Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice
Data(s) |
07/08/2008
07/08/2008
01/06/2008
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Resumo |
Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans’ theory of impatience into Arrow’s social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove that the negative implications of their stationarity axiom are more far-reaching: there is no Arrow social welfare function satisfying their stationarity axiom. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom, and show that an Arrow social welfare function satisfies this modified version if and only if it is a lexicographic dictatorship where the generations are taken into consideration in chronological order. |
Formato |
215133 bytes application/pdf |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
en |
Publicador |
Université de Montréal, Département de sciences économiques |
Relação |
Cahier de recherche #2008-08 |
Palavras-Chave | #Multi-Profile Social Choice #Infinite-Horizon Intergenerational Choice #Lexicographic Dictatorships #D71 |
Tipo |
Article |