of Supremo Tribunal Federal oblige, even the juridical arguments employed, in both diffused and concentrated reviews. It showed that, despite these models of review live together in Brazil, our constitutional system preferred the concentrated one, considering one only court over the other constitutional organs. It discussed about res judicata with the purpose of clarifying its juridical nature, its objective and subjective limits and its regulation in collective demands. It explained that the material res judicata is an effect of a decision which cannot be reviewed, which makes the law s will free of discussion, binding the contendants and avoiding that other courts, judging future demands about the same object, may decide differently. It showed how the regulation of res judicata in collective demands, in respect oh their subjective limits, is useful to demonstrate that it is not the material law who must adapt itself to res judicata as traditionally thought, but res judicata, as a warranty of juridical certainty and security, who must be shaped from the debated rule. It presented to view the main doctrinal conceptions about res judicata s review in the hypothesis of unconstitutional judgement. It concluded that the decisions forged by unconstitutional rules or interpretations reputed not compatible to the Constitution by Supremo Tribunal Federal, in spite of it can make res judicata, may be reviewed beyond the term to file a recissory claim, since while the debated law is still valid, no matter if its decision was before or after the res judicata. At the end, it asserted that, when it is not legally authorized, the judicial review of res judicata is not admissible, after the term to file a recissory claim, under the argument that there was no direct violation to the constitutional principle or rule
Resumo:
PETROBRAS, a Brazilian oil company, follows principles of public administration and from the Constitutional Amendment 9/95 in Brazil began to compete with other companies with the flexibility of the oil monopoly. In this new model started to use the simplified procedure for bidding so that could compete on equal terms. The ordinance that adopted a simplified procedure for bidding has been the subject of some criticism and lawsuits especially under the Court of Audit and the Supreme Court in Brazil. The analysis of their constitutionality, and the possibility of their use by other group companies is the theme of this work, and for this purpose, permeates through the notions of judicial review in the Brazilian law on the stage of law and economics analysis of the norm, and the principles applicable to PETROBRAS and the devices most frequently asked about the implementation of 2745/98 Decree. For this, the basic issue that should be investigated further is the regulatory power of the Federal Executive and the delegation of powers within the legislature and its conformation to the constitutional regency
Resumo:
Brazil since its first republican constitution has adopted systems of laws control. The review activity was given to three state powers or functions state, Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. However, it appears that in the country along the constitutional history, has stood considerably the jurisdictional control of the most important control. Initially, back in 1891, Brazil adopted the jurisdictional control of diffuse from U.S, whose role in monitoring of standards is delivered to all organs of the judiciary, which may face a case, put on trial, ascertain whether or not the possibility of applying a law, removing its impact in case of unconstitutionality. In 1969, entered in the second legal model of judicial review, the concentrated control of constitutionality, whose inspiration comes from the positivist theory of Hans Kelsen, and was adopted by the Austrian Constitution of 1920. According to the abstract control the supervision of law is given to a Court or Constitutional Court, responsible for the analysis of the legal constitutionality independent of its application to a specific case. In Brazil the role of concentrated control was handed over exclusively to the Supreme Court, which serves as the Constitutional Court, which accumulates that function with other constitutionally provided jurisdiction. Throughout this period, from 1891 until today, Brazil has maintained a dual system of judicial control of legal constitutionality, where they coexist and harmonize the diffuse control exercised by any organ of the Judiciary, and concentrated control of competence the Supreme Court. However, one must recognize that with the advent of the Federal Constitution of 1988, the concentrated control has emerged on the national stage due to two important factors: the expansion of the legal capacity to sue and the inclusion of other ways control, besides the already known Direct Claim of Unconstitutionality. This concentrated control and projection of the Supreme Court s attempt to become a true constitutional court, led to a relative weakening of diffuse control even when performed by the Brazilian Constitutional Court. In order to become a true constitutional court, all decisions handed down by the Supreme in the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction should have the same weight and the same measure, or at least bring improvement to similar effects, once is the responsible for the final word when it comes to constitutional interpretation. Thus, the writs of certiorari and stare decisis were responsible for profound changes in the diffuse control, allowing the Supreme Court can strengthen its decisions even in the diffuse control. These two institutions have substantially changed the legal status of diffuse control, allowing an extension of the effects of decisions handed down by the Supreme Court, so that you can no longer be said that the effects of this control to restrict the disputing parties in the process
