Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring


Autoria(s): Socorro Quevedo, María del Pilar
Contribuinte(s)

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica

Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica

Data(s)

09/05/2006

Resumo

We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance.

Formato

31

357278 bytes

application/pdf

Identificador

http://hdl.handle.net/2072/1879

Idioma(s)

eng

Relação

Working papers; 570.03

Direitos

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Tipo

info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper