The use of cues for attention in ancient Greek art: aspects that influence concentration in the work of art and its elements

The goal of this study is to identify cues for the cognitive process of attention in ancient Greek art, aiming to find confirmation of its possible use by ancient Greek audiences and artists. Evidence of cues that trigger attention’s psychological dispositions was searched through content analysis of image reproductions of ancient Greek sculpture and fine vase painting from the archaic to the Hellenistic period - ca. 7th -1st cent. BC. Through this analysis, it was possible to observe the presence of cues that trigger orientation to the work of art (i.e. amplification, contrast, emotional salience, simplification, symmetry), of a cue that triggers a disseminate attention to the parts of the work (i.e. distribution of elements) and of cues that activate selective attention to specific elements in the work of art (i.e. contrast of elements, salient color, central positioning of elements, composition regarding the flow of elements and significant objects). Results support the universality of those dispositions, probably connected with basic competencies that are hard-wired in the nervous system and in the cognitive processes.

Colonialism, political unconscious and cognitive mapping in the space of the film "Captain Phillips"

The purpose of this article has been made through a Marxist analysis of the US film "Captain Phillips" (PaulGreengrass, 2013), based on a true story. I have found how the evolution of capitalism in the West continuesto consolidate the belief reified in a historical and geographical superiority of the political and socioeconomicwestern models regarding Africa and Asia lowers models. At the same time, through categories like dialecticalmaterialism, criticism of diffusionist theory and application of cognitive mapping to large geopoliticalspaces located in most poor areas of the world, I have realized a remark about currently being articulatingthe political unconscious of working class in rich countries and the poor in poor countries, establishing arelationship between the ideological representation that takes an individual from his historical reality (ona scale that moves from local to global), and how he has developed a mental ability to escape of the responsibilityto make a critical review of what's happening around him in all areas. Finally, through physicalspace captured in the film, I have realized a materialist critique of globalized business process that takesplace through the carriage of goods, outlining spatial and cognitively limits of the mentality of our time, bothamong "winners"as among the "losers", based on the spatial movement of capital.

El significado de la prosopopeya de las Leyes en el "Critón" de Platon

El objeto de este trabajo es realizar un estudio iusfilosófico sobre la aparición de las Leyes (nómoi) personificadas de Atenas en el Critón de Platón. La prosopopeya de las Leyes resulta ser un aspecto central para poder comprender la obra, ya que éstas entablan un diálogo imaginario con Sócrates en el cual instalan diversos argumentos filosóficos para fundamentar la autoridad de la pólis. A los fines de identificar el valor argumentativo de este recurso en la obra, analizaré el significado del nómos en la Atenas del siglo V a. C. y la naturaleza de las Leyes en el contexto general del diálogo. Se busca demostrar la importancia que tienen aquéllas para explicar la decisión de Sócrates de beber la cicuta.

El "Fedro" de Platón: un ejercicio de buena retórica engañosa

En este artículo me propongo mostrar que lo que Sócrates hace con Fedro a lo largo de toda la obra no es otra cosa que utilizar la auténtica retórica (con su doble carga, dialéctica y psicológica) que es descrita en la segunda parte del diálogo. Las tensiones, rivalidades y celos de la situación inicial entre ellos expone un perfil representativo de relaciones entre interlocutores con perspectivas intelectuales opuestas. Es preciso disolver la resistencia emocional por medio de una serie de pasos graduales, estratégicos, y ‘engañosos’ (no se puede develar el propio juego desde el principio). Hay que partir de acuerdos, siquiera parciales, para continuar dialogando. Sin embargo, Sócrates también introduce nociones nuevas acerca del amor, pero éstas pasan desapercibidas a un Fedro obsesionado con la imitación de su enamorado Lisias. Hasta que Sócrates decide cortar el juego y cruzar el río. Este corte provoca un giro en ambos personajes: Fedro se dispone a escuchar lo que Sócrates quiere contarle (el mito del carro alado) y Sócrates se revela ante sí mismo como un personaje capaz de ‘encantar’ a Fedro con la belleza rapsódica del relato y superar su propio temor de convertirse en una bestia devoradora. Al final Sócrates muestra su juego a Fedro y le enseña cómo ha sido posible llegar a un auténtico diálogo filosófico, donde pueda tener lugar la enseñanza y el aprendizaje recíprocos.

Eclipses, razón y superstición en las vidas de Nicias y Dión de Plutarco

A partir de un abordaje retórico-literario, nuestro objetivo es indagar las representaciones discursivas de los elementos supersticiosos en la biografía de Nicias y en la de Dión. Tomaremos como ejemplo el eclipse de luna narrado en Nicias 23 y reiterado en Dión 24, para demostrar que mediante la repetición del ejemplo en dos contextos distintos Plutarco nos invita a reflexionar sobre la superstición de un modo más atractivo que la mera exposición teórica de doctrinas filosóficas.

What Heraclitus and Parmenides have in common on Reality and Deception

It is usually assumed that Heraclitus is, exclusively, the philosopher of flux, diversity and opposition while Parmenides puts the case for unity and changelessness. However, there is a significant common understanding of things (though in differing contexts), not simply an accidental similarity of understanding. Both philosophers, critically, distinguish two realms: on the one hand, there is the one, common realm, identical for all, which is grasped by the ‘logos that is common’(Heraclitus) or the steady nous (Parmenides) that follows a right method in order to interpret the real. On the other hand, the realm of multiplicity seen and heard by the senses, when interpreted by ‘barbarian souls’, is not understood in its common unity. Analogously, when grasped by the wandering weak nous it does not comprehend the real’s basic unity. In this paper I attempt to defend the thesis that both thinkers claim that the common logos (to put it in Heraclitean terms) or the steady intellect (to say it with Parmenides) grasp and affirm the unity of the real.