Population Ethics, Social Choice Theory, and Two problems in the Measurement of Economic Poverty

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Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice

Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans’ theory of impatience into Arrow’s social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove that the negative implications of their stationarity axiom are more far-reaching: there is no Arrow social welfare function satisfying their stationarity axiom. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom, and show that an Arrow social welfare function satisfies this modified version if and only if it is a lexicographic dictatorship where the generations are taken into consideration in chronological order.

Extensive Social Choice and the Measurement of Group Fitness in Biological Hierarchies

Extensive social choice theory is used to study the problem of measuring group fitness in a two-level biological hierarchy. Both fixed and variable group size are considered. Axioms are identified that imply that the group measure satisfies a form of consequentialism in which group fitness only depends on the viabilities and fecundities of the individuals at the lower level in the hierarchy. This kind of consequentialism can take account of the group fitness advantages of germ-soma specialization, which is not possible with an alternative social choice framework proposed by Okasha, but which is an essential feature of the index of group fitness for a multicellular organism introduced by Michod, Viossat, Solari, Hurand, and Nedelcu to analyze the unicellular-multicellular evolutionary transition. The new framework is also used to analyze the fitness decoupling between levels that takes place during an evolutionary transition.

Multi-Profile Intertemporal Social Choice

We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described by their corresponding collections of decisive coalitions. We review contributions that explore whether this possibility in the infinite-population context allows for a richer class of social welfare functions in an intergenerational model. Different notions of stationarity formulated for individual and for social preferences are examined. Journal of Economic Literature Classification No.: D71.

Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems.

Self-Selective Social Choice Functions

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situation voters’ preferences on alternatives induce preferences over the voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself when it is also used in choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we in troduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes weaker and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.

Anonymous Single-Profile Welfarism

This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative definition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.

Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being

This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provides an introduction to social-choice theory with interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We argue that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s theorem is to use a richer informational environment than ordinal measurability and the absence of interpersonal comparability of well-being. We discuss welfarist social evaluation (which requires that the levels of individual well-being in two alternatives are the only determinants of their social ranking) and present characterizations of some important social-evaluation orderings.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

Ordered Model Processes, Reference Declaration And The Economic Organization: Implications For A Balanced Scorecard Contextual Framework

Les Tableaux de Bord de la Performance ont été acclamés avec raison depuis leur introduction en 1992, mais les intellectuels continuent encore à étudier leurs aspects pragmatiques. Ce papier contribue à la littérature sur les Tableaux de Bord de la Performance, tout d’abord, en offrant une explication logique quant à leur succès et ensuite, en présentant un cadre de travail contextuel de tableaux de bord de la performance pour une structure de gestion hiérarchisée. Le cadre de travail contextuel réforme la perspective d’apprentissage et de croissance du tableau de bord de la performance (i) en effectuant la transition de référence (subjective/objective), et (ii) en reconnaissant que la Perspective d’Apprentissage et de Croissance implique avant tout une incidence de formulation stratégique d’une extra-entité. Le transfert de l’incidence (intra-entité/extra-entité) réconcilie l’évolution de la position de politique de gestion non ordonnée [Contenu: (Contenu: Contexte): Contexte] qu’est la Perspective d’Apprentissage et de Croissance Concomitante. Le cadre de travail supplante également les Perspectives des Tableaux de Bord de la Performances développés par Kaplan et Norton en ajoutant la perspective de politique sociale qui manquait. La perspective manquante implique une transition de référence objective [(position endogène, perspective exogène): (position exogène, perspective exogène)]. De tels signaux de transition [Contenu: (Contenu: Contexte): Contexte] ordonnent l’évolution de la position de politique de gestion.

Ordered Conflict Resolution

Ordered conflict resolution: understanding her tenets cost Keynes his life and Arrow to live under extortionate threat. Now that the Supreme Court of the United States has conquered the Informal Capital Market Cartel’s stranglehold on academic freedom, the literature can now vindicate impossibility- resolved social choice theory in the venue of a marriage between ethics and economics; as Sen has pled need be the case. This paper introduces ordered conflict resolution and her two impossibility-resolving axioms in effecting (individual: societal) well-being transitivity.

Ordered Conflict Resolution

Ordered conflict resolution: understanding her tenets cost Keynes his life and Arrow to live under extortionate threat. Now that the Supreme Court of the United States has conquered the Informal Capital Market Cartel’s stranglehold on academic freedom, the literature can now vindicate impossibility- resolved social choice theory in the venue of a marriage between ethics and economics; as Sen has pled need be the case. This paper introduces ordered conflict resolution and her two impossibility-resolving axioms in effecting (individual: societal) well-being transitivity.

An axiomatic characterization of the MVSHN group fitness ordering

In order to analyze a unicellular-multicellular evolutionary transition, a multicellular organism is identified with the vector of viabilities and fecundities of its constituent cells. The Michod–Viossat–Solari–Hurand–Nedelcu index of group fitness for a multicellular organism is a function of these cell viabilities and fecundities. The MVSHN index has been used to analyze the germ-soma specialization and the fitness decoupling between the cell and organism levels that takes place during the transition to multicellularity. In this article, social choice theory is used to provide an axiomatic characterization of the group fitness ordering of vectors of cell viabilities and fecundities underlying the MVSHN index.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.