Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
Data(s) |
02/01/2014
02/01/2014
2013
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Resumo |
In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model. ESEIG/IPP. Investing in people! Ph.D. scholarship, Investing in people! Ph.D. scholarship, Project co-financed by the Sectoral Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013 Priority Axis 1. Education and training in support for growth and development of a knowledge based society Key area of intervention 1.5: Doctoral and post-doctoral programs in support of research. Contract POSDRU/88/1.5/S/60185 - Innovative Doctoral Studies in a Knowledge Based Society, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. |
Identificador |
Ferreira, F., & Bode, O. R. (2013). Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model. Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 18(2), 308 – 315. DOI:10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.001 1007-5704 10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.001 |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Elsevier |
Relação |
Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1007570412002900 |
Direitos |
openAccess |
Palavras-Chave | #Game theory #Industrial organization #Optimization #Stackelberg model #R&D investments #Licensing |
Tipo |
article |