IN DUBIO PRO NATURA? A Philosophical Analysis of the Precautionary Principle in Environmental and Health Risk Governance

In this book, I apply a philosophical approach to study the precautionary principle in environmental (and health) risk decision-making. The principle says that unacceptable environmental and health risks should be anticipated, and they ought to be forestalled before the damage comes to fruition even if scientific understanding of the risks is inadequate. The study consists of introductory chapters, summary and seven original publications which aim at explicating the principle, critically analysing the debate on the principle, and constructing a basis for the well-founded use of the principle. Papers I-V present the main thesis of this research. In the two last papers, the discussion is widened to new directions. The starting question is how well the currently embraced precautionary principle stands up to critical philosophical scrutiny. The approach employed is analytical: mainly conceptual, argumentative and ethical. The study draws upon Anglo-American style philosophy on the one hand, and upon sources of law as well as concrete cases and decision-making practices at the European Union level and in its member countries on the other. The framework is environmental (and health) risk governance, including the related law and policy. The main thesis of this study is that the debate on the precautionary principle needs to be shifted from the question of whether the principle (or its weak or strong interpretation) is well-grounded in general to questions about the theoretical plausibility and ethical and socio-political justifiability of specific understandings of the principle. The real picture of the precautionary principle is more complex than that found (i.e. presumed) in much of the current academic, political and public debate surrounding it. While certain presumptions and interpretations of the principle are found to be sound, others are theoretically flawed or include serious practical problems. The analysis discloses conceptual and ethical presumptions and elementary understandings of the precautionary principle, critically assesses current practices invoked in the name of the precautionary principle and public participation, and seeks to build bridges between precaution, engagement and philosophical ethics. Hence, it is intended to provide a sound basis upon which subsequent academic scrutiny can build.

The grammar of psychosis

This thesis is concerned with the philosophical grammar of certain psychiatric concepts, which play a central role in delineating the field of psychiatric work. The concepts studied are ‘psychosis’, ‘delusion’, ‘person’, ‘understanding’ and ‘incomprehensibility’. The purpose of this conceptual analysis is to provide a more perspicuous view of the logic of these concepts, how psychiatric work is constituted in relation to them, and what this tells us about the relationships between the conceptual and the empirical in psychiatric concepts. The method used in the thesis is indebted primarily to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy, where we are urged to look at language uses in relation to practices in order to obtain a clearer overview of practices of interest; this will enable us to resolve the conceptual problems related to these practices. This questioning takes as its starting point the concept of psychosis, a central psychiatric concept during the twentieth century. The conceptual analysis of ‘psychosis’ shows that the concept is logically dependent on the concepts of ‘understanding’ and ‘person’. Following the lead found in this analysis, the logic of person-concepts in psychiatric discourse is analysed by a detailed textual analysis of a psychiatric journal article. The main finding is the ambiguous uses of ‘person’, enabling a specifically psychiatric form of concern in human affairs. The grammar of ‘understanding’ is then tackled from the opposite end, by exploring the logic of the concept of ‘incomprehensibility’. First, by studying the DSM-IV definition of delusion it is shown that its ambiguities boil down to the question of whether psychiatric practice is better accounted for in terms of the grammar of ‘incorrectness’ or ‘incomprehensibility’. Second, the grammar of ‘incomprehensibility’ is further focused on by introducing the distinction between positive and negative conceptions of ‘incomprehensibility’. The main finding is that this distinction has wide-ranging implications for our understanding of psychiatric concepts. Finally, some of the findings gained in these studies are ‘put into practice’ in studying the more practical question of the conceptual and ethical problems associated with the concept of ‘prodromal symptom of schizophrenia’ and the agenda of early detection and intervention in schizophrenia more generally.

