Consistency and the Walrasian allocations correspondence
Contribuinte(s) |
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
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Data(s) |
11/07/2013
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Resumo |
We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence, in classesof exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present three characterizationresults; all of which require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. Two characterizations hold also on domains with a finite number ofpotential agents, one of them requires envy freeness (with respect to trades) and the other--core selection; a third characterization, that requires coreselection, applies only to a variable number of agents domain, but is validalso when the domain includes only a small variety of preferences. |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Direitos |
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</a> |
Palavras-Chave | #Microeconomics |
Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |