Local and global consistency properties for student placement

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based on a fixed population of agents and fixed resources -- we refer to this condition as local consistency and to his condition on the priority structure as local acyclicity. We identify a related but stronger necessary and sufficient condition (unit acyclicity) on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a more standard global consistency property. Next, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy converse consistency principles. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition (local shift-freeness) on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies local converse consistency. Interestingly, local acyclicity implies local shift-freeness and hence the student-optimal stable mechanism more frequently satisfies local converse consistency than local consistency. Finally, in order for the student-optimal stable mechanism to be globally conversely consistent, one again has to impose unit acyclicity on the priority structure. Hence, unit acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy global consistency or global converse consistency.

Consistency and optimality

Assume that the problem Qo is not solvable in polynomial time. For theories T containing a sufficiently rich part of true arithmetic we characterize T U {ConT} as the minimal extension of T proving for some algorithm that it decides Qo as fast as any algorithm B with the property that T proves that B decides Qo. Here, ConT claims the consistency of T. Moreover, we characterize problems with an optimal algorithm in terms of arithmetical theories.

Robust fault detection using consistency techniques for uncertainty handling

Often practical performance of analytical redundancy for fault detection and diagnosis is decreased by uncertainties prevailing not only in the system model, but also in the measurements. In this paper, the problem of fault detection is stated as a constraint satisfaction problem over continuous domains with a big number of variables and constraints. This problem can be solved using modal interval analysis and consistency techniques. Consistency techniques are then shown to be particularly efficient to check the consistency of the analytical redundancy relations (ARRs), dealing with uncertain measurements and parameters. Through the work presented in this paper, it can be observed that consistency techniques can be used to increase the performance of a robust fault detection tool, which is based on interval arithmetic. The proposed method is illustrated using a nonlinear dynamic model of a hydraulic system

Consistency and the Walrasian allocations correspondence

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence, in classesof exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present three characterizationresults; all of which require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. Two characterizations hold also on domains with a finite number ofpotential agents, one of them requires envy freeness (with respect to trades) and the other--core selection; a third characterization, that requires coreselection, applies only to a variable number of agents domain, but is validalso when the domain includes only a small variety of preferences.

A consistency test of the time trade-off

This paper tests the internal consistency of time trade-off utilities.We find significant violations of consistency in the direction predictedby loss aversion. The violations disappear for higher gauge durations.We show that loss aversion can also explain that for short gaugedurations time trade-off utilities exceed standard gamble utilities. Ourresults suggest that time trade-off measurements that use relativelyshort gauge durations, like the widely used EuroQol algorithm(Dolan 1997), are affected by loss aversion and lead to utilities thatare too high.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Stability and consistency of coping in adolescence: A longitudinal study

This study analyzed stability and consistency of coping among adolescents. The objectives were twofold: a) to analyze temporal stability and cross-situational consistency of coping responses after a 17- month interval, taking into account gender, age and type of stressor. b) To analyze the relative weight of contextual versus dispositional factors in predicting future coping. A cohort of 341 adolescents (51% girls and 49% boys aged between 12 and 16) were assessed twice by means of the Coping Responses Inventory - Youth. The results indicated that the coping responses were quite stable over time at the group level, but with important within-subject differences. Girls showed slightly more stability than boys. Among the girls, Avoidance coping showed as much stability as consistency and Approach coping showed more stability than consistency. Among the boys, Avoidance coping showed more stability than consistency, and Approach coping showed both low stability and low consistency. Among the boys, the coping used at Time 1 barely predicted that used at Time 2; in contrast, among the girls, the type of coping used in the past, especially Avoidance coping, predicted the coping that would be used in the future.

Testing reciprocity in social interactions: A comparison between the Directional consistency and Skew symmetry statistics

In the present work we focus on two indices that quantify directionality and skew-symmetrical patterns in social interactions as measures of social reciprocity: the Directional consistency (DC) and Skew symmetry indices. Although both indices enable researchers to describe social groups, most studies require statistical inferential tests. The main aims of the present study are: firstly, to propose an overall statistical technique for testing null hypotheses regarding social reciprocity in behavioral studies, using the DC and Skew symmetry statistics (Φ) at group level; and secondly, to compare both statistics in order to allow researchers to choose the optimal measure depending on the conditions. In order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions, statistical significance for both statistics has been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, this study will enable researchers to choose the optimal observational conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical tests has been estimated.

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core, but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains. Keywords: Multi-sided assignment market, Consistency, Core, Nucleolus. JEL Classification: C71, C78

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.