Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom
| Data(s) |
27/04/2016
|
|---|---|
| Resumo |
the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’. |
| Formato |
application/pdf |
| Identificador |
http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/52110 10.5209/rev_RESF.2016.v41.n1.52110 |
| Publicador |
Ediciones Complutense |
| Relação |
http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/52110/48119 /*ref*/Allison, H. (1990): Kant’s Theory of Freedom, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. /*ref*/Brandom, R. B. (2009): Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. /*ref*/Dennett, D. (1987): The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, The MIT Press. /*ref*/Dennett, D. (2013): Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, New York, W. W. Norton & Company. /*ref*/Devries, W. A. (1991): “The Dialectic of Teleology”, Philosophical Topics, 19, pp. 51-70. /*ref*/Fichte, J. G. (1797): “Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, für Leser, die schon ein philosophisches System haben”, in I. H. Fichte (ed.) Fichtes Werke, vol. 1. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1971, pp. 451-518. /*ref*/Fichte, J. G. (1798): Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, in I. H. Fichte (ed.), Fichtes Werke, vol. 4, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1971, pp. 1-365. /*ref*/Fichte, J. G. (1798/99): Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, in E. Fuchs (ed.), Krause manuscript, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1994 (cited according to the Gesamtausgabe pagination). /*ref*/Fichte, J. G. (1800): Die Bestimmung des Menschen, ed. F. Medicus y H. D. Brandt, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 2000. /*ref*/Hegel, G. W. F. (1801): “Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie”, in H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler (eds.), Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1968, pp. 1-92. /*ref*/Hegel, G. W. F. (1802): “Glauben und Wissen”, in H. Buchner and O. Pöggeler (eds.), Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1968, pp. 315-414. /*ref*/Hegel, G. W. F. (1807): Phänomenologie des Geistes, in E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.), Werke, vol. 3, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970. /*ref*/Hegel, G. W. F. (1812-1816): Wissenschaft der Logik, in E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.), Werke, vols. 5-6, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1970. /*ref*/Hegel, G. W. F. (1821): Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.), Werke, vol. 7, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970. /*ref*/Hegel, G. W. F. (1822): “Fragment zur Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes”, in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 15, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 207-249. /*ref*/Hegel, G. W. F. (1830): Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, in E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.) Werke, vols. 8-10, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1970. /*ref*/HÖSLE, V. (1987): Hegels System. Der Idealismus der Subjektivität und das Problem der Intersubjektivität, Hamburg, Felix Meiner. /*ref*/Jacobi, F. H. (1785): Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, ed. Marion Lauschke, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 2000. /*ref*/Kant, I. (1781/87): Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. J. Timmermann, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1998. /*ref*/Kant, I. (1785): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe, vol. IV, 1911. /*ref*/Kant, I. (1788): Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe, vol. V, 1908. /*ref*/Kant, I. (1790): Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. H. J. Klemme, Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 2001. /*ref*/Kreines, J. (2004): “Hegel’s Critique of Pure Mechanism and the Philosophical Appeal of the Logic Project”, European Journal of Philosophy, 12(1), pp. 38-74. /*ref*/Maraguat, E. (2013): “Mecanismo y teleología en la Lógica de Hegel”, Diánoia, LVIII/70, pp. 59-87. /*ref*/Mcdowell, J. (2009): “Towards a Reading of Hegel on Action in the ‘Reason’ Chapter of the Phenomenology”, in Having the World in View, Cambridge/London, Harvard University Press, pp. 166-184. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (1987): “Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind”, in Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 29-55. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (1989): Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (1999): “Naturalness and Mindedness: Hegel’s Compatibilism”, European Journal of Philosophy, 7(2), pp. 194-212. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (2000a): “Fichte’s Alleged One-Sided, Subjective, Psychological Idealism”, in S. Sedgwick (ed.), The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 147-170. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (2000b): “What is the Question for which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition is the Answer”, European Journal of Philosophy, 8(2), pp. 155-172. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (2000c): “Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: The Realization of Freedom”, in K. Ameriks (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 180-199. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (2005): “Brandom’s Hegel”, European Journal of Philosophy, 13(3), pp. 381-408. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (2008): Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (2010): “Participants and Spectators”, in http://onthehuman.org/2010/04/participants_and_spectators/. /*ref*/Pippin, R. (2013): “Back to Hegel?”, Mediations, 26(1–2), pp. 7-28. /*ref*/Renault, E. (2012): “The Naturalistic Side of Hegel’s Pragmatism”, Critical Horizons, 13(2), pp. 244-274. /*ref*/Rorty, R. (2009): “Comment on Robert Pippin’s ‘Naturalness and Mindedness: Hegel’s Compatibilism’”, European Journal of Philosophy, 7(2), pp. 213-216. /*ref*/Sellars, W. (1963): “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, in Science, Perception and Reality, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 1-40. /*ref*/Stekeler-weithofer, P. (2005): Philosophie des Selbstbewußtseins. Hegels System als Formanalyse von Wissen und Autonomie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp. /*ref*/Strawson, P. F. (1974), Freedom and Resentment, London, Methuen. /*ref*/Taylor, Ch. (1975): Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. /*ref*/Taylor, Ch. (1985): “Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind”, in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 77-96. /*ref*/Willaschek, M. (2010): “The primacy of practical reason and the idea of a practical postulate”, in A. Reath and J. Timmermann (eds.), Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 168-196. /*ref*/Wolff, M. (1992): Das Körper-Seele Problem. Kommentar zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830), § 389, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann. /*ref*/Wood, A. W. (1984): “Kant’s Compatibilism”, in A. W. Wood (ed.), Self and Nature in Kant’s Philosophy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 73-101. /*ref*/Yeomans, Ch. (2012): Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency,Oxford, Oxford University Press. |
| Direitos |
LICENCIA DE USO: Los artículos a texto completo incluidos en el Portal de Revistas Científicas Complutenses son de acceso libre y propiedad de sus autores y/o editores. Por tanto, cualquier acto de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y/o transformación total o parcial requiere el consentimiento expreso y escrito de aquéllos. Cualquier enlace al texto completo de los artículos del Portal de Revistas Científicas Complutenses debe efectuarse a la URL oficial de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid LICENCE OF USE: The full text articles included on the Scientific Journals of the Complutense website are open access and the property of their authors and/or publishers. Therefore, any reproduction, distribution, public communication and/or total or partial transformation requires their express and written consent. Links to the full text of the articles on the Scientific Journals of the Complutense website should be to the official URL of the Complutense University of Madrid. |
| Fonte |
Revista de Filosofía (Madrid); Vol 41, No 1 (2016); 111-134 |
| Palavras-Chave | #German Idealism; Kant; Fichte; Spirit; postulate; teleology; mechanism; naturalism; self-legislation; autonomy; assumption; faith; Science of Logic; Idea; intentional stance; transcendental philosophy; voluntarism; compatibilism; objectivity; action. |
| Tipo |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article Artículo revisado por pares info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
