Consejos superiores de la administración, neocorporativismo y participación orgánica

La Constitución Política de 1991 introdujo el concepto de participación como dato fundamental de su estructura. Un estudio ligero permite evidenciar una cantidad de artículos que regulan la materia participativa sin embargo, dichos preceptos se encuentran sin una relación de convexidad precisa. En cuanto al tema de la participación del administrado en la administración pública, como género de la especie que engloba las normas precisas sobre el ejercicio de funciones administrativas por particulares, el problema es de mayor complejidad; ello debido a que el problema participativo supone el estudio de teorías sociológicas que explican el fenómeno desde perspectivas que superan el ámbito normativo de los preceptos que consagran dicho fenómeno. El presente artículo tiene como propósito estudiar desde un punto de vista teórico el problema de la participación como fundamento del ejercicio de funciones administrativas por particulares con el objeto de explicar su fundamento último. Para este efecto, el artículo propone un panorama general de los fundamentos tradicionales del derecho administrativo y su eficacia actual, dentro del marco de una sociedad compleja en permanente conexión con el Estado Social de Derecho. A su vez expone teorías explicativas de la relación mencionada y sus efectos en la producción de normas jurídicas. Por último, expone un estudio de caso para la aplicación de los fundamentos teóricos expuestos en este artículo.

¿Pueden pensar las máquinas? Una evaluación del problema de la inteligencia artificial mediante el equilibrio refractivo

Revisión del problema de la filosofía de la Inteligencia Artificial a la vista del Equilibrio refractivo. La revisión del problema se lleva a cabo para mostrar como "¿pueden pensar las máquinas?" sólo se ha evaluado en los terminos humanos. El equilibrio refractivo se plantea como una herramienta para definir conceptos de tal modo que la experiencia y los preceptos se encuentren en equilibrio, para con él construir una definición de pensar que no esté limitada exclusivamente a "pensar tal y como lo hacen los humanos".

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

We consider two–sided many–to–many matching markets in which each worker may work for multiple firms and each firm may hire multiple workers. We study individual and group manipulations in centralized markets that employ (pairwise) stable mechanisms and that require participants to submit rank order lists of agents on the other side of the market. We are interested in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more general dropping strategies, which are the lists obtained by only removing partners from a preference list (i.e., no reshuffling). We study when truncation / dropping strategies are exhaustive for a group of agents on the same side of the market, i.e., when each match resulting from preference manipulations can be replicated or improved upon by some truncation / dropping strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1). We show that this result cannot be extended neither to group manipulations (even when all quotas equal 1 – Example 1), nor to individual manipulations when the agent’s quota is larger than 1 (even when all other agents’ quotas equal 1 – Example 2). Finally, we prove that for each stable mechanism, dropping strategies are exhaustive for each group of agents on the same side of the market (Theorem 2), i.e., independently of the quotas.

Does Opaqueness Make Equity Capital Expensive for Banks?

Bank managers often claim that equity is expensive, which contradicts the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem. An opaque bank must signal its solvency by paying high and stable dividends in order to keep depositors tranquil. This signalling may require costly liquidations if the return on assets has been poor, but not paying the dividend might trigger a run. A strongly capitalized bank should keep substantial amounts of risk-free yet non-productive currency because the number of shares is high, which is costly. The dividend is informative of the state of the bank; rational depositors react to it.

Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness

Previous research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.

Risk, ambiguity, and diversification

Attitudes toward risk influence the decision to diversify among uncertain options. Yet, because in most situations the options are ambiguous, attitudes toward ambiguity may also play an important role. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the effect of ambiguity on the decision to diversify. I find that diversification is more prevalent and more persistent under ambiguity than under risk. Moreover, excess diversification under ambiguity is driven by participants who stick with a status quo gamble when diversification among gambles is not feasible. This behavioral pattern cannot be accommodated by major theories of choice under ambiguity.