Resumo:
The independence of the United States and the revolutions that emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century led to the birth of the written constitution, with a mission to limit the power of the State and to ensure fundamental rights to citizens. Thus, the Constitution has become the norm and ultimate founding of the State. Because of this superiority felt the need to protect her, emerging from that constitutional jurisdiction, taking control of constitutionality of provisions his main instrument. In Brazil, the constitutionality control began with the Constitution of 1891, when "imported" the American model, which is named after incidental diffuse model of judicial review. Indeed, allowed that any judge or court could declare the unconstitutionality of the law or normative act in a concrete case. However, the Brazilian Constituent did not bring the U.S. Institute of stare decisis, by which the precedents of higher courts eventually link the below. Because of this lack, each tribunal Brazilian freely decide about the constitutionality of a rule, so that the decision took effect only between the parties to the dispute. This prompted the emergence of conflicting decisions between judicantes organs, which ultimately undermine legal certainty and the image of the judiciary. As a solution to the problem, was incorporated from the 1934 Constitution to rule that the Senate would suspend the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. With the introduction of abstract control of constitutionality, since 1965, the Supreme Court went on to also have the power to declare the invalidity of the provision unconstitutional, effectively against all without the need for the participation of the Senate. However, it remained the view that in case the Supreme Court declared the unconstitutionality of the fuzzy control law by the Senate would continue with the competence to suspend the law unconstitutional, thus the decision of the Praetorium Exalted restricted parties. The 1988 Constitution strengthened the abstract control expanding legitimized the Declaratory Action of Unconstitutionality and creating new mechanisms of abstract control. Adding to this, the Constitutional Amendment. No. 45/2004 brought the requirement of general repercussion and created the Office of Binding Precedent, both to be applied by the Supreme Court judgments in individual cases, thus causing an approximation between the control abstract and concrete constitutional. Saw themselves so that the Supreme Court, to be the guardian of the Constitution, its action should be directed to the trial of issues of public interest. In this new reality, it becomes more necessary the participation of the Senate to the law declared unconstitutional in fuzzy control by the Supreme Court can reach everyone, because such an interpretation has become obsolete. So, to adapt it to this reality, such a rule must be read in the sense that the Senate give publicity to the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, since mutated constitutional
Resumo:
During the ninth century, owing to the process of industrialization, new social conflicts were showed, forcing the Government not to remain inert. The necessity of answer to these new demands requires from the State some actions that assure the new economic, cultural and social rights, able to exceed the formal equality, according to the principles of redistributive equality and well-being. Among the social rights, the right to health is showed up, which is placed at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Treaty for the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as a necessary term to promote the dignity and the free development of the human personality. Under the Constitutional Law, it is clear that the implementation of the right to health, placed at the 6th article of the Brazilian Constitution, demands a government activity, which usually requires a provision of material goods, depending on budgetary resources. The Legislative and Executive Branches have a very important role in compliance with the constitutional regulations about the satisfactory offer of health care services, besides the correct use of the resources at this area. The adoption of public policies is the way of Government action to the planning and realization of this right. Though, some public policies are usually made apart from the social compromises, to the detriment of the basic social rights. The government has a discretionary competence to manage the health services. That is the reason it is necessary the control of the political choices, through the popular control, the extrajudicial control by the Account Courts, or the judicial review. Owed to the constitutionalization of social rights, the constitutional justice has a very relevant role, concerning to the constitutional jurisdiction, in a way the Judiciary Branch assume your position as a player that transforms the society. On the control of the public health policies, there is a cast of official instruments, judicial or not, to the guarantee of the collective right to the public health services, and to allow the citizens to reach the real implementation of the right to health
Resumo:
This master thesis aims to research the tension established between the judicial review and democratic theory which was always present in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. In this regard, the expansion of the Brazilian constitutional jurisdiction checked after the occurrence of the Federal Constitution of 1988 and the inertia of the Legislature in disciplinary relevant legal aspects of Brazilian society contributed to a hyperactivity of the Supreme Court. However, in a complex society of context, as is the Brazilian society, there are contained demands and political controversies that hardly would be well represented or resolved through the action of the Court of ministers at the expense of other government bodies. Among the supremacy of Parliament and the legitimacy deficit of these magistrates, is the constitutional text and the social fabric that makes this legal status of the political. Participatory democracy established by the guidelines of the Federal Constitution requires this perspective when the Supreme Court acting in place of concentrated constitutionality control. In a plural society, there is no reason to get rid of state decision moments popular participation. Lack the Supreme Court, this time, the democratizing perception that the institute brings to the interior of the Court, as state determination of space in which to come together and meet the aspirations of society and state claims. The dissertation investigates thus the possibility of amicus curiae Institute serve as a mediator of the democratic debate, to assist the Supreme Court in the preparation of the decision is, historically, that which is of greater legitimacy, from the perspective of a theory participatory democracy. Analyzes, likewise, the unfolding of abstract judicial review in the context of Brazilian law. Proposes, incidentally, a rereading of the separation of powers, with the call for the Judiciary be careful not to become the protagonist of national political decisions. It maintains, finally, that procedural opening the interpreters of the constitution, through the amicus curiae Institute, shows up as able to decrease the legitimacy deficit in the performance of the Brazilian Supreme Court.
Resumo:
The Textual Analysis of Discourse has its origin in Text Linguistics and it aims at studying the co(n)text meaning production based on the analysis of concrete texts by offering elements to the understanding of the text as a discourse practice throughout the plans or levels of linguistic analysis. In this perspective, we intend to investigate the enunciative responsibility phenomenon in the sentencing court judgment. To do so, we review the theoretical contributions of Textual Analysis of Discourse (ADAM, 2011) and the Enunciative Linguistics from various authors, among them, Rabatel (1998, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010), Nølke (2001, 2005, 2009, 2013), Nølke, Fløttum and Norén (2004), Guentchéva (1994, 1996) and Guentchéva et al. (1994). In this direction, we investigate the enunciative responsibility through a range that comprises the phenomenon from four gradations, each one with a kind of point of view (PoV) and with links that may mark the assumption or the distance from the point of view. Regarding the legal approach of the thesis, our theoretical anchoring follows several authors, among them, Petri (1994), Soto (2001), Alvarez (2002), Alves (2003), Cornu (2005), Albi (2007), Bittar (2010), Asensio and Polanco (2011), López Samaniego (2006), López Montolío and Samaniego (2008), Montolío (2002, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), Sterling (2010), Prieto (2013), Lawrence and Rodrigues (2013) and Rodrigues, Passeggi and Silva Neto (2014). Our corpus is composed of 13 sentences from criminal cases arising from the district of Currais Novos-RN, completed in 2012. The results reveal how the judge, from various enunciative instances, builds the court decision, which allowed us to understand the configuration of (non) assumption of enunciative responsibility in the sentencing court judgment discourse genre. In conclusion, we perceive that the discourse units are envisaged or through the assumption, or the non assumption of PoV by the enunciative instances, what guides the producer organization argumentative text and his (her) communicative purposes. With that, the judge creates and/or modifies values and beliefs, induces and/or guides his (her) interlocutor by being able to demonstrate objectivity and/or preventing his (her) face through the mediated constructions or engage through the assumption of the enunciative responsibility of the propositional content of an utterance. In short, we reaffirm our belief that the (non) assumption of the enunciative responsibility configures as an argumentative mechanism strongly marked by the producer of the text with a view to their communicative purposes. The sentence, therefore, is constructed in this game of taking and/or not taking of statements according to argumentative orientation and the objectives of the text producer.