Concepts and Reference. Defending a Dual Theory of Natural Kind Concepts

In this thesis I argue that the psychological study of concepts and categorisation, and the philosophical study of reference are deeply intertwined. I propose that semantic intuitions are a variety of categorisation judgements, determined by concepts, and that because of this, concepts determine reference. I defend a dual theory of natural kind concepts, according to which natural kind concepts have distinct semantic cores and non-semantic identification procedures. Drawing on psychological essentialism, I suggest that the cores consist of externalistic placeholder essence beliefs. The identification procedures, in turn, consist of prototypes, sets of exemplars, or possibly also theory-structured beliefs. I argue that the dual theory is motivated both by experimental data and theoretical considerations. The thesis consists of three interrelated articles. Article I examines philosophical causal and description theories of natural kind term reference, and argues that they involve, or need to involve, certain psychological elements. I propose a unified theory of natural kind term reference, built on the psychology of concepts. Article II presents two semantic adaptations of psychological essentialism, one of which is a strict externalistic Kripkean-Putnamian theory, while the other is a hybrid account, according to which natural kind terms are ambiguous between internalistic and externalistic senses. We present two experiments, the results of which support the strict externalistic theory. Article III examines Fodor’s influential atomistic theory of concepts, according to which no psychological capacities associated with concepts constitute them, or are necessary for reference. I argue, contra Fodor, that the psychological mechanisms are necessary for reference.

The Rejection of Prioritarianism

Since the late 1990’s, a group of moral doctrines called prioritarianism has received a lot of interest from many moral philosophers. Many contemporary moral philosophers are attracted to prioritarianism to such an extent that they can be called prioritarians. In this book, however, I reject prioritarianism, including not only “pure” prioritarianism but also hybrid prioritarian views which mix one or more non-prioritarian elements with prioritarianism. This book largely revolves around certain problems and complications of prioritarianism and its particular forms. Those problems and complications are connected to risk, impartiality, the arbitrariness of prioritarian weightings and possible future individuals. On the one hand, I challenge prioritarianism through targeted objections to various specific forms of prioritarianism. All those targeted objections are connected to risk or possible future individuals. It seems to me that together they give good grounds for believing that prioritarianism is not the way to go. On the other hand, I challenge prioritarianism by pointing out and discussing certain general problems of prioritarianism. Those general problems are connected to impartiality and the arbitrariness of prioritarian weightings. They may give additional grounds for believing that all prioritarian views should be rejected. Prioritarianism can be seen as a type of weighted utilitarianism and thus as an extension of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is morally ultimately concerned, and morally ultimately concerned only, with some kind of maximization of utility or expected utility. Prioritarianism, on the other hand, is morally ultimately concerned, and morally ultimately concerned only, with some kind of maximization of priority-weighted utility, expected priority-weighted utility or priority-weighted expected utility. Thus prioritarianism, unlike utilitarianism, is a distribution-sensitive moral view. Besides rejecting prioritarianism, I reject also various other distribution-sensitive moral views in this book. However, I do not reject distribution-sensitivity in morality, as I end up endorsing a type of distribution-sensitive hybrid utilitarianism which mixes non-utilitarian elements with utilitarianism.

The Concept of Betterness and Sport Competitions

It is common that people disagree on a question which athlete or team was the best in a particular sport competition. This thesis attempts to clarify these disputes by analysing the concept of betterness in the context of sport competitions. Betterness can be interpersonal, intrapersonal or a combination of the two. I focus on interpersonal betterness, that is, on superiority. For example, interpersonal betterness may be contested in a football match between the national teams of Germany and Argentina. My aim is to provide a philosophical account of interpersonal betterness. The account has two functions: descriptive and normative. It describes the shapes and forms in which superiority is instantiated in sport competitions. It also provides a consistent and accurate way to discuss superiority. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first part, I introduce, elaborate and illustrate my account, which in turn consists of three elements: (1) relations of superiority, (2) standards for the relations of superiority and (3) types of competition. I also discuss my account’s relevance to issues of sport ethics through the example of gender equity and women’s ski jumping. I conclude that this account will not end the disputes over which team or athlete was better in a particular competition. Instead, it provides tools for a more consistent discussion of the disputed issues. The second part of the thesis includes five reprinted original articles. The account presented in the first part is based on these publications.

The Nature of Object of Perception and Its Role in the Knowledge Concerning the External World

Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, shapes, sounds, touches, tastes and smells. According to the appearance/reality distinction, the world of perception is the apparent realm, not the real external world. However, the distinction does not necessarily refute the existence of the external world. We have a causal connection with the external world via mind-internal particulars, and therefore we have indirect knowledge about the external world through perceptual experience. The research especially concerns the reasons for George Berkeley’s claim that material things are mind-dependent ideas that really are perceived. The necessity of a perceiver’s own qualities for perceptual experience, such as mind, consciousness, and the brain, supports the causal theory of perception. Finally, it is asked why mind-internal entities are present when perceiving an object. Perception would not directly discern material objects without the presupposition of extra entities located between a perceiver and the external world. Nevertheless, the results show that perception is not sufficient to know what a perceptual object is, and that the existence of appearances is necessary to know that the external world is being perceived. However, the impossibility of matter does not follow from Berkeley’s theory. The main result of the research is that singular knowledge claims about the external world never refer directly and immediately to the objects of the external world. A perceiver’s own qualities affect how perceptual objects appear in a perceptual situation.

