Cournot competition between a non-profit firm and a for-profit firm with uncertainty

In this paper, we consider a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Asymmetric taxation in a competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms

This paper considers a Cournot competition between a nonprofit firm and a for-profit firm in a homogeneous goods market, with uncertain demand. Given an asymmetric tax schedule, we compute explicitly the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we analize the effects of the tax rate and the degree of altruistic preference on market equilibrium outcomes.

Planning, Cooperation and Competition: A case study in industry and construction in a Portuguese Region

In the present paper we analyzed the behavior of firms in the construction and manufacturing sectors, located in the region of Vale do Sousa, in the north of Portugal. From the literature, even existing some disagreements, it is possible to conclude that planning is crucial for firms survival and growth. Cooperation is another aspect that the literature presents as an important factor for firms sustainability. It also plays a major role in competition, since firms are adopting coopetition strategies. By studying a sample of 251 firms, it was possible to realize, that the majority started their business without a formal planning, and they keep going without using it. In cooperation aspects, there is a lack of cooperation. It was possible to verify, that existing cooperation has some evidence but at a vertical level. These vertical relations were also identified in stakeholder’s involvement.

The Portuguese law on social economy

This study is a reflection on the Portuguese Framework Law on Social Economy, highlighting, from a critical point-of-view, its contribution to the explicit institutional and legal recognition of the social economy sector. It does so by defining the concept of social economy and listing the entities engaged in this sector, by defining its guiding principles and the mechanisms for its promotion and encouragement, and also by describing the creation of a tax and competition regime which will take into account its specificities. The setting up of this foundations of the social economy was based on the constitutional principle of protection of the social and cooperative sector, which substantiates the adoption of differentiating solutions in view of the positive discrimination of this sector.

Quantity-setting competition with differentiated goods under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce differentiated goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.

Maximum-revenue tariff with different roles in a price-setting competition

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science

Privatization in a mixed duopoly with environmental taxes

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

A lei de bases da economia social portuguesa: do projeto ao texto final

ISSN 1577-4430, com fator de impacto, calculado pelo IN-RECS (http://ec3.ugr.es/in-recj/ii/Derecho_Civil-2010.htm), Bases de dados de indexação: LATINDEX, DIALNET, ISOC, COMLUDOC e AGRIS]

Preços de transferência – o caso português

Dissertação de Mestrado apresentado ao Instituto de Contabilidade e Administração do Porto para a obtenção do grau de Mestre em Auditoria, sob orientação da Mestre Gabriela Pinheiro

Government preference, environmental taxes and privatization

We analyse the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for environmental tax revenue. The model that we consider is more general than the one consider in Wang and Wang (2009), in the sense that we put a larger weight in the environment tax revenue than on the other terms of the government's objective function. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels.

Quantity-setting competition under uncertain demand

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that. the firms produce homogeneous goods and that. there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

Quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly

In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choose their output levels in order to maximise their profits. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that there is exactly one perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game. We analyse the variations of the expected profits with the parameters of the model, namely with the parameters of the probability distributions, and with the parameters of the demand and differentiation.

Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty

We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters.

Cournot duopoly with competition in the R&D expenditures

We present a new R&D investment in a Cournot Duopoly model and we analyze the different possible types of Nash R&D investments. We observe that the new production costs region can be decomposed in three economical regions, depending on the Nash R&D investment, showing the relevance of the use of patents in new technologies.