Sectors and routes in solid waste collection

Collecting and transporting solid waste is a constant problem for municipalities and populations in general. Waste management should take into account the preservation of the environment and the reduction of costs. The goal with this paper is to address a real-life solid waste problem. The case reveals some general and specific characteristics which are not rare, but are not widely addressed in the literature. Furthermore, new methods and models to deal with sectorization and routing are introduced, which can be extended to other applications. Sectorization and routing are tackled following a two-phase approach. In the first phase, a new method is described for sectorization based on electromagnetism and Coulomb’s Law. The second phase addresses the routing problems in each sector. The paper addresses not only territorial division, but also the frequency with which waste is collected, which is a critical issue in these types of applications. Special characteristics related to the number and type of deposition points were also a motivation for this work. A new model for a Mixed Capacitated Arc Routing Problem with Limited Multi-Landfills is proposed and tested in real instances. The computational results achieved confirm the effectiveness of the entire approach.

Learning business strategies for competitive electronic marketplaces

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Market simulator designed for developing new agent market strategies based on a complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviors, preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences and game theory for scenario analysis. This tool studies negotiations based on different market mechanisms and, time and behavior dependent strategies. The results of the negotiations between agents are analyzed by data mining algorithms in order to extract rules that give agents feedback to improve their strategies. The system also includes agents that are capable of improving their performance with their own experience, by adapting to the market conditions, and capable of considering other agent reactions.

Agent-based simulation of electronic marketplaces with decision support

This paper presents a Multi-Agent Market simulator designed for analyzing agent market strategies based on a complete understanding of buyer and seller behaviors, preference models and pricing algorithms, considering user risk preferences and game theory for scenario analysis. The system includes agents that are capable of improving their performance with their own experience, by adapting to the market conditions, and capable of considering other agents reactions.

Adaptive learning in multiagent systems: a forecasting methodology based on error analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, playing in a dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. MASCEM is a multi-agent electricity market simu-lator to model market players and simulate their operation in the market. Market players are entities with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting with other players. MASCEM pro-vides several dynamic strategies for agents’ behaviour. This paper presents a method that aims to provide market players strategic bidding capabilities, allowing them to obtain the higher possible gains out of the market. This method uses an auxiliary forecasting tool, e.g. an Artificial Neural Net-work, to predict the electricity market prices, and analyses its forecasting error patterns. Through the recognition of such patterns occurrence, the method predicts the expected error for the next forecast, and uses it to adapt the actual forecast. The goal is to approximate the forecast to the real value, reducing the forecasting error.

Virtual power producers market strategies

This paper presents MASCEM - a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimisation techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. This paper mainly focus on the MASCEM ability to provide the means to model and simulate Virtual Power Producers (VPP). VPPs are represented as a coalition of agents, with specific characteristics and goals. The paper detail some of the most important aspects considered in VPP formation and in the aggregation of new producers and includes a case study.

MASCEM - an electricity market simulator providing coalition support for virtual power players

This paper presents MASCEM - a multi-agent based electricity market simulator. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimization techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. This paper mainly focus on the MASCEM ability to provide the means to model and simulate Virtual Power Players (VPP). VPPs are represented as a coalition of agents, with specific characteristics and goals. The paper details some of the most important aspects considered in VPP formation and in the aggregation of new producers and includes a case study based on real data.

Dgenco market balancing - cost repartition under light regulation markets

In this paper we present a new methodology, based in game theory, to obtain the market balancing between Distribution Generation Companies (DGENCO), in liberalized electricity markets. The new contribution of this methodology is the verification of the participation rate of each agent based in Nucléolo Balancing and in Shapley Value. To validate the results we use the Zaragoza Distribution Network with 42 Bus and 5 DGENCO.

Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model

In this paper we consider a differentiated Stackelberg model, when the leader firm engages in an R&D process that gives an endogenous cost-reducing innovation. The aim is to study the licensing of the cost-reduction by a two-part tariff. By using comparative static analysis, we conclude that the degree of the differentiation of the goods plays an important role in the results. We also do a direct comparison between our model and Cournot duopoly model.

Six thinking hats for electricity markets simulation: adapting meeting tools to agent decision

In almost all industrialized countries, the energy sector has suffered a severe restructuring that originated a greater complexity in market players’ interactions. The complexity that these changes brought made way for the creation of decision support tools that facilitate the study and understanding of these markets. MASCEM – “Multiagent Simulator for Competitive Electricity Markets” arose in this context providing a framework for evaluating new rules, new behaviour, and new participants in deregulated electricity markets. MASCEM uses game theory, machine learning techniques, scenario analysis and optimisation techniques to model market agents and to provide them with decision-support. ALBidS is a multiagent system created to provide decision support to market negotiating players. Fully integrated with MASCEM it considers several different methodologies based on very distinct approaches. The Six Thinking Hats is a powerful technique used to look at decisions from different perspectives. This tool’s goal is to force the thinker to move outside his habitual thinking style. It was developed to be used mainly at meetings in order to “run better meetings, make faster decisions”. This dissertation presents a study about the applicability of the Six Thinking Hats technique in Decision Support Systems, particularly with the multiagent paradigm like the MASCEM simulator. As such this work’s proposal is of a new agent, a meta-learner based on STH technique that organizes several different ALBidS’ strategies and combines the distinct answers into a single one that, expectedly, out-performs any of them.

Stochastic short-term maintenance scheduling of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity market

In the proposed model, the independent system operator (ISO) provides the opportunity for maintenance outage rescheduling of generating units before each short-term (ST) time interval. Long-term (LT) scheduling for 1 or 2 years in advance is essential for the ISO and the generation companies (GENCOs) to decide their LT strategies; however, it is not possible to be exactly followed and requires slight adjustments. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decision-making procedure of an individual GENCO for ST intervals considering the effective coordination with LT plans. Random inputs, such as parameters of the demand function of loads, hourly demand during the following ST time interval and the expected generation pattern of the rivals, are included as scenarios in the stochastic mixed integer program defined to model the payoff-maximizing objective of a GENCO. Scenario reduction algorithms are used to deal with the computational burden. Two reliability test systems were chosen to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model for the ST decision-making process for future planned outages from the point of view of a GENCO.

Social welfare with a foreign competitor

In this paper, we consider a mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing public (domestic) firm competes against a profit-maximizing private (foreign) firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is less eflScient than the foreign firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of entry of a foreign firm on decisions upon cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare.

Maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly with unknown costs

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm.

Signalling in an international cournot model

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We study the influences of the non-homogeneity of the goods and of the uncertainty on the production costs of the home firm in the signalling strategies by the home firm. We show that some results obtained for homogeneous goods are not robust under non-homogeneity.

Environmental policies in an international mixed duopoly

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm.

Simultaneous decisions or leadership in an international competition

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms.