Developing discontinuous Galerkin methods for the resolution of the incompressible Navier-Stokes equations

Informe de investigación elaborado a partir de una estancia en el Laboratorio de Diseño Computacional en Aeroespacial en el Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Estados Unidos, entre noviembre de 2006 y agosto de 2007. La aerodinámica es una rama de la dinámica de fluidos referida al estudio de los movimientos de los líquidos o gases, cuya meta principal es predecir las fuerzas aerodinámicas en un avión o cualquier tipo de vehículo, incluyendo los automóviles. Las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes representan un estado dinámico del equilibrio de las fuerzas que actúan en cualquier región dada del fluido. Son uno de los sistemas de ecuaciones más útiles porque describen la física de una gran cantidad de fenómenos como corrientes del océano, flujos alrededor de una superficie de sustentación, etc. En el contexto de una tesis doctoral, se está estudiando un flujo viscoso e incompresible, solucionando las ecuaciones de Navier- Stokes incompresibles de una manera eficiente. Durante la estancia en el MIT, se ha utilizado un método de Galerkin discontinuo para solucionar las ecuaciones de Navier-Stokes incompresibles usando, o bien un parámetro de penalti para asegurar la continuidad de los flujos entre elementos, o bien un método de Galerkin discontinuo compacto. Ambos métodos han dado buenos resultados y varios ejemplos numéricos se han simulado para validar el buen comportamiento de los métodos desarrollados. También se han estudiado elementos particulares, los elementos de Raviart y Thomas, que se podrían utilizar en una formulación mixta para obtener un algoritmo eficiente para solucionar problemas numéricos complejos.

Olympic Games as showcase

In the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, besides the country-versus-country typical showdown in the backdrop of Olympics, and the economic and political impulses for the host city, there was a third factor complicating the celebration: rivalry between the Catalan hosts and the Spanish state. By guiding the development of and eventual Olympic projection of national identity, Catalan and Spanish politicians hoped to create a resounding rallying point around which they could unite disparate individuals. The text is made up of: an introduction, five paragraphs on the different political perspective, conclusions, a commentary on the tallying of score and a note section with bibliographical references.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

The economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An analysis of first impacts and prospects

This paper was presented at the International Sport Business Symposium, held by the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, in 2008. The speakers, Ferran Brunet, as a professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and Zuo Xinwen, as a member of Beijing Development and Reform Commission, both set out to analyze changes in the economic and social development of the city which were undertaken with the aim to celebrate the 2008 Olympic Games. They discuss aspects as a transformation in the mode of economic growth, resources of the Organizing Committee, investments related to the Games, transport and communications, industries, the balance of urban and rural development, urban construction and management service and operations into a well-off society.

International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Discontinuous Galerkin methods for the one-dimensional Vlasov-Poisson system

We construct a new family of semi-discrete numerical schemes for the approximation of the one-dimensional periodic Vlasov-Poisson system. The methods are based on the coupling of discontinuous Galerkin approximation to the Vlasov equation and several finite element (conforming, non-conforming and mixed) approximations for the Poisson problem. We show optimal error estimates for the all proposed methods in the case of smooth compactly supported initial data. The issue of energy conservation is also analyzed for some of the methods.

A numerical algorithm for finding solutions of a generalized Nash equilibrium problem

A family of nonempty closed convex sets is built by using the data of the Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). The sets are selected iteratively such that the intersection of the selected sets contains solutions of the GNEP. The algorithm introduced by Iusem-Sosa (2003) is adapted to obtain solutions of the GNEP. Finally some numerical experiments are given to illustrate the numerical behavior of the algorithm.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Discontinuous Galerkin methods for the Multi-dimensional Vlasov-Poisson problem

We introduce and analyze two new semi-discrete numerical methods for the multi-dimensional Vlasov-Poisson system. The schemes are constructed by combing a discontinuous Galerkin approximation to the Vlasov equation together with a mixed finite element method for the Poisson problem. We show optimal error estimates in the case of smooth compactly supported initial data. We propose a scheme that preserves the total energy of the system.

Existence and uniqueness of viscosity solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equation with discontinuous coefficients dependent on time

The main result is a proof of the existence of a unique viscosity solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equation, where the hamiltonian is discontinuous with respect to variable, usually interpreted as the spatial one. Obtained generalized solution is continuous, but not necessarily differentiable.

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

A subspace correction method for discontinuous Galerkin discretizations of linear elasticity equations

We study preconditioning techniques for discontinuous Galerkin discretizations of isotropic linear elasticity problems in primal (displacement) formulation. We propose subspace correction methods based on a splitting of the vector valued piecewise linear discontinuous finite element space, that are optimal with respect to the mesh size and the Lamé parameters. The pure displacement, the mixed and the traction free problems are discussed in detail. We present a convergence analysis of the proposed preconditioners and include numerical examples that validate the theory and assess the performance of the preconditioners.