Reconsidering Relativism and Intentionalism in Interpretation : Donald Davidson, Hermeneutics, and Pragmatism

This study focuses on two philosophical issues related to the interpretation of art. Firstly, it considers the role of authorial intentions in interpretation. Secondly, the study raises the issue of relativism in interpretation through a discussion of the relativistic tendencies apparent in the views of three major figures of contemporary philosophy: Joseph Margolis, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Richard Rorty. The major goal of the thesis is to develop a theory of interpretation supporting the role of authorial intentions in interpretation on the basis of Donald Davidson s late philosophy of language and the holistic account of interpretation that underlies different parts of his philosophy. It is my belief that an intentionalist view of interpretation built on Davidsonian elements manages to form the most convincing defense of that interpretive position against the skepticism present in the views of Margolis, Gadamer, and Rorty. The theoretical issues addressed in the thesis are illuminated by discussions of case-examples, most importantly Richard Wagner s The Valkyrie, Thomas Adés America: A Prophecy, and some symphonies by Dimitri Shostakovich. In chapter one, I present a critical discussion of Margolis robust relativism. While finding Margolis criticism of the self-refutive argument plausible, I, nevertheless, argue that the relativistic logic Margolis offers should not be favored in interpretation. The first parts of chapter two outline Davidsonian intentionalism by presenting a reading of Davidson s later work in philosophy of language and mind, and by indicating its relationship to Davidson s views of literature. Then, I shall compare Davidson s ideas with some recent modest forms of intentionalism found in analytic aesthetics, and argue that Davidsonian intentionalism is in many respects more satisfactory compared to them. Chapter three engages Gadamer s hermeneutics by defending E.D. Hirsch s criticism of Gadamer. Uncovering the shortcomings in the replies of Gadamer s followers to Hirsch s criticism serves as a basis for the defense of intentionalism in interpretation carried out in the chapter. That defense is then extended with a discussion of some recent hermeneutic readings of Davidson s views. Chapter four deals with the standing of intentionalism through Rorty s pragmatist approach to literature. By indicating the position of pragmatist notions of aesthetic experience and imagination in Davidsonian intentionalism, it is shown that an intentionalist approach need not be as impoverished with regard to the value Rorty attributes to literature as he assumes. The concluding chapter outlines some ways in which one can be a pluralist with regard to art and interpretation without falling into relativism.

The Homeless Etiquette : Social Interaction and Behavior Among the Homeless in Taito Ward, Tokyo

The thesis focuses on the social interaction and behavior of the homeless living in Tokyo's Taito Ward. The study is based on the author's own ethnographic field research carried out in the autumn 2003. The chosen methodologies were based on the methodology called "participant observation", and they were used depending on the context. The ethnographic field research was carried out from the mid-August to the beginning of the October in 2003. The most important targets of the research were three separate loosely knit groups placed in certain parts of Taito Ward. One of these groups was based in proximity to the Ueno train station, one group gathered every morning around a homeless support organization called San'yûkai, and one was based in Tamahime Park located in the old San'ya area of Tokyo. The analysis is based on the aspects of Takie Sugiyama Lebra's theory of "social relativism". Lebra's theory consists of the following, arguably universal aspects: belongingness, empathy, dependence, place in the society, and reciprocity. In addition, all the interaction and behavior is tied to the context and the situation. According to Lebra, ritual and intimate situations produce similar action, which is socially relative. Of these, the norms of the ritual behavior are more regulated, while the intimate bahavior is less spontaneous. On the contrary, an anomic situation produces anomic behavior, which is not socially relative. Lebra's theory is critically reviewed by the author of the thesis, and the author has attempted to modify the theory to make it more adaptable to the present-day society and to the analysis. Erving Goffman's views of the social interaction and Anthony Giddens' theories about the social structures have been used as complementary thoretical basis. The aim of the thesis is to clarify, how and why the interaction and the behavior of some homeless individuals in some situations follow the aspects of Lebra's "social relativism", and on the other hand, why in some situations they do not. In the latter cases the answers can be sought from regional and individual differences, or from the inaptness of the theory to analyze the presented situation. Here, a significant factor is the major finding of the field study: the so called "homeless etiquette", which is an abstract set of norms and values that influences the social interaction and behavior of the homeless, and with which many homeless individuals presented in the study complied. The fundamental goal of the thesis is to reach profound understanding about the daily life of the homeless, whose lives were studied. The author argues that this kind of profound understanding is necessary in looking for sustainable solutions in the areas of social and housing policy to improve the position of the homeless and the qualitative functioning of the society.

