Consistency and optimality

Assume that the problem Qo is not solvable in polynomial time. For theories T containing a sufficiently rich part of true arithmetic we characterize T U {ConT} as the minimal extension of T proving for some algorithm that it decides Qo as fast as any algorithm B with the property that T proves that B decides Qo. Here, ConT claims the consistency of T. Moreover, we characterize problems with an optimal algorithm in terms of arithmetical theories.

Consistency and the Walrasian allocations correspondence

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence, in classesof exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present three characterizationresults; all of which require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. Two characterizations hold also on domains with a finite number ofpotential agents, one of them requires envy freeness (with respect to trades) and the other--core selection; a third characterization, that requires coreselection, applies only to a variable number of agents domain, but is validalso when the domain includes only a small variety of preferences.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

Testing reciprocity in social interactions: A comparison between the Directional consistency and Skew symmetry statistics

In the present work we focus on two indices that quantify directionality and skew-symmetrical patterns in social interactions as measures of social reciprocity: the Directional consistency (DC) and Skew symmetry indices. Although both indices enable researchers to describe social groups, most studies require statistical inferential tests. The main aims of the present study are: firstly, to propose an overall statistical technique for testing null hypotheses regarding social reciprocity in behavioral studies, using the DC and Skew symmetry statistics (Φ) at group level; and secondly, to compare both statistics in order to allow researchers to choose the optimal measure depending on the conditions. In order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions, statistical significance for both statistics has been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, this study will enable researchers to choose the optimal observational conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical tests has been estimated.

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core, but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains. Keywords: Multi-sided assignment market, Consistency, Core, Nucleolus. JEL Classification: C71, C78

Local and global consistency properties for student placement

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based on a fixed population of agents and fixed resources -- we refer to this condition as local consistency and to his condition on the priority structure as local acyclicity. We identify a related but stronger necessary and sufficient condition (unit acyclicity) on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a more standard global consistency property. Next, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy converse consistency principles. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition (local shift-freeness) on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies local converse consistency. Interestingly, local acyclicity implies local shift-freeness and hence the student-optimal stable mechanism more frequently satisfies local converse consistency than local consistency. Finally, in order for the student-optimal stable mechanism to be globally conversely consistent, one again has to impose unit acyclicity on the priority structure. Hence, unit acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure for the student-optimal stable mechanism to satisfy global consistency or global converse consistency.

Stability and consistency of coping in adolescence: A longitudinal study

This study analyzed stability and consistency of coping among adolescents. The objectives were twofold: a) to analyze temporal stability and cross-situational consistency of coping responses after a 17- month interval, taking into account gender, age and type of stressor. b) To analyze the relative weight of contextual versus dispositional factors in predicting future coping. A cohort of 341 adolescents (51% girls and 49% boys aged between 12 and 16) were assessed twice by means of the Coping Responses Inventory - Youth. The results indicated that the coping responses were quite stable over time at the group level, but with important within-subject differences. Girls showed slightly more stability than boys. Among the girls, Avoidance coping showed as much stability as consistency and Approach coping showed more stability than consistency. Among the boys, Avoidance coping showed more stability than consistency, and Approach coping showed both low stability and low consistency. Among the boys, the coping used at Time 1 barely predicted that used at Time 2; in contrast, among the girls, the type of coping used in the past, especially Avoidance coping, predicted the coping that would be used in the future.

On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games

On the domain of cooperative transferable utility games, we investigate if there are single valued solutions that reconcile rationality, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition) properties. This paper collects some impossibility results on the combination of core selection with either complement or projected consistency, and core selection, max consistency and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results show up when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

Dirac and reduced quantization: A Lagrangian approach and Application to Coset Spaces

A Lagrangian treatment of the quantization of first class Hamiltonian systems with constraints and Hamiltonian linear and quadratic in the momenta, respectively, is performed. The first reduce and then quantize and the first quantize and then reduce (Diracs) methods are compared. A source of ambiguities in this latter approach is pointed out and its relevance on issues concerning self-consistency and equivalence with the first reduce method is emphasized. One of the main results is the relation between the propagator obtained la Dirac and the propagator in the full space. As an application of the formalism developed, quantization on coset spaces of compact Lie groups is presented. In this case it is shown that a natural selection of a Dirac quantization allows for full self-consistency and equivalence. Finally, the specific case of the propagator on a two-dimensional sphere S2 viewed as the coset space SU(2)/U(1) is worked out. 1995 American Institute of Physics.

A statistical procedure for testing social reciprocity at group, dyadic and individual levels

This paper examines statistical analysis of social reciprocity, that is, the balance between addressing and receiving behaviour in social interactions. Specifically, it focuses on the measurement of social reciprocity by means of directionality and skew-symmetry statistics at different levels. Two statistics have been used as overall measures of social reciprocity at group level: the directional consistency and the skew-symmetry statistics. Furthermore, the skew-symmetry statistic allows social researchers to obtain complementary information at dyadic and individual levels. However, having computed these measures, social researchers may be interested in testing statistical hypotheses regarding social reciprocity. For this reason, it has been developed a statistical procedure, based on Monte Carlo sampling, in order to allow social researchers to describe groups and make statistical decisions.

Bias and standard error for social reciprocity measurements

The directional consistency and skew-symmetry statistics have been proposed as global measurements of social reciprocity. Although both measures can be useful for quantifying social reciprocity, researchers need to know whether these estimators are biased in order to assess descriptive results properly. That is, if estimators are biased, researchers should compare actual values with expected values under the specified null hypothesis. Furthermore, standard errors are needed to enable suitable assessment of discrepancies between actual and expected values. This paper aims to derive some exact and approximate expressions in order to obtain bias and standard error values for both estimators for round-robin designs, although the results can also be extended to other reciprocal designs.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.