Monitoring bank performance in the presence of risk

This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency scores. Building on existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the undesirable output is defined as non-performing loans to capture credit risk, and is linked only to the relevant dimension of the output set. We empirically illustrate how our efficiency measure functions for managerial control purposes. The application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks during 1998-2012. Efficiency scores? implications are mostly discussed at bank-level, and their interpretations are enhanced by using accounting ratios. We also show the usefulness of our tool for corporate governance by examining performance changes around executive turnover. Results confirm that appointing CEOs from outside the bank significantly improves performance, thus suggesting the potential benefits of new organisational practices.

Fostering Collaborative Knowledge Building by the Effective Provision of Knowledge about the Discussion Process

Peer-reviewed

Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random

We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, and on penalties over unreported emissions. We show that the optimal inspection policy is a cut-off strategy, for several scenarios concerning the observability of the adoption of the clean technology and the cost of adopting it. We also show that the optimal inspection policy induces the firm to adopt the clean technology if the adoption cost is not too high, but the cost levels for which the firm adopts it depend on the scenario.

The Benefits of building barrier-free: a contingent valuation of accessibilty as an attribute of housing

Estimating the social benefits of barrier-free building has always required indirect solutions, such as calculating the savings in social services, hospitalisation or adaptations made possible by the increase in accessibility. This research uses the Contingent Valuation Method to gain a direct appraisal of the benefits from barrier-free housing. When comparing two similar dwellings, with the only difference being their accessibility conditions, the 1,007 randomly chosen households that answered the direct survey would pay, on average 12.5 per cent more for being barrier-free. None of the different appraisals made on accessibility costs reaches 5 per cent. This confirms the social profitability of building without barriers and shows the potential size of the private market for those housing developers that meet the demand. Accessibility is a general concern, an economic good or attribute that most households value, irrespective of the physical conditions of their members.

Historic evolution and urban planning typology of Olympic Village

Article providing a broad historical overview of the role and typology of Olympic villages along the history of the Modern Olympic Games. This article was published in the book entitled ‘Olympic Villages: a hundred years of urban planning and shared experiences’ compiling the papers given at the 1997 International Symposium on International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB).

Terrestrial laser scanning for landslides deformation monitoring

Within last few years a new type of instruments called Terrestrial Laser Scanners (TLS) entered to the commercial market. These devices brought a possibility to obtain completely new type of spatial, three dimensional data describing the object of interest. TLS instruments are generating a type of data that needs a special treatment. Appearance of this technique made possible to monitor deformations of very large objects, like investigated here landslides, with new quality level. This change is visible especially with relation to the size and number of the details that can be observed with this new method. Taking into account this context presented here work is oriented on recognition and characterization of raw data received from the TLS instruments as well as processing phases, tools and techniques to do them. Main objective are definition and recognition of the problems related with usage of the TLS data, characterization of the quality single point generated by TLS, description and investigation of the TLS processing approach for landslides deformation measurements allowing to obtain 3D deformation characteristic and finally validation of the obtained results. The above objectives are based on the bibliography studies and research work followed by several experiments that will prove the conclusions.

Marine biotoxins in the Catalan littoral: could biosensors be integrated into monitoring programmes?