Scheffleriläinen rationaalisuus ja kasvatustodellisuuden monikerroksisuus : Jännitteitä ja ratkaisuja Israel Schefflerin kasvatusfilosofiassa

The study is a philosophical analysis of Israel Scheffler’s philosophy of education, focusing on three crucial conceptions in his philosophy: the conception of rationality, the conception of human nature, and the conception of reality. The interrelations of these three concepts as well as their relations to educational theorizing are analysed and elaborated. A conceptual problem concerning Scheffler’s ideal of rationality derives from Scheffler’s supposition of the strong analogy between science education and moral education in terms of the ideal of rationality. This analogy is argued to be conceptually problematic, since the interconnections of rationality, objectivity, and truth, appear to differ from each other in the realms of ethics and science, given the presuppositions of ontological realism and ethical naturalism, to which Scheffler explicitly subscribes. This study considers two philosophical alternatives for solving this problem. The first alternative relates the analogy to the normative concept of personhood deriving from the teleological understanding of human nature. Nevertheless, this position turns out to be problematic for Scheffler, since he rejects all teleological thinking in his philosophy. The problem can be solved, as it is argued, by limiting Scheffler’s rejection of teleology – in light of his philosophical outlook on the whole – in a manner that allows a modest version of a teleological conception of human nature. The second alternative, based especially on Scheffler’s later contributions, is to suggest that reality is actually more complex and manifold than it appears to be in light of a contemporary naturalist worldview. This idea of plurealism – Scheffler’s synthesis of pluralism and realism – is represented especially in Scheffler’s contributions related to his debate with Nelson Goodman dealing with both constructivism and realism. The idea of plurealism is not only related to the ethics-science-distinction, but is more widely related to the relationship between ontological realism and the incommensurable systems of description in diverse realms of human understanding. The Scheffler-Goodman debate is also analysed in relation to the contemporary constructivism-realism debate in educational philosophy. In terms of educational questions, Scheffler’s plurealism is argued as offering a fruitful perspective. Scheffler’s philosophy of education can be interpreted as searching for solutions to the problems deriving from the tension between the tradition of analytical philosophy and the complexity and multiplicity of educational reality. The complexity of reality combined with the supposition of the limitedness of human knowledge does not lead Scheffler to relativism or particularism, but, in contrast, Schefflerian formulations of rationality and objectivity preserve the possibility for critical inquiry in all realms of educational reality. In light of this study, Scheffler’s philosophy of education provides an exceptional example of combining ontological realism, epistemological fallibilism, and the defence of the ideal of rationality, combined with a wide-ranging understanding of educational reality.

Konstruktiivisen linjakkuuden perusteita etsimässä : Systemaattinen analyysi John Biggsin esittämistä yliopisto-opetuksen lähtökohdista

The aim of this study is to explore by systematic textual analysis the crucial conceptions of constructive alignment and to reconstruct the concept of constructive alignment and examine the relation between conceptual relationships in John Biggs’s texts. In this study, I have also analyzed the presuppositions of the concept of constructive alignment and its possible implications. The research material includes Biggs’s (1996b; 2003) article entitled Enhancing Teaching through Constructive Alignment and book entitled Teaching for Quality Learning at University. The primary purpose of the systematic textual analysis is to reconstruct concepts and gain access to a new or more profound understanding of the concepts. The main purpose of the constructive alignment is to design a teaching system that supports and encourages students to adopt a deep approach learning. At the center of the constructive alignment are two concepts: constructivism in learning and alignment in teaching. A tension was detected between these concepts. Biggs assumes that students’ learning activities are primed by the teaching. Because of this it is not important what the teacher does. At the same time he emphasizes that teaching interacts with learning. The teacher’s task is to support student’s appropriate learning activities. On the basis of the analysis, I conclude these conceptions are not mutually exclusive. Interaction between teaching and learning has an effect on student’s learning activities. The most essential benefit of the model of constructive alignment is that Biggs brings together and considers teaching at the same level with learning. A weakness of Biggs’s model relates to the theoretical basis and positions of the concept of constructive alignment. There are some conflicts between conceptions of epistemology in Biggs’s texts. In addition, Biggs writes about constructivism also as conceptions of epistemology, but doesn’t consider implications of that position or what follows or doesn’t follow from that commitment. On the basis of the analysis, I suggest that constructivism refers in Biggs’s texts rather to constructivism in learning than philosophical constructivism. In light of this study, constructive alignment doesn´t lead to philosophical constructivism. That’s why constructive alignment stays out of idealism. Biggs’s way of thinking about teachers possibility to confronting students’ misconceptions and evaluate and assess students’ constructions support a realist purpose in terms of philosophical stance. Realism does not drift toward general problems of relativism, like lack of criteria for assessing or evaluate these constructions.

From Habits to Social Structures : Pragmatism and Contemporary Social Theory

Pragmatism has sometimes been taken as a catchphrase for epistemological stances in which anything goes. However, other authors argue that the real novelty and contribution of this tradition has to do with its view of action as the context in which all things human take place. Thus, it is action rather than, for example, discourses that should be our starting point in social theory. The introductory section of the book situates pragmatism (especially the ideas of G. H. Mead and John Dewey) within the field and tradition of social theory. This introductory also contextualizes the main core of the book which consists of four chapters. Two of these chapters have been published as articles in scientific journals and one in an edited book. All of them discuss the core problem of social theory: how is action related to social structures (and vice versa)? The argument is that habitual action is the explanation for the emergence of social structures from our action. Action produces structures and social reproduction takes place when action is habitualized; that is, when we develop social dispositions to act in a certain manner in familiar environments. This also means that even though the physical environment is the same for all of us, our habits structure it into different kinds of action possibilities. Each chapter highlights these general insights from different angles. Practice theory has gained momentum in recent years and it has many commonalities with pragmatism because both highlight the situated and corporeal character of human activity. One famous proponent of practice theory is Margaret Archer who has argued that the pragmatism of G. H. Mead leads to an oversocialized conception of selfhood. Mead does indeed present a socialized view of selfhood but this is a meta-sociological argument rather than a substantial sociological claim. Accordingly, one can argue that in this general sense intersubjectivity precedes subjectivity and not the other way around. Such a view does not indicate that our social relation would necessarily "colonize" individual action because there is a place for internal conversations (in Archer s terminology); it is especially in those phases of action where it meets obstacles due to the changes of the environment. The second issue discussed has the background assumption that social structures can fruitfully be conceptualized as institutions. A general classification of different institution theories is presented and it is argued that there is a need for a habitual theory of institutions due to the problems associated with these other theories. So-called habitual institutionalism accounts for institutions in terms of established and prevalent social dispositions that structure our social interactions. The germs of this institution theory can be found in the work of Thorstein Veblen. Since Veblen s times, these ideas have been discussed for example, by the economist Geoffrey M. Hodgson. His ideas on the evolution of institutions are presented but a critical stance is taken towards his tendency of defining institutions with the help of rules because rules are not always present in institutions. Accordingly, habitual action is the most basic but by no means the only aspect of institutional reproduction. The third chapter deals with theme of action and structures in the context of Pierre Bourdieu s thought. Bourdieu s term habitus refers to a system of dispositions which structure social fields. It is argued that habits come close to the concept of habitus in the sense that the latter consists of particular kinds of habits; those that are related to the reproduction of socioeconomic positions. Habits are thus constituents of a general theory of societal reproduction whereas habitus is a systematic combination of socioeconomic habits. The fourth theme relates to issues of social change and development. The capabilities approach has been associated with the name of Amartya Sen, for example, and it underscores problems inhering in economistic ways of evaluating social development. However, Sen s argument has some theoretical problems. For example, his theory cannot adequately confront the problem of relativism. In addition, Sen s discussion lacks also a theory of the role of the public. With the help of arguments derived from pragmatism, one gets an action-based, socially constituted view of freedom in which the role of the public is essential. In general, it is argued that a socially constituted view of agency does not necessarily to lead to pessimistic conclusions about the freedom of action.