Mobile termination, network externalities, and consumer expectations

We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network externalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on- and off-net calls or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases and consumer surplus increases in termination charge in a neighborhood of termination cost. This creates a puzzle since in reality we see regulators worldwide pushing termination rates down while being opposed by network operators. We show that this puzzle is resolved when consumers' expectations are assumed passive but required to be fulfilled in equilibrium (as defined by Katz and Shapiro, AER 1985), instead of being rationally responsive to non-equilibrium prices, as assumed until now.

Consumer populations and nutritional transition in Spain in the 20th century: a methodology for their reconstruction

One feature of the modern nutrition transition is the growing consumption of animal proteins. The most common approach in the quantitative analysis of this change used to be the study of averages of food consumption. But this kind of analysis seems to be incomplete without the knowledge of the number of consumers. Data about consumers are not usually published in historical statistics. This article introduces a methodological approach for reconstructing consumer populations. This methodology is based on some assumptions about the diffusion process of foodstuffs and the modeling of consumption patterns with a log-normal distribution. This estimating process is illustrated with the specific case of milk consumption in Spain between 1925 and 1981. These results fit quite well with other data and indirect sources available showing that this dietary change was a slow and late process. The reconstruction of consumer population could shed a new light in the study of nutritional transitions.

An axiomatic justification of mediation in bankruptcy problems.

This paper provides a natural way of reaching an agreement between two prominent proposals in a bankruptcy problem. Particularly, using the fact that such problems can be faced from two different points of views, awards and losses, we justify the average of any pair of dual bankruptcy rules through the definition a double recursive process. Finally, by considering three posible sets of equity principles that a particular society may agree on, we retrieve the average of old and well known bankruptcy rules, the Constrained Equal Awards and the Constrained Equal Losses rules, Piniles’ rule and its dual rule, and the Constrained Egalitarian rule and its dual rule. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Midpoint, Bounds, Duality, Recursivity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

A way to play bankruptcy problems.

The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide how to distribute the available amount of a scarce resource among all. On the one hand, there are a multiplicity of possible ways for assigning the available amount; and, on the other hand, each agent is going to propose that distribution which provides her the highest possible award. In this paper, with the purpose of making this agreement easier, firstly we use two different sets of basic properties, called Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, to delimit what agents can propose as reasonable allocations. Secondly, we extend the results obtained by Chun (1989) and Herrero (2003), obtaining new characterizations of old and well known bankruptcy rules. Finally, using the fact that bankruptcy problems can be analyzed from awards and losses, we define a mechanism which provides a new justification of the convex combinations of bankruptcy rules. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Unanimous Concessions procedure, Diminishing Claims mechanism, Piniles’ rule, Constrained Egalitarian rule. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum

In a distribution problem, and specfii cally in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. The Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that no agent receives more than her claim, a problem that can arise when using the egalitarian division. We propose an alternative modi cation, by using a convex combination of P and EA. The recursive application of this new rule finishes at the CEA rule. Our solution concept ensures a minimum amount to each agent, and distributes the remaining estate in a proportional way. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Proportional rule, Equal Awards, Convex combination of rules, Lorenz dominance. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems

The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems

The solution for the ‘Contested Garment Problem’, proposed in the Babylonic Talmud, suggests that each agent should receive at least some part of the resources whenever the demand overcomes the available amount. In this context, we propose a new method to define lower bounds on awards, an idea that has underlied the theoretical analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning (O’Neill, 1982) to present day (Dominguez and Thomson, 2006). Specifically, starting from the fact that a society establishes its own set of ‘Commonly Accepted Equity Principles’, our proposal ensures to each agent the smallest amount she gets according to all the admissible rules. As in general this new bound will not exhaust the estate, we analyze its recursive application for different sets of equity principles. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Bankruptcy rules, Lower bounds, Recursive process

Recommender System Based on Consumer Product Reviews

Consumer reviews, opinions and shared experiences in the use of a product is a powerful source of information about consumer preferences that can be used in recommender systems. Despite the importance and value of such information, there is no comprehensive mechanism that formalizes the opinions selection and retrieval process and the utilization of retrieved opinions due to the difficulty of extracting information from text data. In this paper, a new recommender system that is built on consumer product reviews is proposed. A prioritizing mechanism is developed for the system. The proposed approach is illustrated using the case study of a recommender system for digital cameras

