Predictable dividends and returns

The conventional wisdom is that the aggregate stock price is predictable by the lagged pricedividend ratio, and that aggregate dividends follow approximately a random-walk. Contrary to this belief, this paper finds that variation in the aggregate dividends and price-dividend ratio is related to changes in expected dividend growth. The inclusion of labor income in a cointegrated vector autoregression with prices and dividends allows the identification of predictable variation in dividends. Most of the variation in the price-dividend ratio is due to changes in expected returns, but this paper shows that part of variation is related to transitory dividend growth shocks. Moreover, most of the variation in dividend growth can be attributed to these temporary changes in dividends. I also show that the price-dividend ratio (or dividend yield) can be constructed as the sum of two distinct, but correlated, variables that separately predict dividend growth and returns. One of these components, which could be called the expected return state variable, predicts returns better than the price-dividend ratio does.

Inovação e criatividade nas pequenas e médias empresas

The importance of small and medium enterprises for the economy of a country is fundamental because they have several strategic social and economic roles. Besides contributing to the production of national wealth, they also counterbalance the vulnerabilities of large companies providing the necessary economic balance. Socially their contribution is directly related to the lessening of unemployment, functioning also as source of stability in the community, as a means of reducing inequalities in the distribution of income among regions and economic groups, and contributes, decisively, to limit migration to urbans area. The capacity to innovate is now a key component for the survival and development of small organizations. The future today is increasingly less predictable using past parameters and the business world is more turbulent. The objective of this is to point out the need to revise the models which serve as examples for their adoption of competitive alternatives of development and to offer theoretical-practical knowledge to make possible the implementation of the innovative culture in small enterprises. It emphasizes, moreover, that in the present context, flexibility and skills to work in ambiguous situations and to find creative solutions become central concerns of businessmen and managers.

Racionalidade e pesquisa comportamental no direito: avanço científico ou retórica?

Esse é um trabalho sobre estudos comportamentais que questionam a confiabilidade empírica das premissas de racionalidade das ciências sociais. Décadas de pesquisa comportamental vêm nos ensinando é que a grande maioria das tendências cognitivas identificadas e comprovadas, que se afastam dos pressupostos da Teoria da Escolha Racional não são de forma alguma aleatórias, mas ao invés, são sistemáticas e previsíveis. A ideia unificando esse trabalho é de que a literatura de pesquisa comportamental pode nos permitir modelar e prever comportamentos relevantes para o direito, com pressupostos mais realistas sobre o comportamento humano. No entanto, alguns pesquisadores pintam uma figura entusiástica sobre o potencial que tal pesquisa possui para informar a análise jurídica e, assim, cometem algumas desatenções ao defender generalizações não embasadas por evidências científicas, quase aproximando-se do uso de uma mera retórica. Dado esse cenário, devemos procurar garantir que a incorporação das evidências da pesquisa comportamental no discurso jurídico seja acompanhada de maior ênfase na pesquisa empírica em ambientes específicos. Esse trabalho possui três objetivos. O primeiro é analisar as diferentes concepções de racionalidade e caso elas devem manter sua posição privilegiada nas ciências sociais. O segundo é tentar entender melhor a literatura de pesquisa comportamental que questionam a validade empírica dos axiomas da Teoria da Escolha Racional. O terceiro é identificar problemas na forma pela qual a pesquisa comportamental tem sido incorporada no discurso jurídico.

Os juízes no país da imprevisibilidade? Qualidade e previsibilidade no Brasil

Há um grau de incerteza que é próprio da atividade jurisdicional e não é possível de ser mitigado em razão da própria natureza dos juízos a respeito de normas jurídicas. Decisões judiciais não são e nem podem ser absolutamente previsíveis. Há, contudo, um grau de incerteza que é evitável e o deve ser evitado, por ser prejudicial à saúde de um sistema jurídico. Outros pesquisadores no Brasil trabalharam com esta noção, e foi muito bem sucedida a formulação dos conceitos de incerteza estrutural e incerteza patológica de Joaquim Falcão, Luís Fernando Schuartz e Diego Arguelhes. Contudo, acreditamos que a concepção de incerteza patológica apresentada dos autores precisa de reformulação, especialmente para que pudesse ser verificada a partir de elementos da decisão judicial e não apenas de elementos sociológicos e psicológicos. Propomos uma concepção de incerteza patológica calcada na qualidade da fundamentação das decisões judiciais e concluímos que o cultivo de uma cultura de precedentes é necessária no Brasil para mitigar os efeitos nocivos da incerteza patológica.

A (in)segurança jurídica do contencioso administrativo tributário estadual : estudo de casos sobre a aplicação da súmula nº 166 nas saídas por transferência de mercadorias

DISSERTAÇÃO DE MESTRADO - ESCOLA DE DIREITO DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.