Learning business strategies for competitive electronic marketplaces

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Market simulator designed for developing new agent market strategies based on a complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviors, preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences and game theory for scenario analysis. This tool studies negotiations based on different market mechanisms and, time and behavior dependent strategies. The results of the negotiations between agents are analyzed by data mining algorithms in order to extract rules that give agents feedback to improve their strategies. The system also includes agents that are capable of improving their performance with their own experience, by adapting to the market conditions, and capable of considering other agent reactions.

Agent-based simulation of electronic marketplaces with decision support

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Market simulator designed for analyzing agent market strategies based on a complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviors, preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences and game theory for scenario analysis. The system includes agents that are capable of improving their performance with their own experience, by adapting to the market conditions, and capable of considering other agents reactions.

Adaptive learning in multiagent systems: a forecasting methodology based on error analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. MASCEM is a multi-agent electricity market simu-lator to model market players and simulate their operation in the market. Market players are entities with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting with other players. MASCEM pro-vides several dynamic strategies for agents’ behaviour. This paper presents a method that aims to provide market players strategic bidding capabilities, allowing them to obtain the higher possible gains out of the market. This method uses an auxiliary forecasting tool, e.g. an Artificial Neural Net-work, to predict the electricity market prices, and analyses its forecasting error patterns. Through the recognition of such patterns occurrence, the method predicts the expected error for the next forecast, and uses it to adapt the actual forecast. The goal is to approximate the forecast to the real value, reducing the forecasting error.

Virtual power producers market strategies

This paper presents MASCEM - a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimisation techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. This paper mainly focus on the MASCEM ability to provide the means to model and simulate Virtual Power Producers (VPP). VPPs are represented as a coalition of agents, with specific characteristics and goals. The paper detail some of the most important aspects considered in VPP formation and in the aggregation of new producers and includes a case study.

MASCEM - an electricity market simulator providing coalition support for virtual power players

This paper presents MASCEM - a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimization techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. This paper mainly focus on the MASCEM ability to provide the means to model and simulate Virtual Power Players (VPP). VPPs are represented as a coalition of agents, with specific characteristics and goals. The paper details some of the most important aspects considered in VPP formation and in the aggregation of new producers and includes a case study based on real data.

Dgenco market balancing - cost repartition under light regulation markets

In this paper we present a new methodology, based in game theory, to obtain the market balancing between Distribution Generation Companies (DGENCO), in liberalized electricity markets. The new contribution of this methodology is the verification of the participation rate of each agent based in Nucléolo Balancing and in Shapley Value. To validate the results we use the Zaragoza Distribution Network with 42 Bus and 5 DGENCO.

