Qui est ‘je’? Autour de quelques stratégies vidéoludiques de design de personnage pour gérer l’actantialité ludo-narrative du joueur et son immersion fictionnelle

De plus en plus, le jeu vidéo se présente et se vit en termes de récit, ce qui n’est pas sans causer de nombreux maux de tête aux concepteurs de jeux comme aux théoriciens. Cet article s’intéresse au rôle central joué par le personnage dans la réconciliation de la narrativité et de l’interactivité à travers une étude théorique et critique de quelques stratégies employées par les concepteurs pour réaliser une fusion identitaire du joueur avec le personnage. Il y est question de deux postures d’immersion fictionnelle identifiées par Jean-Marie Schaeffer : l’identification allosubjective et la virtualisation identitaire. Ces postures sont liées à des processus de design de personnage : l’approche avatorielle, centrée sur le concept d’avatar et qui tente d’aplanir les différences intersubjectives, et l’approche actorielle, qui au contraire vise à les accroître en faisant du personnage un acteur autonome plutôt qu’un avatar. Ces deux pratiques ne sont pas mutuellement exclusives; au contraire, il est démontré que pour réaliser l’immersion fictionnelle, la plupart des jeux tentent de conserver une trace du joueur dans l’avatar, et une trace du personnage dans l’acteur. Des marqueurs d’allosubjectivité et de subjectivisation sont identifiés par l’analyse des jeux Metroid Prime, Duke Nukem 3D, Gears of War et Shadowrun. Enfin, l’article étudie également les rapports entre le ludique et le narratif selon le rôle actantiel du joueur et du personnage, écorchant au passage la convention du « héros muet » (silent protagonist) souvent rencontrée dans le jeu vidéo mais ultimement improductive.

Repenser l’histoire de la jouabilité : l’émergence du jeu de stratégie en temps réel

L’objectif de cette thèse est de réfléchir aux enjeux d’une histoire du jeu de stratégie en temps réel (STR). Il s’agit de mieux comprendre les contextes dans lesquels le genre prend sens pour historiciser son émergence et sa période classique. Cette thèse cherche à documenter, d’une part, la cristallisation du STR en tant qu’objet ayant une forme relativement stable et en tant que corpus précis et identifié et, d’autre part, l’émergence des formes de jouabilité classiques des STR. La première partie est consacrée à décrire l’objet de cette recherche, pour mieux comprendre la complexité du terme « stratégie » et de la catégorisation « jeu de stratégie ». La seconde partie met en place la réflexion épistémologique en montrant comment on peut tenir compte de la jouabilité dans un travail historien. Elle définit le concept de paradigme de jouabilité en tant que formation discursive pour regrouper différents énoncés actionnels en une unité logique qui n’est pas nécessairement l’équivalent du genre. La troisième partie cartographie l’émergence du genre entre les wargames des années 1970 et les jeux en multijoueur de la décennie suivante. Deux paradigmes de jouabilité se distinguent pour former le STR classique : le paradigme de décryptage et le paradigme de prévision. La quatrième partie explique et contextualise le STR classique en montrant qu’il comporte ces deux paradigmes de jouabilité dans deux modes de jeu qui offrent des expériences fondamentalement différentes l’une de l’autre.

Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? a Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence

This paper tests the predictions of the Barro-Gordon model using US data on inflation and unemployment. To that end, it constructs a general game-theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model and a version of Cukierman’s model as special cases. Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of Cukierman’s model is not. Reduced-form estimates are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Aumann-Shapley Pricing : A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1,...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1,...,xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1,...,pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is regarded as a distinct player. The Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method assigns the cost share pixi to agent i. When goods come in indivisible units, we show that this method is characterized by the two standard axioms of Additivity and Dummy, and the property of No Merging or Splitting: agents never find it profitable to split or merge their demands.

The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior

We introduce a procedure to infer the repeated-game strategies that generate actions in experimental choice data. We apply the technique to set of experiments where human subjects play a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The technique suggests that two types of strategies underly the data.

Nearly Serial Sharing Methods

A group of agents participate in a cooperative enterprise producing a single good. Each participant contributes a particular type of input; output is nondecreasing in these contributions. How should it be shared? We analyze the implications of the axiom of Group Monotonicity: if a group of agents simultaneously decrease their input contributions, not all of them should receive a higher share of output. We show that in combination with other more familiar axioms, this condition pins down a very small class of methods, which we dub nearly serial.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.