Forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty using VAR models with short- and long-term economic restrictions: a Monte-Carlo study

Using vector autoregressive (VAR) models and Monte-Carlo simulation methods we investigate the potential gains for forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty of two commonly used restrictions arising from economic relationships. The Örst reduces parameter space by imposing long-term restrictions on the behavior of economic variables as discussed by the literature on cointegration, and the second reduces parameter space by imposing short-term restrictions as discussed by the literature on serial-correlation common features (SCCF). Our simulations cover three important issues on model building, estimation, and forecasting. First, we examine the performance of standard and modiÖed information criteria in choosing lag length for cointegrated VARs with SCCF restrictions. Second, we provide a comparison of forecasting accuracy of Ötted VARs when only cointegration restrictions are imposed and when cointegration and SCCF restrictions are jointly imposed. Third, we propose a new estimation algorithm where short- and long-term restrictions interact to estimate the cointegrating and the cofeature spaces respectively. We have three basic results. First, ignoring SCCF restrictions has a high cost in terms of model selection, because standard information criteria chooses too frequently inconsistent models, with too small a lag length. Criteria selecting lag and rank simultaneously have a superior performance in this case. Second, this translates into a superior forecasting performance of the restricted VECM over the VECM, with important improvements in forecasting accuracy ñreaching more than 100% in extreme cases. Third, the new algorithm proposed here fares very well in terms of parameter estimation, even when we consider the estimation of long-term parameters, opening up the discussion of joint estimation of short- and long-term parameters in VAR models.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

Lucas (1987) has shown the surprising result that the welfare cost of business cycles is quite small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-áedged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for the post-WWII era using the multivariate Beveridge-Nelson decomposition for trends and cycles, which considers not only business-cycle uncertainty but also uncertainty from the stochastic trend in consumption. The post-WWII period is relatively quiet, with the welfare costs of uncertainty being about 0:9% of per-capita consumption. Although changing the decomposition method changed substantially initial results, the welfare cost of uncertainty is qualitatively small in the post-WWII era - about $175.00 a year per-capita in the U.S. We also computed the marginal welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty using this same technique. It is about twice as large as the welfare cost ñ$350.00 a year per-capita.

Normality under uncertainty

Consider the demand for a good whose consumption be chosen prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding income. How do changes in the distribution of income affect the demand for this good? In this paper we show that normality, is sufficient to guarantee that consumption increases of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the new distribution with respect to the old is non-decreasing in the whole domain. However, if only first order stochastic dominance is assumed more structure must be imposed on preferences to guanantee the validity of the result. Finally a converse of the first result also obtains. If the change in measure is characterized by non-decreasing Radon-Nicodyn derivative, consumption of such a good will always increase if and only if the good is normal.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

The welfare cost of macroeconomic uncertainty in the post-war period

With standard assumptions on preferences and a fully-fledged econometric model we computed the welfare costs of macroeconomic uncertainty for post-war U.S. using the BeveridgeNelson decomposition. Welfare costs are about 0.9% per-capita consumption ($175.00) and marginal welfare costs are about twice as large.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking down backward induction (extensively revised version)

We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal form games in the presence of uncertainty, in the sense of Knight(1921). We use the fonna1iution of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show tbat there exist Nash equilibria for any degree of uncertainty, as measured by the uncertainty aversion (Dow anel Wer1ang(l992a». We show by example tbat prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationaliuble in the usual sense. Next, we break down backward industion in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We link these results with those on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma obtained by Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wdson(1982), and withthe 1iterature on epistemological conditions underlying Nash equilibrium. The knowledge notion implicit in this mode1 of equilibrium does not display logical omniscience.

Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty: breaking-down backward induction

We present two alternative definitions of Nash equilibrium for two person games in the presence af uncertainty, in the sense of Knight. We use the formalization of uncertainty due to Schmeidler and Gilboa. We show that, with one of the definitions, prudent behaviour (maxmin) can be obtained as an outcome even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense. Most striking is that with the Same definition we break down backward induction in the twice repeated prisoner's dilemma. We also link these results with the Kreps-Milgrom-Roberts-Wilson explanation of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Brazil's regulatory framework: predictability or uncertainty?