Desenvolvimento de um sensor óptico para determinação de Norfloxacina

A presente dissertação descreve o desenvolvimento e a caracterização de sensores ópticos com base em membranas de poli(cloreto de vinilo), PVC, para determinação de Norfloxacina em amostras do sector da aquacultura. Estes sensores basearam-se na reacção colorimétrica entre um metal imobilizado em PVC e a Norfloxacina. O metal foi escolhido com base em ensaios prévios de reacção colorimétrica entre a Norfloxacina e várias espécies metálicas, nomeadamente, Fe(III), Al(III), Pb(II), Aluminon, Mo(II), Mn(II), Ni(II), Cu(II), Co(II), Sn(II) e V(V). A reacção mais intensa foi obtida com o Fe(III). Neste sentido, numa primeira fase foram desenvolvidos sensores baseados em Fe(III). O efeito de alguns parâmetros experimentais na resposta desses sensores foi avaliado de modo univariado. Incluem-se aqui o efeito do pH, avaliado entre 2,00 e 6,00, e o da concentração de Fe(III), variada entre cerca de 1,00x10-5 M e 2,00x10-4 M. Os melhores valores foram obtidos a pH 3, para o qual se verificou um comportamento linear entre cerca de 1,00x10-5 M e 1,70x10-4 M de Fe(III). Utilizando as condições seleccionadas anteriormente, procedeu-se à caracterização do complexo sob ponto de vista químico. Os valores obtidos apontaram para a necessidade de um excesso de Fe(III) de, pelo menos, 10 vezes, no sentido de garantir a máxima extensão de complexação. O complexo referido apresentou, nestas condições, um comportamento linear ao longo do intervalo de concentrações de cerca de 7,00x10-5 M a 7,00x10-4 M em NOR. O complexo formado foi estável ao longo de 90 minutos. As condições óptimas para análise desse complexo numa superfície sólida foram obtidas após avaliação do efeito da quantidade de Fe(III) e do tipo e quantidade de solvente mediador (o-nitrofenil octil éter, di-n-octilftalato, dibutilftalato, bis(etilhexil)sebacato, bis(etilhexil)ftalato). O bis(etilhexil)sebacato foi o solvente mediador escolhido e a relação de quantidade entre o PVC e o solvente mediador foi igual a 1:2. O procedimento de preparação do sensor sólido e subsequente optimização foi aplicado a outras espécies metálicas, para além do Fe(III), tais como, Cu(II), Mn(II) e aluminon. A conjugação de todos estes metais permitiu desenvolver um array de sensores para despistagem de Norfloxacina em águas de aquacultura. Algumas membranas sensoras foram aplicadas com sucesso no controlo de Norfloxacina em amostras de águas ambientais dopadas. Os resultados obtidos com membranas de Fe(III) e Cu(II) foram exactos, tendo-se registado valores de concentração próximos dos reais. O método proposto permitiu, por isso, a despistagem rápida e eficaz da presença de um antibiótico em águas ambientais, permitindo ainda o seu doseamento a um baixo custo. Numa perspectiva de rotina, e tendo em vista a despistagem deste antibiótico, este método revelou-se mais rápido e mais barato do que os demais métodos descritos na literatura para este efeito.

Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.

Six thinking hats for electricity markets simulation: adapting meeting tools to agent decision

In almost all industrialized countries, the energy sector has suffered a severe restructuring that originated a greater complexity in market players’ interactions. The complexity that these changes brought made way for the creation of decision support tools that facilitate the study and understanding of these markets. MASCEM – “Multiagent Simulator for Competitive Electricity Markets” arose in this context providing a framework for evaluating new rules, new behaviour, and new participants in deregulated electricity markets. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimisation techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. ALBidS is a multiagent system created to provide decision support to market negotiating players. Fully integrated with MASCEM it considers several different methodologies based on very distinct approaches. The Six Thinking Hats is a powerful technique used to look at decisions from different perspectives. This tool’s goal is to force the thinker to move outside his habitual thinking style. It was developed to be used mainly at meetings in order to “run better meetings, make faster decisions”. This dissertation presents a study about the applicability of the Six Thinking Hats technique in Decision Support Systems, particularly with the multiagent paradigm like the MASCEM simulator. As such this work’s proposal is of a new agent, a meta-learner based on STH technique that organizes several different ALBidS’ strategies and combines the distinct answers into a single one that, expectedly, out-performs any of them.

Stochastic short-term maintenance scheduling of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity market

In the proposed model, the independent system operator (ISO) provides the opportunity for maintenance outage rescheduling of generating units before each short-term (ST) time interval. Long-term (LT) scheduling for 1 or 2 years in advance is essential for the ISO and the generation companies (GENCOs) to decide their LT strategies; however, it is not possible to be exactly followed and requires slight adjustments. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decision-making procedure of an individual GENCO for ST intervals considering the effective coordination with LT plans. Random inputs, such as parameters of the demand function of loads, hourly demand during the following ST time interval and the expected generation pattern of the rivals, are included as scenarios in the stochastic mixed integer program defined to model the payoff-maximizing objective of a GENCO. Scenario reduction algorithms are used to deal with the computational burden. Two reliability test systems were chosen to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model for the ST decision-making process for future planned outages from the point of view of a GENCO.