Aquest article descriu els sensors enzimàtics i immunosensors electroquímics que s’han desenvolupat als nostres grups per a la detecció de la biotoxina marina àcid okadaic (OA), i discuteix la possibilitat d’integrar-los en programes de seguiment. Els sensors enzimàtics per a OA que es presenten es basen en la inhibició de la proteïna fosfatasa (PP2A) per aquesta toxina i la mesura electroquímica de l’activitat enzimàtica mitjançant l’ús de substrats enzimàtics apropiats, electroquímicament actius després de la seva desfosforació per l’enzim. Els immunosensors electroquímics descrits en aquest article es basen en un enzimoimmunoassaig sobre fase sòlida competitiu indirecte (ciELISA), amb fosfatasa alcalina (ALP) o peroxidasa (HRP) com a marcatges, i un sistema de reciclatge enzimàtic amb diaforasa (DI). Els biosensors presentats aquí s’han aplicat a l’anàlisi de dinoflagel·lats, musclos i ostres. Les validacions preliminars amb assaigs colorimètrics i LC-MS/MS han demostrat la possibilitat d’utilitzar les bioeines desenvolupades per al cribratge preliminar de biotoxines marines en mostres de camp o de cultiu, que ofereixen informació complementària a la cromatografia. En conclusió, tot i que encara cal optimitzar alguns paràmetres experimentals, la integració dels biosensors a programes de seguiment és viable i podria proporcionar avantatges respecte a altres tècniques analítiques pel que fa al temps d’anàlisi, la simplicitat, la selectivitat, la sensibilitat, el fet de poder ser d’un sol ús i l’efectivitat de cost. This article describes the electrochemical enzyme sensors and immunosensors that have been developed by our groups for the detection of marine biotoxin okadaic acid (OA), and discusses the possibility of integrating them into monitoring programmes. The enzyme sensors for OA reported herein are based on the inhibition of immobilised protein phosphatase 2A (PP2A) by this toxin and the electrochemical measurement of the enzyme activity through the use of appropriate enzyme substrates, which are electrochemically active after dephosphorylation by the enzyme. The electrochemical immunosensors described in this article are based on a competitive indirect Enzyme- Linked ImmunoSorbent Assay (ciELISA), using alkaline phosphatase (ALP) or horseradish peroxidase (HRP) as labels, and an enzymatic recycling system with diaphorase (DI). The biosensors presented herein have been applied to the analysis of dinoflagellates, mussels and oysters. Preliminary validations with colorimetric assays and LC-MS/MS have demonstrated the possibility of using the developed biotools for the preliminary screening of marine biotoxins in field or cultured samples, offering complementary information to chromatography. In conclusion, although optimisation of some experimental parameters is still required, the integration of biosensors into monitoring programmes is viable and may provide advantages over other analytical techniques in terms of analysis time, simplicity, selectivity, sensitivity, disposability of electrodes and cost effectiveness.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

Teachers' reactions on students' responses: essential for an adequate task monitoring

This research project analyzes the reactions the teacher has on students' responses. Different techniques as discourse markers, types of questions and repair sequences are taken into account, but the author puts a special emphasis on non-verbal communication. To be aware of all these ways of reacting in a class interaction is essential for an adequate task monitoring

Avaluació alternativa de l'assignatura "Geografia Humana" en el context de l'Espai Europeu d'Educació Superior

Aquest projecte ha aplicat algunes noves metodologies docents que seran imprescindibles per a la integració en l'EEES i, en particular, sistemes d'avaluació alternatius que puguin formar la base d'un sistema d'avaluació continuada per als continguts i adquisició d'habilitats que fins ara s'han aplegat en l'assignatura "Geografia Humana" de la llicenciatura de Geografia de la Universitat de Barcelona. A partir de la reflexió conjunta entre els membres de l’equip integrant del projecte sobre les competències i continguts que es desitja que adquireixi l'estudiant s'han dissenyat un conjunt de recursos per a l’avaluació: 1. exercicis individuals, destinats a valorar la capacitat d’estructurar idees, expressió escrita i gràfica, presentació etc. 2. treballs en equip, destinats a fomentar l’esperit de divisió del treball i de cooperació entre els estudiants i a mostrar el guany individual del treball col·lectiu. 3. proves objectives (tipus test), destinades a valorar l’adquisició de conceptes i de continguts bàsics. 4. preguntes d'autoavaluació, amb la finalitat que l’estudiant pugui fer el seu propi seguiment de l’adquisició de Coneixements. 5. qüestionaris d’autovaloració dels exercicis individuals i dels treballs en equip, amb l’objectiu que els alumnes reflexionin sobre el treball realitzat i que serveixin de base per a contrastar amb la valoració del professor. L’objectiu final és que l’estudiant pugui ser avaluat de manera contínua en el portafoli que recull el treball acumulat al llarg del curs. Tot i que el projecte s’ha basat en l’ús de l’eina dels “dossiers electrònics” de la UB, en el futur immediat els resultats obtinguts passaran a integrar-se en el Campus Virtual de la UB que utilitza la plataforma Moodle, les posibilitats tècniques de la qual permetran afegir una dimensió cooperativa més gran al treball avaluable (accés al treball dels grups, cooperació en la construcció de bases de dades, wikis editades pel conjunt de la classe etc.)

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

NetEye - Network Monitoring, Zabbix implementation

Trabajo de presentación en formato PowerPoint del TFC NetEye- Zabbix, network monitoring implementation.

Building Capacity in Developing Countries : OER for Food Safety

The Food Safety Knowledge Network (FSKN) was developed through the collaboration of Michigan State University and a professional network of international food industry retailers and manufacturers. The key objective of the FSKN project is to provide technical resources, in a cost effective way, in order to promote food safety in developing countries and for small and less developed companies. FSKN uses a competency based model including a framework, OERs, and assessments. These tools are being used to support face-to-face training, fully online training, and to gauge the learning outcomes of a series of pilot groups which were held in India, Egypt, and China.