Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Banif Bank: Value creation in the Maltese market

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Creating a business model for a pharmaceutical bank in Lisbon

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Financial crisis spillovers to the corporate sector: Bank-dependent borrowers versus bond market paticipants

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

How bank business models relate with risk?: The case of Portugal in times of financial crisis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Bank-firm relationships and financial crisis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Design of a balanced scorecard-type management system for a back-office department in a bank

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The effect of ownership concentration on management behavior in Belgian banks: A case study

Double Degree. A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s Degree in Finance from NOVA – School of Business and Economics and a Masters Degree in Management from Louvain School of Management

Does ownership structure matter? Three essays in finance

Management

Universal banks and corporate control: Evidence from the global syndicated loan market

We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003-2006 credit boom, but lower spreads during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank- firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, suggests there are costs and benefits from banks’ involvement in firm governance.

Garland, since 1776- a unique ownership structure

The case is based on Garland, a 240 years old Portuguese family business, now owned by the Dawson family. It focuses on a decision made 50 years ago, aligned with what had been the company’s history, about the ownership rules for family members, which influences the ownership structure of the firm. It addresses the main issues about ownership in family businesses, and tackles the problem of succession planning and fair process. It contains a teaching note to support the utilization of the case in a classroom context, with learning objectives, target audience, a teaching plan, questions and proposed answers, and theory that relates to the case. It is also complemented with an epilogue and an overview of the case.

Improving Millennium Bank's personal finance manager

Double Degree