Legal and political regulation of higher education in Portugal: an evolutionary perspective on the current policy issues and the problem of order

The higher education system in Europe is currently under stress and the debates over its reform and future are gaining momentum. Now that, for most countries, we are in a time for change, in the overall society and the whole education system, the legal and political dimensions have gained prominence, which has not been followed by a more integrative approach of the problem of order, its reform and the issue of regulation, beyond the typical static and classical cost-benefit analyses. The two classical approaches for studying (and for designing the policy measures of) the problem of the reform of the higher education system - the cost-benefit analysis and the legal scholarship description - have to be integrated. This is the argument of our paper that the very integration of economic and legal approaches, what Warren Samuels called the legal-economic nexus, is meaningful and necessary, especially if we want to address the problem of order (as formulated by Joseph Spengler) and the overall regulation of the system. On the one hand, and without neglecting the interest and insights gained from the cost-benefit analysis, or other approaches of value for money assessment, we will focus our study on the legal, social and political aspects of the regulation of the higher education system and its reform in Portugal. On the other hand, the economic and financial problems have to be taken into account, but in a more inclusive way with regard to the indirect and other socio-economic costs not contemplated in traditional or standard assessments of policies for the tertiary education sector. In the first section of the paper, we will discuss the theoretical and conceptual underpinning of our analysis, focusing on the evolutionary approach, the role of critical institutions, the legal-economic nexus and the problem of order. All these elements are related to the institutional tradition, from Veblen and Commons to Spengler and Samuels. The second section states the problem of regulation in the higher education system and the issue of policy formulation for tackling the problem. The current situation is clearly one of crisis with the expansion of the cohorts of young students coming to an end and the recurrent scandals in private institutions. In the last decade, after a protracted period of extension or expansion of the system, i. e., the continuous growth of students, universities and other institutions are competing harder to gain students and have seen their financial situation at risk. It seems that we are entering a period of radical uncertainty, higher competition and a new configuration that is slowly building up is the growth in intensity, which means upgrading the quality of the higher learning and getting more involvement in vocational training and life-long learning. With this change, and along with other deep ones in the Portuguese society and economy, the current regulation has shown signs of maladjustment. The third section consists of our conclusions on the current issue of regulation and policy challenge. First, we underline the importance of an evolutionary approach to a process of change that is essentially dynamic. A special attention will be given to the issues related to an evolutionary construe of policy analysis and formulation. Second, the integration of law and economics, through the notion of legal economic nexus, allows us to better define the issues of regulation and the concrete problems that the universities are facing. One aspect is the instability of the political measures regarding the public administration and on which the higher education system depends financially, legally and institutionally, to say the least. A corollary is the lack of clear strategy in the policy reforms. Third, our research criticizes several studies, such as the one made by the OECD in late 2006 for the Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, for being too static and neglecting fundamental aspects of regulation such as the logic of actors, groups and organizations who are major players in the system. Finally, simply changing the legal rules will not necessary per se change the behaviors that the authorities want to change. By this, we mean that it is not only remiss of the policy maker to ignore some of the critical issues of regulation, namely the continuous non-respect by academic management and administrative bodies of universities of the legal rules that were once promulgated. Changing the rules does not change the problem, especially without the necessary debates form the different relevant quarters that make up the higher education system. The issues of social interaction remain as intact. Our treatment of the matter will be organized in the following way. In the first section, the theoretical principles are developed in order to be able to study more adequately the higher education transformation with a modest evolutionary theory and a legal and economic nexus of the interactions of the system and the policy challenges. After describing, in the second section, the recent evolution and current working of the higher education in Portugal, we will analyze the legal framework and the current regulatory practices and problems in light of the theoretical framework adopted. We will end with some conclusions on the current problems of regulation and the policy measures that are discusses in recent years.

Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.