Este Trabalho Discute as Perspectivas da Regulação Econômica no Brasil. para Tanto, Primeiramente Apresenta-Se a Evolução Histórica da Regulação no País, Discutindo as Principais Questões Relacionadas Às Agências Reguladoras Federais. em Segundo Lugar, os Marcos Regulatórios de Cinco Diferentes Setores (Telecomunicações, Eletricidade, Saneamento Básico, Petróleo e Gás Natural) são Analisados. em Terceiro Lugar, a Questão do Financiamento de Investimentos em Infra-Estrutura é Tratada, Enfatizando o Papel das Parcerias Público-Privadas (Ppps). uma Seção Final Cont~Em um Possível Agenda para a Regulação no Brasil

Municipalities secession and uncertainty on public goods provision

This paper investigates the causes of municipalities secession in Brazil. The theoretical model proposes that the median voter is not fully informed about the efficiency effect of secession on public good provision and uses the break up decision undertaken by neighbor’s municipalities within the state to account for his voting. Our empirical results confirms that prediction

"We sold a million units": the role of advertising past-sales

In a market where past-sales embed information about consumers’ tastes (quality), we analyze the seller’s incentives to invest in a costly advertising campaign to report them under two informational assumptions. In the …rst scenario, a pooling equilibrium with past-sales advertising is derived. Information revelation only occurs when the seller bene…ciates from the herding behaviour that the advertising campaign induces on the part of consumers. In the second informational regime, a separating equilibrium with past-sales advertising is computed. Information revelation always happens, either through prices or through costly advertisements.

A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty

We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two well known games: the chain store and the centipede. On the one hand, we show that subgame perfection under Knightian uncertainty explains the chain store paradox in a one shot version. On the other hand, we show that subgame perfection under uncertainty does not account for the leaving behavior observed in the centipede game. This is in contrast to Dow, Orioli and Werlang(1996) where we explain by means of Nash equilibria under uncertainty (but not subgame perfect) the experiments of McKelvey and Palfrey(1992). Finally, we show that there may be nontrivial subgame perfect equilibria under uncertainty in more complex extensive form games, as in the case of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which accounts for cooperation in early stages of the game.

Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.

Os jornais brasileiros e sua atuação na internet: um estudo exploratório com base na economia da informação

A internet é considerada a mais completa manifestação da nova mídia e tem causado um impacto relevante no campo da comunicação. Os veículos de comunicação tradicionais enfrentam hoje um cenário de incerteza em relação ao futuro. As mudanças provocadas pela nova mídia criam inúmeras possibilidades, que podem ser ameaças ou novas oportunidades, mas que, em ambos os casos, exigem reações dos participantes deste mercado. Este estudo tem por objetivo identificar como os jornais diários brasileiros estão atuando no meio online em reação a estas mudanças. O processo para se atingir este objetivo ocorreu, primeiramente por meio da identificação das características e da classificação dos principais jornais brasileiros nos meios impresso e online. Em seguida, houve um aprofundamento desta pesquisa em entrevistas com profissionais deste mercado. Com base nos conceitos teóricos da economia da informação, foi construída a estrutura de uma taxonomia que permitisse uma análise mais objetiva dos veículos estudados. A avaliação dos dados coletados, tendo o apoio das informações capturadas nas entrevistas, resultou em uma análise bastante rica, da qual algumas conclusões importantes foram extraídas. Identificou-se, por exemplo, uma possível relação entre o nível de adaptação do jornal ao meio online a categoria de seu conteúdo. Outra constatação é a grande importância que o meio impresso ainda tem em termos de resultados financeiros dos jornais. Em relação ao futuro, existem muitas expectativas para o mercado de notícias, mas seu rumo ainda é muito incerto. Apesar disso, uma coisa parece clara: é importante a construção de uma marca forte baseada em credibilidade. No futuro, independentemente dos modelos de negócios que vigorarem, este será um diferencial importante para a sobrevivência dos jornais.