Is bundling anticompetitive?

I analyze the implications of bundling on price competition in a market for complementary products. Using a model of imperfect competition with product differentiation, I identify the incentives to bundle for two types of demand functions and study how they change with the size of the bundle. With an inelastic demand, bundling creates an advantage over uncoordinated rivals who cannot improve by bundling. I show that this no longer holds with an elastic demand. The incentives to bundle are stronger and the market outcome is symmetric bundling, the most competitive one. Profits are lowest and consumer surplus is maximized.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Infinite index subgroups and finiteness properties of intersections of geometrically finite groups

We explore which types of finiteness properties are possible for intersections of geometrically finite groups of isometries in negatively curved symmetric rank one spaces. Our main tool is a twist construction which takes as input a geometrically finite group containing a normal subgroup of infinite index with given finiteness properties and infinite Abelian quotient, and produces a pair of geometrically finite groups whose intersection is isomorphic to the normal subgroup.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Norm inequalities in multidimensional Lorentz spaces

In this paper we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for double trigonometric series to belong to generalized Lorentz spaces, not symmetric in general. Estimates for the norms are given in terms of coefficients.

Generalized factor models: a bayesian approach

There is recent interest in the generalization of classical factor models in which the idiosyncratic factors are assumed to be orthogonal and there are identification restrictions on cross-sectional and time dimensions. In this study, we describe and implement a Bayesian approach to generalized factor models. A flexible framework is developed to determine the variations attributed to common and idiosyncratic factors. We also propose a unique methodology to select the (generalized) factor model that best fits a given set of data. Applying the proposed methodology to the simulated data and the foreign exchange rate data, we provide a comparative analysis between the classical and generalized factor models. We find that when there is a shift from classical to generalized, there are significant changes in the estimates of the structures of the covariance and correlation matrices while there are less dramatic changes in the estimates of the factor loadings and the variation attributed to common factors.

Invariants de matrius Hadamard en MAGMA

L'objectiu d'aquest projecte ha estat generalitzar i integrar la funcionalitat de dos projectes anteriors que ampliaven el tractament que oferia el Magma respecte a les matrius de Hadamard. Hem implementat funcions genèriques que permeten construir noves matrius Hadamard de qualsevol mida per a cada rang i dimensió de nucli, i així ampliar la seva base de dades. També hem optimitzat la funció que calcula el nucli, i hem desenvolupat funcions que calculen la invariant Symmetric Hamming Distance Enumerator (SH-DE) proposada per Kai-Tai Fang i Gennian Gei que és més sensible per a la detecció de la no equivalència de les matrius Hadamard.

A class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents related to Glauber dynamics on random graphs

We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon nonzero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove “fixation”, i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zerotemperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.

A model category structure on the category of simplicial multicategories

We establish a Quillen model structure on simplicial(symmetric) multicategories. It extends the model structure on simplicial categories due to J. Bergner [2]. We observe that our technique of proof enables us to prove a similar result for (symmetric) multicategories enriched over other monoidal model categories than simplicial sets. Examples include small categories, simplicial abelian groups and compactly generated Hausdorff spaces.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

The role of fixed delays in neuronal rate models

Fixed delays in neuronal interactions arise through synaptic and dendritic processing. Previous work has shown that such delays, which play an important role in shaping the dynamics of networks of large numbers of spiking neurons with continuous synaptic kinetics, can be taken into account with a rate model through the addition of an explicit, fixed delay. Here we extend this work to account for arbitrary symmetric patterns of synaptic connectivity and generic nonlinear transfer functions. Specifically, we conduct a weakly nonlinear analysis of the dynamical states arising via primary instabilities of the stationary uniform state. In this way we determine analytically how the nature and stability of these states depend on the choice of transfer function and connectivity. While this dependence is, in general, nontrivial, we make use of the smallness of the ratio in the delay in neuronal interactions to the effective time constant of integration to arrive at two general observations of physiological relevance. These are: 1 - fast oscillations are always supercritical for realistic transfer functions. 2 - Traveling waves are preferred over standing waves given plausible patterns of local connectivity.

Parallel spinors on pseudo-riemannian spin(q) manifolds

We study simply-connected irreducible non-locally symmetric pseudo-Riemannian Spin(q) manifolds admitting parallel quaternionic spinors.