Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Industrial Adjustment: Context, Causes, Impacts and Methods for Analysis

Adjustement is an ongoing process by which factors of reallocated to equalize their returns in different uses. Adjustment occurs though market mechanisms or intrafirm reallocation of resources as a result of changes in terms of trade, government policies, resource availability, technological change, etc. These changes alter production opportunities and production, transaction and information costs, and consequently modify production functions, organizational design, etc. In this paper we define adjustment (section 2); review empirical estimates of the extent of adjustment in Canada and abroad (section 3); review selected features of the trade policy and adjustment context of relevance for policy formulation among which: slow growth, a shift to services, a shift to the Pacific Rim, the internationalization of production, investment distribution communications the growing use of NTB's, changes in foreign direct investment patterns, intrafirm and intraindustry trade, interregional trade flows, differences in micro economic adjustment processes of adjustment as between subsidiaries and Canadian companies (section 4); examine methodologies and results of studies of the impact of trade liberalization on jobs (section 5); and review the R. Harris general equilibrium model (section 6). Our conclusion emphasizes the importance of harmonizing commercial and domestic policies dealing with adjustment (section 7). We close with a bibliography of relevant publications.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Patents, the Healthcare System and Benefit-Sharing

Lorraine Sheremeta, Research Associate, Health Law Institute, University of Alberta

Le transfert informel des connaissances tacites chez les gestionnaires municipaux en situation de coordination

Ce rapport de recherche porte sur une étude s’intéressant au transfert des connaissances tacites chez les gestionnaires, c’est-à-dire le partage de ces connaissances et leur utilisation informelle, durant une situation de coordination dans un service municipal. La thèse est articulée autour des questions suivantes : Quelles sont les situations de coordination vécues par les gestionnaires municipaux? Quelles sont les sources de connaissances tacites partagées et utilisées? Quelles sont les relations de connaissances mobilisées de façon informelle lors du transfert des connaissances tacites? Quels sont les facteurs encourageant ou inhibant le transfert informel des connaissances tacites? À partir d’un modèle basé sur une approche situationnelle (Taylor, 1989 et 1991), nous avons revu la documentation touchant nos questions de recherche. Nous avons défini notamment la récursivité des connaissances et le réseau de connaissances, de même que présenté le modèle de la conversion des connaissances (Nonaka, 1994) et celui de l’actualisation de soi (St-Arnaud, 1996). Nous avons questionné 22 répondants à l’aide d’instruments de mesure qui combinent les techniques de l’incident critique, de l’entrevue cognitive et réflexive, le questionnement sur les réseaux organisationnels et l’observation participante. Tels des filets, ces instruments ont permis de traquer et d’obtenir des données d’une grande richesse sur les connaissances tacites et les comportements informels durant le transfert de connaissances en situation de coordination. Ces données ont été analysées selon une approche méthodologique essentiellement qualitative combinant l’analyse de contenu, la schématisation heuristique et l’analyse des réseaux sociaux. Nos résultats montrent que la complexité d’une situation de coordination conditionne le choix des mécanismes de coordination. De plus, les sources de connaissances sont, du point de vue individuel, le gestionnaire et ses artefacts, de même que son réseau personnel avec ses propres artefacts. Du point de vue collectif, ces sources sont réifiées dans le réseau de connaissances. Les connaissances clés d’une situation de coordination sont celles sur le réseau organisationnel, le contexte, les expériences en gestion et en situation complexe de coordination, la capacité de communiquer, de négocier, d’innover et celle d’attirer l’attention. Individuellement, les gestionnaires privilégient l’actualisation de soi, l’autoformation et la formation contextualisée et, collectivement, la coprésence dans l’action, le réseautage et l’accompagnement. Cette étude fournit un modèle valide du transfert contextualisé des connaissances qui est un cas de coordination complexe d’activités en gestion des connaissances. Ce transfert est concomitant à d’autres situations de coordination. La nature tacite des connaissances prévaut, de même que le mode informel, les médias personnels et les mécanismes d’ajustement mutuel. Les connaissances tacites sont principalement transférées au début des processus de gestion de projet et continuellement durant la rétroaction et le suivi des résultats. Quant aux connaissances explicites, les gestionnaires les utilisent principalement comme un symbole à la fin des processus de gestion de projet. Parmi les personnes et les groupes de personnes d’une situation de transfert contextualisé des connaissances, 10 % jouent des rôles clés, soit ceux d’experts et d’intermédiaires de personnes et d’artefacts. Les personnes en périphérie possèdent un potentiel de structuration, c’est-à-dire de connexité, pour assurer la continuité du réseau de connaissances organisationnel. Notre étude a élargi le modèle général de la complexité d’une situation (Bystrom, 1999; Choo, 2006; Taylor, 1986 et 1991), la théorie de la coordination (Malone et Crowston, 1994), le modèle de la conversion des connaissances (Nonaka, 1994), celui de l’actualisation de soi (St-Arnaud, 1996) et la théorie des réseaux de connaissances (Monge et Contractor, 2003). Notre modèle réaffirme la concomitance de ces modèles généraux selon une approche constructiviste (Giddens, 1987) où la dualité du structurel et la compétence des acteurs sont confirmées et enrichies.