Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

Cognition in Seemingly Riskless Choices and Judgments.

We instillate rational cognition and learning in seemingly riskless choices and judgments. Preferences and possibilities are given in a stochastic sense and based on revisable expectations. the theory predicts experimental preference reversals and passes a sharp econometric test of the status quo bias drawn from a field study.

Arbitrage-Based Pricing when Volatility is Stochastic.

The paper investigates the pricing of derivative securities with calendar-time maturities.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Comment s'accorder sur les normes ? Le droit et la Gouvernance face à Internet

Un résumé en anglais est également disponible.

Analyse des enjeux éthiques attribuables au don d’organes après décès cardiocirculatoire selon l’approche bioéthique par principes

Travail dirigé présenté à la Faculté des sciences infirmières en vue de l'obtention du grade de M. Sc. en Sciences Infirmières option infirmière clinicienne

L'exécution des décisions de la Cour internationale de Justice : faiblesses et malentendus

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit international (LL.M)"

Le hardship : vers une reconnaissance du principe par les tribunaux arbitraux du commerce international

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise, option droit des affaires (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

Intégration scolaire des élèves handicapés par une déficience intellectuelle et droit à l'égalité

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)"

La demi-vie des jugements

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit option Droit des technologies de l'information"

Le paradoxe de la politique canadienne visant l'impunité des criminels de guerre

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (L.L.M.)"

Un contrat pédagogique : l'entente sur mesures volontaires dans l'application de la Loi sur la protection de la jeunesse

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en droit (LL.D.)"