Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model


Autoria(s): Ferreira, Flávio; Bode, Oana R.
Data(s)

02/01/2014

02/01/2014

2013

Resumo

In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.

ESEIG/IPP. Investing in people! Ph.D. scholarship, Investing in people! Ph.D. scholarship, Project co-financed by the Sectoral Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013 Priority Axis 1. Education and training in support for growth and development of a knowledge based society Key area of intervention 1.5: Doctoral and post-doctoral programs in support of research. Contract POSDRU/88/1.5/S/60185 - Innovative Doctoral Studies in a Knowledge Based Society, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

Identificador

Ferreira, F., & Bode, O. R. (2013). Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model. Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation, 18(2), 308 – 315. DOI:10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.001

1007-5704

10.1016/j.cnsns.2012.07.001

http://hdl.handle.net/10400.22/3181

Idioma(s)

eng

Publicador

Elsevier

Relação

Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1007570412002900

Direitos

openAccess

Palavras-Chave #Game theory #Industrial organization #Optimization #Stackelberg model #R&D investments #Licensing
Tipo

article