A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum


Autoria(s): Giménez-Gómez, José Manuel; Peris, Josep E.
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Centre de Recerca en Economia Industrial i Economia Pública

Data(s)

2012

Resumo

In a distribution problem, and specfii cally in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. The Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that no agent receives more than her claim, a problem that can arise when using the egalitarian division. We propose an alternative modi cation, by using a convex combination of P and EA. The recursive application of this new rule finishes at the CEA rule. Our solution concept ensures a minimum amount to each agent, and distributes the remaining estate in a proportional way. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Proportional rule, Equal Awards, Convex combination of rules, Lorenz dominance. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Formato

23 p.

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182645

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia

Relação

Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2012-04

Direitos

info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess

L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/

Fonte

RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)

Palavras-Chave #Fallida #Jocs cooperatius #Economia del benestar #Elecció social #33 - Economia
Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper