Capital Income Taxation, Depletion, Allowances and Non-Renewable Resource Extraction

Dans Cet Article, Nous Etudions les Distorsions Que Cause L'impot Sur le Revenu des Societes Dans le Profil de Production des Firmes Extractives et Dans L'allocation des Ressources Entre les Secteurs D'extraction et les Autres Secteurs Soumis a L'impot Sur les Societes. Nous Etudions En Particulier L'allocation D'epuisement, Dont Nous Montrons Qu'elle Peut Trouver Sa Justification, Non Pas a Assurer la Neutralite de L'impot, Mais En Permettant L'etablissement de Taux Effectifs D'imposition Identiques Dans les Secteurs D'extraction et Dans les Autres Secteurs.

Industrial Adjustment: Context, Causes, Impacts and Methods for Analysis

Adjustement is an ongoing process by which factors of reallocated to equalize their returns in different uses. Adjustment occurs though market mechanisms or intrafirm reallocation of resources as a result of changes in terms of trade, government policies, resource availability, technological change, etc. These changes alter production opportunities and production, transaction and information costs, and consequently modify production functions, organizational design, etc. In this paper we define adjustment (section 2); review empirical estimates of the extent of adjustment in Canada and abroad (section 3); review selected features of the trade policy and adjustment context of relevance for policy formulation among which: slow growth, a shift to services, a shift to the Pacific Rim, the internationalization of production, investment distribution communications the growing use of NTB's, changes in foreign direct investment patterns, intrafirm and intraindustry trade, interregional trade flows, differences in micro economic adjustment processes of adjustment as between subsidiaries and Canadian companies (section 4); examine methodologies and results of studies of the impact of trade liberalization on jobs (section 5); and review the R. Harris general equilibrium model (section 6). Our conclusion emphasizes the importance of harmonizing commercial and domestic policies dealing with adjustment (section 7). We close with a bibliography of relevant publications.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On Limits to the Use of Linear Markov Strategies in Common Property Natural Resource Games

We derive conditions that must be satisfied by the primitives of the problem in order for an equilibrium in linear Markov strategies to exist in some common property natural resource differential games. These conditions impose restrictions on the admissible form of the natural growth function, given a benefit function, or on the admissible form of the benefit function, given a natural growth function.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

On the Profitability of Production Constraints in a Dynamic Natural Resource Oligopoly

Static oligopoly analysis predicts that if a single firm in Cournot equilibrium were to be constrained to contract its production marginally, its profits would fall. on the other hand, if all the firms were simultaneously constrained to reduce their productino, thus moving the industry towards monopoly output, each firm's profit would rise. We show that these very intuitive results may not hold in a dynamic oligopoly.