Discrimination in Bankruptcy Situations

In a bankruptcy situation, not all claimants are affected in the same way. In particular, some depositors may enter into a situation of personal bankruptcy if they lose part of their investments. Events of this kind may lead to a social catastrophe. We propose discrimination among the claimants as a possible solution. A fact considered in the American bankruptcy law (among others) that establishes some discrimination on the claimants, or the Santander Bank that in the Madoff’s case reimbursed only the deposits to its particular customers. Moreover, the necessity of discriminating has already been mentioned in different contexts by Young (1988), Bossert (1995), Thomson (2003) and Pulido et al. (2002, 2007), for instance. In this paper, we take a bankruptcy solution as the reference point. Given this initial allocation, we make transfers from richer to poorer with the purpose of distributing not only the personal incurred losses as evenly as possible but also the transfers in a progressive way. The agents are divided into two groups depending on their personal monetary value (wealth, net-income, GDP or any other characteristic). Then, we impose a set of Axioms that bound the maximal transfer that each net-contributor can make and each net-receiver can obtain. Finally, we define a value discriminant solution, and we characterize it by means of the Lorenz criterion. Endogenous convex combinations between solutions are also considered. Keywords: Bankruptcy, Discrimination, Compensation, Rules JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

When to carry eccentric products? Optimal retail assortment under consumer returns

To understand whether retailers should consider consumer returns when merchandising, we study howthe optimal assortment of a price-taking retailer is influenced by its return policy. The retailer selects itsassortment from an exogenous set of horizontally differentiated products. Consumers make purchase andkeep/return decisions in nested multinomial logit fashion. Our main finding is that the optimal assortmenthas a counterintuitive structure for relatively strict return policies: It is optimal to offer a mix of the mostpopular and most eccentric products when the refund amount is sufficiently low, which can be viewed asa form of risk sharing between the retailer and consumers. In contrast, if the refund is sufficiently high, orwhen returns are disallowed, optimal assortment is composed of only the most popular products (a commonfinding in the literature). We provide preliminary empirical evidence for one of the key drivers of our results:more eccentric products have higher probability of return conditional on purchase. In light of our analyticalfindings and managerial insights, we conclude that retailers should take their return policies into accountwhen merchandising.

Revenue management under general discrete choice model of consumer behavior

Customer choice behavior, such as 'buy-up' and 'buy-down', is an importantphe-nomenon in a wide range of industries. Yet there are few models ormethodologies available to exploit this phenomenon within yield managementsystems. We make some progress on filling this void. Specifically, wedevelop a model of yield management in which the buyers' behavior ismodeled explicitly using a multi-nomial logit model of demand. Thecontrol problem is to decide which subset of fare classes to offer ateach point in time. The set of open fare classes then affects the purchaseprobabilities for each class. We formulate a dynamic program todetermine the optimal control policy and show that it reduces to a dynamicnested allocation policy. Thus, the optimal choice-based policy caneasily be implemented in reservation systems that use nested allocationcontrols. We also develop an estimation procedure for our model based onthe expectation-maximization (EM) method that jointly estimates arrivalrates and choice model parameters when no-purchase outcomes areunobservable. Numerical results show that this combined optimization-estimation approach may significantly improve revenue performancerelative to traditional leg-based models that do not account for choicebehavior.

Salience and consumer choice

We present a theory of context-dependent choice in which a consumer's attention is drawnto salient attributes of goods, such as quality or price. An attribute is salient for a good when itstands out among the good's attributes, relative to that attribute's average level in the choice set (orgenerally, the evoked set). Consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributesand their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality/price ratios. The model accounts fora variety of disparate evidence, including decoy effects, context-dependent willingness to pay, andlarge shifts in demand in response to price shocks.

Consumer choice in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

A new direction of research in Competitive Location theory incorporatestheories of Consumer Choice Behavior in its models. Following thisdirection, this paper studies the importance of consumer behavior withrespect to distance or transportation costs in the optimality oflocations obtained by traditional Competitive Location models. To dothis, it considers different ways of defining a key parameter in thebasic Maximum Capture model (MAXCAP). This parameter will reflectvarious ways of taking into account distance based on several ConsumerChoice Behavior theories. The optimal locations and the deviation indemand captured when the optimal locations of the other models are usedinstead of the true ones, are computed for each model. A metaheuristicbased on GRASP and Tabu search procedure is presented to solve all themodels. Computational experience and an application to 55-node networkare also presented.