Climate Change and Ethics of Geoengineering -- Implications Of Climate Emergency Ethics

Global climate change and intentional climate modification, i.e. geoengineering include various ethical problems which are entangled as a complex ensemble of questions regarding the future of the biosphere. The possibilities of catastrophic effects of climate change which are also called “climate emergency” have led to the emergence of the idea of modifying the atmospheric conditions in the form of geoengineering. The novel issue of weather ethics is a subdivision of climate ethics, and it is interested in ethical and political questions surrounding weather and climate control and modification in a restricted spatio-temporal scale. The objective of geoengineering is to counterbalance the adverse effects of climate change and its diverse corollaries in various ways on a large scale. The claim of this dissertation is that there are ethical justifications to claim that currently large-scale interventions to the climate system are ethically questionable. The justification to pursue geoengineering on the basis of considering its pros and cons, is inadequate. Moral judgement can still be elaborated in cases where decisions have to be made urgently and the selection of desirable choices is severely limited. The changes needed to avoid severe negative impacts of climate change requires commitment to mitigation as well as social changes because technical solutions cannot address the issue of climate change altogether. The quantitative emphasis of consumerism should shift to qualitative focus on the aspiration for simplicity in order to a move towards the objective of the continuation of the existence of humankind and a flourishing, vital biosphere.

Political Legitimacy and Ethnocultural Justice. Essays on Public Reason, Democratic Citizenship, and the Rights of Cultural Minorities

In this thesis, I argue that there are public cultural reasons that can underpin public justifications of minority rights of indigenous and national minorities in a constitutionaldemocracy. I do so by tackling diverse issues facing a liberal theory of multiculturalism. In the first essay, I criticize Will Kymlicka’s comprehensive liberal theory of minority rights and propose a political liberal alternative. The main problem of Will Kymlicka’s theory is that it builds on the contestable liberal value of individual autonomy and thus fails to take diversity seriously. In the second essay, I elaborate on the Rawlsian political liberalism assumed here by criticizing Chandran Kukathas’s version of political liberalism as overly accommodating to diversity. In the third essay, I discuss questions of method that arise for a political liberal approach to the moral-political foundations of multiculturalism, and propose a certain understanding of the political liberal enterprise and its crucial standard of reasonableness. In the fourth essay, I dwell on the political liberal ethic of citizenship and propose a strongly inclusionist interpretation of the duty of civility. In the fifth and last essay, I introduce a certain understanding of ethnocultural justice and propose a view on certain cultural reasons as public cultural reasons. Cultural reasons are public when they are based on necessarily established cultural marks of a democratic polity, as specified by the cultural establishment view; and when they are crucial for the societal cultural bases of self-respect of citizens. The arguments in this thesis support, and help to spell out, moral-political rights of indigenous and national minorities as formulated in international legal documents, such as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations 2007) or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 1966).

Animal Experience in Kant’s Philosophy

The role of animals in the philosophy of mind is primarily to help understand the human mind by serving as practical examples of cognition that differs from ours either in kind or in degree. Kant regarded animals as beings that only have the faculty of sensibility. By examining what Kant writes about animal experience we gain knowledge concerning the role of sensibility in experience, free from the influence of understanding and reason. I look at Kant’s view of animals in the historical context of alternative views presented by Descartes’ and Hume’s views. Kant’s view can be seen as a counterargument against Descartes’ doctrine of animal machines according to which animals do not have minds and they do not think. I suggest that while it can be argued that some kind of elementary experience could be possible in the physiological level, this only makes sense when it is possible to become conscious of the unconscious sensation, and this requires a mind. A further option is to claim that there is only a difference in degree between human and animal cognitive capacities. This is Hume’s view. I argue that even though Kant’s and Hume’s view on the cognitive capacities of animals seems to depart from each other to a considerable extent, the differences between them diminish when the focus is on the experience these capacities enable. I also briefly discuss the relation of the metaphysics of animal minds to animal ethics.

Anarkistin viimeistä viimeisin sana

Kirjallisuusarvostelu