Determinantes da procura da Bitcoin

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças, sob orientação da Professora Doutora Celsa Maria Carvalho Machado

Transmission costs allocation based on optimal re-dispatch

Congestion management of transmission power systems has achieve high relevance in competitive environments, which require an adequate approach both in technical and economic terms. This paper proposes a new methodology for congestion management and transmission tariff determination in deregulated electricity markets. The congestion management methodology is based on a reformulated optimal power flow, whose main goal is to obtain a feasible solution for the re-dispatch minimizing the changes in the transactions resulting from market operation. The proposed transmission tariffs consider the physical impact caused by each market agents in the transmission network. The final tariff considers existing system costs and also costs due to the initial congestion situation and losses. This paper includes a case study for the 118 bus IEEE test case.

Heterodox economics approach to business co-operation

Purpose- Economics and business have evolved as sciences in order to accommodate more of ‘real world’ solutions for the problems approached. In many cases, both business and economics have been supported by other disciplines in order to obtain a more complete framework for the study of complex issues. The aim of this paper is to explore the contribution of three heterodox economics disciplines to the knowledge of business co-operation. Design/methodology/approach- This approach is theoretical and it shows that many relevant aspects of business co-operation have been proposed by economic geography, institutional economics, and economic sociology. Findings- This paper highlights the business mechanisms of co-operation, reflecting on the role of places, institution and the social context where businesses operate. Research Implications- It contributes with a theoretical framework for the explanation of business co-operations and networks that goes beyond the traditional economics theories. Originality/value- This paper contributes with a framework for the study of business co-operation both from an economics and management perspective. This framework embodies a number of non-quantitative issues that are critical for understanding the complex networks in which firms operate.

The economics of language or how can language be an asset? General reflections on the European case and brief focus on the case of portuguese

In this paper, we will focus on the importance of languages as an asset to people and companies in knowledge-based society, giving special attention to the case of portuguese, not forgetting the role of Higher Education Institutions in preparing students to be part of the new creative multilingual and sucsessful class.

Legal and political regulation of higher education in Portugal: an evolutionary perspective on the current policy issues and the problem of order

The higher education system in Europe is currently under stress and the debates over its reform and future are gaining momentum. Now that, for most countries, we are in a time for change, in the overall society and the whole education system, the legal and political dimensions have gained prominence, which has not been followed by a more integrative approach of the problem of order, its reform and the issue of regulation, beyond the typical static and classical cost-benefit analyses. The two classical approaches for studying (and for designing the policy measures of) the problem of the reform of the higher education system - the cost-benefit analysis and the legal scholarship description - have to be integrated. This is the argument of our paper that the very integration of economic and legal approaches, what Warren Samuels called the legal-economic nexus, is meaningful and necessary, especially if we want to address the problem of order (as formulated by Joseph Spengler) and the overall regulation of the system. On the one hand, and without neglecting the interest and insights gained from the cost-benefit analysis, or other approaches of value for money assessment, we will focus our study on the legal, social and political aspects of the regulation of the higher education system and its reform in Portugal. On the other hand, the economic and financial problems have to be taken into account, but in a more inclusive way with regard to the indirect and other socio-economic costs not contemplated in traditional or standard assessments of policies for the tertiary education sector. In the first section of the paper, we will discuss the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of our analysis, focusing on the evolutionary approach, the role of critical institutions, the legal-economic nexus and the problem of order. All these elements are related to the institutional tradition, from Veblen and Commons to Spengler and Samuels. The second section states the problem of regulation in the higher education system and the issue of policy formulation for tackling the problem. The current situation is clearly one of crisis with the expansion of the cohorts of young students coming to an end and the recurrent scandals in private institutions. In the last decade, after a protracted period of extension or expansion of the system, i. e., the continuous growth of students, universities and other institutions are competing harder to gain students and have seen their financial situation at risk. It seems that we are entering a period of radical uncertainty, higher competition and a new configuration that is slowly building up is the growth in intensity, which means upgrading the quality of the higher learning and getting more involvement in vocational training and life-long learning. With this change, and along with other deep ones in the Portuguese society and economy, the current regulation has shown signs of maladjustment. The third section consists of our conclusions on the current issue of regulation and policy challenge. First, we underline the importance of an evolutionary approach to a process of change that is essentially dynamic. A special attention will be given to the issues related to an evolutionary construe of policy analysis and formulation. Second, the integration of law and economics, through the notion of legal economic nexus, allows us to better define the issues of regulation and the concrete problems that the universities are facing. One aspect is the instability of the political measures regarding the public administration and on which the higher education system depends financially, legally and institutionally, to say the least. A corollary is the lack of clear strategy in the policy reforms. Third, our research criticizes several studies, such as the one made by the OECD in late 2006 for the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, for being too static and neglecting fundamental aspects of regulation such as the logic of actors, groups and organizations who are major players in the system. Finally, simply changing the legal rules will not necessary per se change the behaviors that the authorities want to change. By this, we mean that it is not only remiss of the policy maker to ignore some of the critical issues of regulation, namely the continuous non-respect by academic management and administrative bodies of universities of the legal rules that were once promulgated. Changing the rules does not change the problem, especially without the necessary debates form the different relevant quarters that make up the higher education system. The issues of social interaction remain as intact. Our treatment of the matter will be organized in the following way. In the first section, the theoretical principles are developed in order to be able to study more adequately the higher education transformation with a modest evolutionary theory and a legal and economic nexus of the interactions of the system and the policy challenges. After describing, in the second section, the recent evolution and current working of the higher education in Portugal, we will analyze the legal framework and the current regulatory practices and problems in light of the theoretical framework adopted. We will end with some conclusions on the current problems of regulation and the policy measures that are discusses in recent years.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies when rivals' costs are unknown

We study Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly models with incomplete information about rivals’ costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian- Nash equilibrium of both games, the ex-ante expected profits and the ex-post profits of each firm. We see that, in the price competition, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

Uncertainty in a mixed duopoly with quadratic costs

In this paper, we consider a mixed market with uncertain demand, involving one private firm and one public firm with quadratic costs. The model is a two-stage game in which players choose to make their output decisions either in stage 1 or stage 2. We assume that the demand is unknown until the end of the first stage. We compute the output levels at equilibrium in each possible role. We also determine ex-ante and ex-post firms’ payoff functions.

Motivations to participate in international trade fairs: the Portuguese experience

Motivations/barriers to participate in ITF

International duopoly with unknown costs

We consider two firms, located in different countries, selling the same homogeneous good in both countries. In each country there is a non negative tariff on imports of the good produced in the other country. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms and also on the welfare of the governments.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.