New records of interesting xenophytes in the Iberian Peninsula. V

As a continuation of previous research on the naturalization of non-native vascular plants in the Iberian Peninsula new chorological data are presented for 16 xenophytes recorded between 2010 and 2014, mostly in the provinces of Huelva and Barcelona (Spain) and in the Algarve and Estremadura (Portugal). For each taxon details about distribution, habitats occupied, previous records, degree of naturalization, etc. are provided. Lachenalia bulbifera and Cyperus albostriatus are probably reported for the first time in the wild in Europe, as are Gamochaeta filaginea, and Dysphania anthelmintica and Oenothera lindheimeri for Portugal and Spain respectively. Cosmos bipinnatus is cited as a novelty for the Algarve (Portugal). Newly reported or confirmed for the province of Huelva are: Amaranthus hypochondriacus, Epilobium brachycarpum, Nephrolepis cordifolia, Ficus microcarpa, Tamarix parviflora and Tamarix ramosissima, while Atriplex semibaccata, Chloris truncata, and Elymus elongatus subsp. ponticus are new for Barcelona. Finally, Passiflora caerulea is a novelty for both Barcelona and Huelva provinces.

The gift of the ungiven: Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of giveness facing Levinas’ “there is”

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology of giveness constitutes one of the most outstanding attempts to set up a universal theory of the phenomenologically given as a whole within the framework of contemporary philosophical thought. The aim of the present study is to apply the main categories of this phenomenological theory concerning gift to the singular type of phenomenon represented by the pure indeterminate and anonymous being to which Emmanuel Levinas refers by the name of il y a (“there is”) in his early writings (and also subsequently). Therefore, this concerns examining the multiple specific modes of giveness proper to the impersonal “there is” and also its paradoxical relationship both with the donor and with the receiver of such gift in order to show the possibility of a “third way” of phenomenological investigation. This is a way equally distant from the western traditional concept of Being as “stable presence” and from Levinas’ proposal geared to substitute ontology for ethics as “first philosophy”.

Narrative Deliberation? On Storytelling as a Necessary Component of Public Deliberation

This paper deals with the place of narrative, that is, storytelling, in public deliberation. A distinction is made between weak and strong conceptions of narrative. According to the weak one, storytelling is but one rhetorical device among others with which social actors produce and convey meaning. In contrast, the strong conception holds that narrative is necessary to communicate, and argue, about topics such as the human experience of time, collective identities and the moral and ethical validity of values. The upshot of this idea is that storytelling should be a necessary component of any ideal of public deliberation. Contrary to recent work by deliberative theorists, who tend to adopt the weak conception of narrative, the author argues for embracing the strong one. The main contention of this article is that stories not only have a legitimate place in deliberation, but are even necessary to formulate certain arguments in the fi rst place; for instance, arguments drawing on historical experience. This claim, namely that narrative is constitutive of certain arguments, in the sense that, without it, said reasons cannot be articulated, is illustrated by deliberative theory’s own narrative underpinnings. Finally, certain possible objections against the strong conception of narrative are dispelled.

The Narrative Value of Dance Communication: "habitus", musicality and emotion

The richness of dance comes from the need to work with an individual body. Still, the body of the dancer belongs to plural context, crossed by artistic and social traditions, which locate the artists in a given field. We claim that role conflict is an essential component of the structure of collective artistic creativity. We address the production of discourse in a British dance company, with data that spawns from the ethnography ‘Dance and Cognition’, directed by David Kirsh at the University of California, together with WayneMcGregor-Random Dance. Our Critical Discourse Analysis is based on multiple interviews to the dancers and choreographer. Our findings show how creativity in dance seems to be empirically observable, and thus embodied and distributed shaped by the dance habitus of the particular social context.

Negative Archaeology. The Archaeological Borders of the Present

Nowadays, archaeology is trying to redefine its relation with objects. This change is taking place at the same time as the West is breaking once and for all with the generation who did the rural exodus in the mid of the twentieth century. The present paper proposes a revision of the conditions that allow us to both define this rupture and at the same time determine our affinity with materiality. This is done through a reconsideration of the relation between the past and the present and the dynamics marking this difference. We are situated in a moment when the experience of time is shifting and thus so is the integrity of archaeological objects. Under the name of Negative Archaeology, the border between past and present is explored. This border determines the creation of the past in a present which intends to homogenise changes. Archaeology is a unique discipline which could prevent this process, or at least bear witness to the dynamics to which objects seem to be subjected. Obscolescence is introduced as a concept in an attempt to name the aforementioned problem.

Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.