The sources of moral motivation : studies on empathy, guilt, shame and values

The goals of this study were to analyze the forms of emotional tendencies that are likely to motivate moral behaviors, and to find correlates for these tendencies. In study 1, students narratives of their own guilt or shame experiences were analyzed. The results showed that pure shame was more likely to motivate avoidance than reparation, whereas guilt and combination of guilt and shame were likely to motivate reparation. However, all types of emotion could lead to chronic rumination if the person was not clearly responsible for the situation. In study 2, the relations of empathy with two measures of guilt were examined in a sample of 13- to 16-year-olds (N=113). Empathy was measured using Davis s IRI and guilt by Tangney s TOSCA and Hoffman s semi-projective story completion method that includes two different scenarios, guilt over cheating and guilt over inaction. Empathy correlated more strongly with both measures of guilt than the two measures correlated with each other. Hoffman s guilt over inaction was more strongly associated with empathy measures in girls than in boys, whereas for guilt over cheating the pattern was the opposite. Girls and boys who describe themselves as empathetic may emphasize different aspect of morality and feel guilty in different contexts. In study 3, cultural and gender differences in guilt and shame (TOSCA) and value priorities (the Schwartz Value Survey) were studied in samples of Finnish (N=156) and Peruvian (N=159) adolescents. Gender differences were found to be larger and more stereotypical among the Finns than among the Peruvians. Finnish girls were more prone to guilt and shame than boys were, whereas among the Peruvians there was no gender difference in guilt, and boys were more shame-prone than girls. The results support the view that psychological gender differences are largest individualistic societies. In study 4, the relations of value priorities to guilt, shame and empathy were examined in two samples, one of 15 19-year-old high school students (N = 207), and the other of military conscripts (N = 503). Guilt was, in both samples, positively related to valuing universalism, benevolence, tradition, and conformity, and negatively related to valuing power, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. The results for empathy were similar, but the relation to the openness conservation value dimension was weaker. Shame and personal distress were weakly related to values. In sum, shame without guilt and the TOSCA shame scale are tendencies that are unlikely to motivate moral behavior in Finnish cultural context. Guilt is likely to be connected to positive social behaviors, but excessive guilt can cause psychological problems. Moral emotional tendencies are related to culture, cultural conceptions of gender and to individual value priorities.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

The Art of Sympathy : Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion in Fiction

"The Art of Sympathy: Forms of Moral and Emotional Persuasion" in Fiction is an interdisciplinary study that looks closely at the ways that stories evoke sympathy, and the significance of this emotion for the development of moral attitudes and awareness. By linking readers' emotional responses to fiction with the potential impact of such responses on "the moral imagination," the study builds on empirical research conducted by literary scholars and psychologists into the emotional effects of reading fiction, as well as social psychological research into the connections between empathy/sympathy and moral development. I first investigate the dynamics of readers beliefs regarding characters in fictional narratives, and the nature of the emotions that they may experience as a result of those beliefs. The analysis demonstrates that there are important similarities between real emotions and emotions generated by fiction. Recognizing these similarities, I claim, can help us to conceptualize the nature of sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Building on these assertions, I then draw on research from social psychology and philosophy to develop a comprehensive definition of sympathy and to clarify the ways in which sympathy operates, both in people s daily lives and in readers sympathetic responses to fictional characters. Having established this definition and delineated its practical implications, I then examine how particular stories, through a variety of narrative techniques, persuade readers to feel sympathy for characters who are unsympathetic in certain ways. In order to verify my claims about the impact of these stories on readers emotions, I also review the results of tests that I conducted with nearly 200 adolescent readers. Through these tests, which were constructed and scored according to methods prevalent in social psychological research, it was determined that a majority of readers felt sympathy for the protagonists in two of the stories included in the study. These results were combined with data from an additional test, a standard measure of empathy and sympathy in the field of social psychology. The cross-tabulation of these results suggests that there was not a strong connection between readers responses and their general tendencies to feel sympathy for others. This finding would appear to support my hypotheses regarding the sympathetic persuasiveness of the stories in question. In light of these results, finally, I consider the potential contribution that fiction can make to adolescent emotional and moral development and the implications of that potential for future language arts curricula in the schools. In particular, I suggest the pedagogical importance of providing adolescents with opportunities to engage with the lives of fictional characters, and especially to experience feelings of sympathy for individuals towards whom they ordinarily might feel aversion.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

A Literary Turn : Rethinking the Roles of Generalization and Theory in Anglo-American Moral Philosophy

This work investigates the role of narrative literature in late-20th century and contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy. It aims to show the trend of reading narrative literature for purposes of moral philosophy from the 1970 s and early 80 s to the present day as a part of a larger movement in Anglo-American moral philosophy, and to present a view of its significance for moral philosophy overall. Chapter 1 provides some preliminaries concerning the view of narrative literature which my discussion builds on. In chapter 2 I give an outline of how narrative literature is considered in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy, and connect this use to the broad trend of neo-Aristotelian ethics in this context. In chapter 3 I connect the use of literature to the idea of the non-generalizability of moral perception and judgment, which is central to the neo-Aristotelian trend, as well as to a range of moral particularisms and anti-theoretical positions of late 20th century and contemporary ethics. The joint task of chapters 2 and 3 is to situate the trend of reading narrative literature for the purposes of moral philosophy in the present context of moral philosophy. In the following two chapters, 4 and 5, I move on from the particularizing power of narrative literature, which is emphasized by neo-Aristotelians and particularists alike, to a broader under-standing of the intellectual potential of narrative literature. In chapter 4 I argue that narrative literature has its own forms of generalization which are enriching for our understanding of the workings of ethical generalizations in philosophy. In chapter 5 I discuss Iris Murdoch s and Martha Nussbaum s respective ways of combining ethical generality and particularity in a philosophical framework where both systematic moral theory and narrative literature are taken seriously. In chapter 6 I analyse the controversy between contemporary anti-theoretical conceptions of ethics and Nussbaum s refutation of these. I present my suggestion for how the significance of the ethics/literature discussion for moral philosophy can be understood if one wants to overcome the limitations of both Nussbaum s theory-centred, equilibrium-seeking perspective, and the anti-theorists repudiation of theory. I call my position the inclusive approach .

On the moderators of trait avoidance motivation in predicting cognitive biases and adjustment

The present research focused on motivational and personality traits measuring individual differences in the experience of negative affect, in reactivity to negative events, and in the tendency to avoid threats. In this thesis, such traits (i.e., neuroticism and dispositional avoidance motivation) are jointly referred to as trait avoidance motivation. The seven studies presented here examined the moderators of such traits in predicting risk judgments, negatively biased processing, and adjustment. Given that trait avoidance motivation encompasses reactivity to negative events and tendency to avoid threats, it can be considered surprising that this trait does not seem to be related to risk judgments and that it seems to be inconsistently related to negatively biased information processing. Previous work thus suggests that some variable(s) moderate these relations. Furthermore, recent research has suggested that despite the close connection between trait avoidance motivation and (mal)adjustment, measures of cognitive performance may moderate this connection. However, it is unclear whether this moderation is due to different response processes between individuals with different cognitive tendencies or abilities, or to the genuinely buffering effect of high cognitive ability against the negative consequences of high trait avoidance motivation. Studies 1-3 showed that there is a modest direct relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments, but studies 2-3 demonstrated that state motivation moderates this relation. In particular, individuals in an avoidance state made high risk judgments regardless of their level of trait avoidance motivation. This result explained the disparity between the theoretical conceptualization of avoidance motivation and the results of previous studies suggesting that the relation between trait avoidance motivation and risk judgments is weak or nonexistent. Studies 5-6 examined threat identification tendency as a moderator for the relationship between trait avoidance motivation and negatively biased processing. However, no evidence for such moderation was found. Furthermore, in line with previous work, the results of studies 5-6 suggested that trait avoidance motivation is inconsistently related to negatively biased processing, implying that theories concerning traits and information processing may need refining. Study 7 examined cognitive ability as a moderator for the relation between trait avoidance motivation and adjustment, and demonstrated that cognitive ability moderates the relation between trait avoidance motivation and indicators of both self-reported and objectively measured adjustment. Thus, the results of Study 7 supported the buffer explanation for the moderating influence of cognitive performance. To summarize, the results showed that it is possible to find factors that consistently moderate the relations between traits and important outcomes (e.g. adjustment). Identifying such factors and studying their interplay with traits is one of the most important goals of current personality research. The present thesis contributed to this line of work in relation to trait avoidance motivation.

Is a Majority Enough? Psychological Well-being and Its Relation to Academic and Prosocial Motivation, Self-regulation and Achievement at school

This cross-sectional study analyzed psychological well-being at school using the Self-Determination theory as a theoretical frame-work. The study explored basic psychological needs fulfillment (BPNS), academic (SRQ-A), prosocial self-regulation (SRQ-P) and motivation, and their relationship with achievement in general, special and selective education (N=786, 444 boys, 345 girls, mean age 12 yrs 8 mths). Motivation starts behavior which becomes guided by self-regulation. The perceived locus of control (PLOC) affects how self-determined this behavior will be; in other words, to what extent it is autonomously regulated. In order learn and thus to be able to accept external goals, a student has to feel emotionally safe and have sufficient ego-flexibility—all of which builds on satisfied psychological needs. In this study those conditions were explored. In addition to traditional methods Self-organizing maps (SOM), was used in order to cluster the students according to their well-being, self-regulation, motivation and achievement scores. The main impacts of this research were: a presentation of the theory based alternative of studying psychological well-being at school and usage of both the variable and person-oriented approach. In this Finnish sample the results showed that the majority of students felt well, but the well-being varied by group. Overall about for 11–15% the basic needs were deprived depending on the educational group. Age and educational group were the most effective factors; gender was important in relation to prosocial identified behavior. Although the person-oriented SOM-approach, was in a large extent confirming what was no-ticed by using comparison of the variables: the SEN groups had lower levels of basic needs fulfillment and less autonomous self-regulation, interesting deviations of that rule appeared. Some of the SEL- and GEN-group members ended up in the more unfavorable SOM-clusters, and not all SEN-group members belonged to the poorest clusters (although not to the best either). This evidence refines the well-being and self-regulation picture, and may re-direct intervention plans, and turn our focus also on students who might otherwise remain unnoticed. On the other hand, these results imply simultaneously that in special education groups the average is not the whole truth. On the basis of theoretical and empirical considerations an intervention model was sug-gested. The aim of the model was to shift amotivation or external motivation in a more intrinsic direction. According to the theoretical and empirical evidence this can be achieved first by studying the self-concept a student has, and then trying to affect both inner and environmental factors—including a consideration of the basic psychological needs. Keywords: academic self-regulation, prosocial self-regulation, basic psychological needs, moti-vation, achievement

Spirituality of Finnish peacekeepers

The previous academic research on Finnish peacekeeping has clarified the operative and historical aspects of Finnish peacekeeping lacking the view of an individual who does the actual peacekeeping work. This research is based on the underlying theoretical assumption of human beings possessing different kinds of talents and intelligences creating a holistic entity. In this broad perspective spirituality was explored as an umbrella concept, as a holistic ability or talent, that can be explored as the deepest aspect of defining what it means to be human. The theoretical framework incorporated the concept of an intelligence, which is defined in Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences as the ability to solve problems, or to create products, that are valued within one or more cultural settings (Gardner, 1993, x). The viability of this theory was studied in the sample of Finnish peacekeepers. Spirituality in the theoretical and conceptual horizon was viewed as an extension of Gardner's theory of intelligences as one potential Gardnerian intelligence candidate. In addition to Gardner's theory, spirituality was explored as sensitivity which includes capacities such as sensing awareness, sensing mystery and sensing value (Hay, 1998). Also the practical aspects of spirituality were taken in account as shown in our everyday lives giving us the direction and influencing our social responsibilities and concerns (Bradford, 1995). Spirituality was explored also involving the element of the peacekeepers' community, the element of personal moral orientations and in the domain of religion and coping. The purpose of this research aimed in two dimensions. First, the aim was to outline the intelligence profile and the spiritual sensitivity profile of peacekeepers. Second, the aim was to understand qualitatively the nature of peacekeepers' spirituality The research interests were studied with different kinds of peacekeepers. Applying the mixed methods approach the research was conducted in two phases: first the former SFOR peacekeepers (N=6) were interviewed and the data was analysed. Inspired by the primary findings of these interviews, the data for the case-study of one peacekeeper was collected in co-operation with one former SFOR peacekeeper (N=1). In the second phase the data was collected from KFOR peacekeepers through the quantitative MI-Survey and the spiritual sensitivity survey (N=195). The quantitative method was used to outline the intelligence profile and the spiritual sensitivity profile of peacekeepers (N=195). In the mixed methods approach this method highlighted the general overview of intelligence traits and spiritual sensitivity of peacekeepers. In the mixed methods approach the qualitative method including interviews (N=6) and a case-study of one peacekeeper (N=1) increased subjective, qualitative information of spirituality of peacekeepers. The intelligence profile of peacekeepers highlighted the bodily-kinesthetic and interpersonal dimensions as the practical and social aspects of peacekeepers. Strong inter-item dependencies in the intrapersonal intelligence profile meant that peacekeepers possess a self-reflection and self-knowledge component and they reflect on deep psychological and philosophical issues. Regarding the spiritual sensitivity, peacekeepers found awareness-sensing, mystery-sensing, value-sensing and community-sensing important. The community-sensing emphasised a strong will to advance peace and to help people who are in need: things that are close to the heart of the peacekeepers. These results depicted practicality, being socially capable, and reflecting one's inner world as essential to peacekeepers. Moreover, spirituality as peacekeepers' moral endeavour became clearer because the sub-model of their community-sensing described morally charged destinations: advancing peace and helping people in need. In the qualitative findings peacekeepers articulated justice orientation and rule-following characterising the nature of peacekeepers' moral attitude and moral call (Kohlberg, 1969). An ethic of care (Gilligan, 1982) describes mainly female moral orientation, but the findings revealed that an ethic of care is also an important agent supporting strongly male peacekeepers in their aim to carry out qualitatively good peacekeeping work. The moral endeavour was voiced, when the role of religion in coping meant the assessment of the a way of life, a way of conduct, a way of being truthful to one's own values in confusing surroundings. The practical level of spiritual and religious contemplation was voiced as morally charged inner motivation to fulfil one's duties and at the same time to cope with various peacekeeping challenges. The results of different data sets were combined and interpreted as the moral endeavour, which characterises peacekeepers' spirituality. As the combining result, the perspective of peacekeepers' spirituality is considered moral or at least morally charged.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Suomalaisten yritysten vapaaehtoinen sosiaalinen vastuu : Sidosryhmäviitekehys yritysten ja ulkoisten sidosryhmien edustajien näkemyksissä

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is no longer only an issue of companies but a concern shared by e.g. the European Union, the International Labour Organization, labour market organizations and many others. This thesis examines what kind of voluntary corporate social responsibility exceeding the minimum level set in the legislation can be expected from the Finnish companies. The research was based on the interviews of some representatives of Finnish companies and of external stakeholders. Earlier Finnish empirical research on the topic has solely analysed the stakeholder thinking and the ethics of the views of the company representatives. The views of the external stakeholders brought ht up a much more versatile perspective on the voluntary corporate social responsibility of the companies. That is the particular surplus value of this research. This research, founded on stakeholder thinking, evaluated what kind of starting points and ideas on responsibility the views of the representatives of the companies and the external stakeholders were based on the voluntary social responsibility. Furthermore, the research also investigated how their views about the corporate social responsibility indicated the benefits achieved on the cooperative actions with different partners - for example companies, communities and public administration. To fulfil the aims of the research, the following questions were used as part tasks in mapping the basic foundations and starting points expressed by the representatives of the companies and the external stakeholders: 1) How do laws, directions concerning social responsibility of companies, and opinions and demands of the stakeholders guide and affect the voluntary corporate social responsibility? 2) How can companies assume voluntary corporate social responsibility in addition to their core functions and without compromising their profitability, and how does, for example, the tightening competition affect the possibility of taking responsibility? 3) What kind of ethic and moral foundations is the corporate social responsibility based on? 4) What kind of roles can companies have in securing and promoting the well-being of citizens in Finland and on the global market as one subsystem of the society? The views on the voluntary corporate social responsibility of nine big companies, one medium-sized company and one small company, all considered responsible pioneer companies, were studied with surveys and half-structured theme interviews between 2003 and 2004. The research proceeded as a theory-bounded study. The empirical material and the previous stakeholder thinking theories (Takala 2000b, Vehkaperä 2003) guided the thesis and worked abductively in interplay with each other during the research process. (Tuomi, Sarajärvi 2002.) The aims and the methods of the research and the themes of the interviews were defined on the basis of that information. The aims of the research were surveyed qualitatively with the strategy of a multiple case study. Representatives from nine big peer companies and nine external stakeholders were interviewed with half-structured themes between 2004 and 2005. The external stakeholders and the peer companies were chosen with the "thinking" of theoretical replication by Yin, according to which the views of the representatives of those groups would differ from those of the pioneer companies and also from those of each others. The multiple case study supports analysing the internal cohesion of the views of different groups and comparing their differences, and it supports theoretical evaluation and theory-building as well. (Yin 2003.) Another reason for choosing the external stakeholders was their known cooperation with companies. The spoken argumentations of the company and stakeholder representatives on the voluntary social responsibility of the companies were analysed and interpreted in the first place with an analytic discourse analysis, and the argumentations were classified allusively into the stakeholder discourses in three of the part tasks. In the discourse analysis, argumentations of the speech is seen to be intervowen with cultural meanings. (Jokinen, Juhila 1999.) The views of the representatives of the pioneer companies and the external stakeholders were more stakeholder-orientated than the views of the representatives of the peer companies. For the most part, the voluntary corporate social responsibility was seemingly targeted on single, small cooperation projects of the companies and external stakeholders. The pioneer companies had more of those projects, and they were participating in the projects more actively than the peer companies were. The significant result in this research was the notion that, in particular, the representatives of the pioneer companies and external stakeholders did not consider employing and paying taxes to be enough of reciprocal corporate social responsibility. However, they still wanted to preserve the Finnish welfare model, and the interviewees did not wish major changes in the present legislation or the social agreements. According to this study, the voluntary corporate social responsibility is motivated by ethical utilitarianism which varied from very narrow to very wide in relation to benefits achieved by companies and stakeholders (Velasquez 2002, Lagerspetz 2004). Compared with the peer companies, more of the representatives of the pioneer companies and of external stakeholders estimated that companies in their decision-making and operations considered not only the advantages and the benefits of the owners and other internal stakeholders, but also those of the external stakeholders and of the whole society. However, all interviewees expressed more or less strongly that the economic responsibility guides the voluntary responsible actions of the companies in the first place. This kind of utilitarian foundation of behaviour appeared from this research was named as business-orientated company moral. This thesis also presents a new voluntary corporate social responsibility model with four variables on the stakeholder discourses and their distinctive characteristics. The utilitarian motivation of a company s behaviour on their operations has been criticized on the grounds that the end justifies the means. It has also been stated that it is impossible to evaluate the benefits of the utilitarian type of actions to the individuals and the society. It is expected however that companies for their part promote the material and immaterial well-being of the individuals on the global, national and local markets. The expectations are so strong that if companies do not take into account the ethical and moral values, they can possibly suffer significant financial losses. All stakeholders, especially consumers, can with their own choices promote the responsible behaviour of the companies. Key words: voluntary corporate social responsibility, external stakeholders, corporate citizenship, ethics and morality, utilitarianism, stakeholder discourses, welfare society, globalisation