Un santo. Un pueblo. Estudio de la devoción a San Pedro Bautista en San Esteban del Valle.

El conjunto del trabajo busca adentrarse desde la antropología, pero con la ayuda de otras disciplinas, en la devoción de San Esteban del Valle (Ávila) hacia San Pedro Bautista; franciscano natural del mismo pueblo que fue martirizado en Japón a finales del s. XVI. O dicho de otra manera, lo que se pretende mostrar es el rol que San Pedro Bautista ocupa en la forma en que la religión católica se ha configurado en este pueblo abulense.

[Ressenya del llibre] Esteban, Mari Luz. (2011). Crítica del pensamiento amoroso. Barcelona. Bellaterra. ISBN: 978­84­7290­549­8

Ressenya del llibre de Mari Luz Esteban, titulat 'Crítica del pensamiento amoroso', i publicat l'any 2011 per Hepatia Press, sobre l'amor

Restricción de crédito bancario en economías emergentes: el caso de la PYME en México

Los mercados financieros en economías emergentes como la mexicana se caracterizan por importantes asimetrías de información que dificultan el acceso de las PYMEs al crédito bancario. En este artículo se analiza el problema de la restricción de crédito a partir de una muestra de empresas industriales obtenida en el entorno industrial de Guadalajara (México). Nuestro propósito se centra en identificar qué elementos caracterizan a las empresas que sufren esta restricción, cuestión de gran interés desde la perspectiva de política económica, en el sentido de orientar los esfuerzos de las instituciones gubernamentales(banca de desarrollo) hacia las empresas con mayores problemas de financiación.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Redistributive taxation with endogenous sentiments

We present a model in which an individual's sentiments towards others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to the societal average. This, in turn, affects the individual's own behavior and hence other agents' sentiments toward her. We focus on stationary patterns of utility interdependence. To demonstrate the effects of such endogeneity, we consider an example of a production economy with redistributive taxation. There are two types of stationary equilibria: one in which all agents conform to the societal norm, into two or three groups. The main conclusion is that the tax structure, in that it affects behavior which in turn affects sentiments, plays a crucial role in determining which type of equilibrium occurs and its characteristics as well as the extent of altruism and social cohesion in society.

Stochastic dominance and absolute risk aversion

In this paper we propose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function. We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, there exists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasing concave utility functions with at least as much global risk aversion would rank the two distributions in the same way. Furthermore, this threshold level is sharp in the sense that, for any lower level of global risk aversion, we can find two utility functions in this class yielding opposite preference relations for the two distributions.

Factor decomposition of spatial income inequality: a revision

Duro and Esteban (1998) proposed an additive decomposition of Theil populationweighted index by four income multiplicative factors (in spatial contexts). This note makes some additional methodological points: first, it argues that interaction effects are taken into account in the factoral indexes although only in a fairly restrictive way. As a consequence, we suggest to rewrite the decomposition formula as a sum of strict Theil indexes plus the interactive terms; second, it might be instructive to aggregate some of the initial factors; third, this decomposition can be immediately extended to the between- and within-group components.

Polarització comarcal de rendes a Catalunya

Sovint parlem de les comarques catalanes en termes de grups més o menys homogenis. Per exemple, les segmenten en riques i pobres, en dinàmiques i estancades, en interiors o costaneres, etc. Apart de l'interès com a instrument de síntesi, el grau de formació de grups cohesionats i distants entre si pot ser un assumpte rellevant en termes de la cohesió territorial. En aquestes circumstàncies, la disponibilitat d'una mesura específica que permeti la quantificació precisa d'aquest fenomen sembla particularment útil. En aquest sentit, la literatura ens ha suggerit diverses mesures de polarització, entre les que s’haurien de destacar els Índexos de Polarització Generalitzada (Esteban, Gradín i Ray (1999)). El principal objecte d'aquest treball consisteix a aplicar aquestes mesures a la distribució comarcal de la renda a Catalunya al llarg del període 1990-2002. El principal resultat obtingut apunta cap a una creixent polarització econòmica de les comarques que, conjuntament amb l'increment observat en les desigualtats, recolzaria una actitud molt més decidida per part de l'administració en el reequilibri del territori.

A Comparison of polarization measures

This paper provides a systematic classification of the different measures of polarization based on their properties. Together with the axioms proposed in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and in Wang and Tsui (2000) we consider three additional properties. We examine which properties are common to all indices and which set them apart.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic (typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ (polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various specifications of "conflict" (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions of "conflict" it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly perplexed. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases.

Disseny i aplicació del protocol d'instal·lació d'energia fotovoltaica en edificis aïllats de la xarxa elèctrica al PNAP

En el perímetre del parc es troben gran nombre d’edificacions amb mancances de subministrament elèctric per la gran dispersió de la població de la comarca. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi és desenvolupar un protocol per determinar la viabilitat de l’energia fotovoltaica en edificis aïllats i aplicar-la de forma pilot a dos edificis gestionats pels responsables del Parc Natural de l’Alt Pirineu: el Centre de Logística i Manteniment (CLM) i el Refugi del Fornet. Aquests han estat escollits per la seva representativitat com a edificis aïllats de la xarxa elèctrica convencional. S’ha elaborat una metodologia pròpia, el Protocol d’instal·lació d’energia fotovoltaica en edificis aïllats de la xarxa elèctrica. S’ha realitzat una anàlisi de sensibilitats del dimensionat fotovoltaic davant la modificació de diversos paràmetres rellevants. Això ha permès determinar les característiques òptimes de viabilitat per als dos edificis en estudi i el cost de la instal·lació fotovoltaica (17.183€ el CLM i 164.815 € el Refugi del Fornet). Els resultats obtinguts en els dos edificis pilot han mostrat el gran cost relatiu entre l’energia fotovoltaica i l’energia elèctrica produïda a partir de combustibles fòssils.

Resultados del test de consumidores de manzana del proyecto ISAFRUIT

El IRTA ha coordinado el desarrollo de un test de consumidores de nuevas variedades de manzana que se ha desarrollado dentro el programa de trabajo denominado ‘Implementación de nuevas variedades de manzana en base a las preferencias de los consumidores’ en el marco del proyecto europeo de investigación ISAFRUIT. En este programa de trabajo han participado 14 instituciones de investigación, universidades y empresas de Europa