¿Pueden pensar las máquinas? Una evaluación del problema de la inteligencia artificial mediante el equilibrio refractivo


Autoria(s): Uribe Cerdas, Orlando Enrique
Contribuinte(s)

Patarroyo G, Carlos G

Data(s)

14/12/2012

Resumo

Revisión del problema de la filosofía de la Inteligencia Artificial a la vista del Equilibrio refractivo. La revisión del problema se lleva a cabo para mostrar como "¿pueden pensar las máquinas?" sólo se ha evaluado en los terminos humanos. El equilibrio refractivo se plantea como una herramienta para definir conceptos de tal modo que la experiencia y los preceptos se encuentren en equilibrio, para con él construir una definición de pensar que no esté limitada exclusivamente a "pensar tal y como lo hacen los humanos".

On this paper I will present a way to understand “thought”, that is to build a definition of it, that could be applied to other minds. The case of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is going to be my main example, but the criterion that I am proposing is broad enough to include any other kind of objects or beings, with criterion that goes beyond our first-person experience. For this, I will first show how when studying AI the main arguments given for and against their ability to “think” is not an exploration of their capabilities but rather a mere contrast with the human experience of thinking. After this I will show how the reflective equilibrium could be presented as a tool to define “thinking” in a way that would enable us to judge the ability to think of any object from a wider perspective. Finally, I’ll posit that when we consider the possibility of other minds it would be more meaningful to ask “How do machines think?” rather than “Can machines think?”

Formato

application/pdf

Identificador

http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/4158

Idioma(s)

spa

Publicador

Escuela de Ciencias Humanas

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

Fonte

instname:Universidad del Rosario

reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR

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TF 0002 2012

Palavras-Chave #FILOSOFÍA DE LA CIENCIA #INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL - FILOSOFÍA #TEORÍA DEL CONOCIMIENTO #Artificial Intelligence #Philosophy of Mind #Reflective Equilibrium #Pther minds
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis

info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion