Essays on Corporate Governance and the Quality of Disclosed Earnings: Across Transitional Europe

A growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance systems around the world. An important insight from this literature is that corporate governance mechanisms address the excessive use of managerial discretionary powers to get private benefits by expropriating the value of shareholders. One possible way of expropriation is to reduce the quality of disclosed earnings by manipulating the financial statements. This lower quality of earnings should then be reflected by the stock price of firm according to value relevance theorem. Hence, instead of testing the direct effect of corporate governance on the firm’s market value, it is important to understand the causes of the lower quality of accounting earnings. This thesis contributes to the literature by increasing knowledge about the extent of the earnings management – measured as the extent of discretionary accruals in total disclosed earnings - and its determinants across the Transitional European countries. The thesis comprises of three essays of empirical analysis of which first two utilize the data of Russian listed firms whereas the third essay uses data from 10 European economies. More specifically, the first essay adds to existing research connecting earnings management to corporate governance. It testifies the impact of the Russian corporate governance reforms of 2002 on the quality of disclosed earnings in all publicly listed firms. This essay provides empirical evidence of the fact that the desired impact of reforms is not fully substantiated in Russia without proper enforcement. Instead, firm-level factors such as long-term capital investments and compliance with International financial reporting standards (IFRS) determine the quality of the earnings. The result presented in the essay support the notion proposed by Leuz et al. (2003) that the reforms aimed to bring transparency do not correspond to desired results in economies where investor protection is lower and legal enforcement is weak. The second essay focuses on the relationship between the internal-control mechanism such as the types and levels of ownership and the quality of disclosed earnings in Russia. The empirical analysis shows that the controlling shareholders in Russia use their powers to manipulate the reported performance in order to get private benefits of control. Comparatively, firms owned by the State have significantly better quality of disclosed earnings than other controllers such as oligarchs and foreign corporations. Interestingly, market performance of firms controlled by either State or oligarchs is better than widely held firms. The third essay provides useful evidence on the fact that both ownership structures and economic characteristics are important factors in determining the quality of disclosed earnings in three groups of countries in Europe. Evidence suggests that ownership structure is a more important determinant in developed and transparent countries, while economic determinants are important determinants in developing and transitional countries.

Essays on corporate governance, stakeholders, and restructuring

This dissertation consists of an introductory section and three theoretical essays analyzing the interaction of corporate governance and restructuring. The essays adopt an incomplete contracts approach and analyze the role of different institutional designs to facilitate the alignment of the objectives of shareholders and management (or employees) over the magnitude of corporate restructuring. The first essay analyzes how a firm's choice of production technology affects the employees' human capital investment. In the essay, the owners of the firm can choose between a specific and a general technology that both require a costly human capital investment by the employees. The specific technology is initially superior in using the human capital of employees but, in contrast to the general technology, it is not compatible with future innovations. As a result, anticipated changes in the specific technology diminish the ex ante incentives of the employees to invest in human capital unless the shareholders grant the employees specific governance mechanisms (a right of veto, severance pay) so as to protect their investments. The results of the first essay indicate that the level of protection that the shareholders are willing to offer falls short of the socially desirable one. Furthermore, when restructuring opportunities become more abundant, it becomes more attractive both socially and from the viewpoint of the shareholders to initially adopt the general technology. The second essay analyzes how the allocation of authority within the firm interacts with the owners' choice of business strategy when the ability of the owners to monitor the project proposals of the management is biased in favor of the status quo strategy. The essay shows that a bias in the monitoring ability will affect not only the allocation of authority within the firm but also the choice of business strategy. Especially, when delegation has positive managerial incentive effects, delegation turns out to be more attractive under the new business strategy because the improved managerial incentives are a way for the owners to compensate their own reduced information gathering ability. This effect, however, simultaneously makes the owners hesitant to switch the strategy since it would involve a more frequent loss of control over the project choice. Consequently, the owners' lack of knowledge of the new business strategy may lead to a suboptimal choice of strategy. The third essay analyzes the implications of CEO succession process for the ideal board structure. In this essay, the presence of the departing CEO on the board facilitates the ability of the board to find a matching successor and to counsel him. However, the ex-CEO's presence may simultaneously also weaken the ability of the board to restructure since the predecessor may use the opportunity to distort the successor's project choice. The results of the essay suggest that the extent of restructuring gains, the firm's ability to hire good outside directors and the importance of board's advisory role affect at which point and for how long the shareholders may want to nominate the predecessor to the board.

Essays on the Costs and Benefits of Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance (summary section only)

“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737). According to La Porta et al. (1999), research in corporate finance relevant for most countries should focus on the incentives and capabilities of controlling shareholders to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of minority shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis sets out to answer a number of research questions regarding the role of large shareholders in public firms that have received little attention in the literature so far. A common theme in the essays stems from the costs and benefits of individual large-block owners and the role of control contestability from the perspective of outside minority shareholders. The first essay empirically examines whether there are systematic performance differences between family controlled and nonfamily controlled firms in Western Europe. In contrast to the widely held view that family control penalizes firm value, the essay shows that publicly traded family firms have higher performance than comparable firms. In the second essay, we present both theoretical and empirical analysis on the effects of control contestability on firm valuation. Consistent with the theoretical model, the empirical results show that minority shareholders benefit from a more contestable control structure. The third essay explores the effects of individual large-block owners on top management turnover and board appointments in Finnish listed firms. The results indicate that firm performance is an important determinant for management and board restructurings. For certain types of turnover decisions the corporate governance structure influences the performance / turnover sensitivity. In the fourth essay, we investigate the relation between the governance structure and dividend policy in Finnish listed firms. We find evidence in support of the outcome agency model of dividends stating that lower agency conflicts should be associated with higher dividend payouts.

Corporate Governance in European Banks: Essays on Bank Ownership

Banks are important as they have a central role in the financial system, where funds are channelled either through financial intermediaries, such as banks, or through financial markets, hence promoting growth in any economy. Recently, we have been reminded of the drawbacks of the central role of banks. The current financial crisis, which started out as a sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US, has become a global financial crisis with substantial impact on the real economy in many countries. Some of the roots to the current financial crisis can be sought in the changing role of banks and in bank corporate governance. Moreover, the substantial revitalising measures taken have been justified by the central role of banks. Not only are banks important, they are also very special. The fact that banks are regulated in conjunction with greater opacity, make bank corporate governance different from corporate governance in non-bank companies. Surprisingly little is, however, known about bank corporate governance, in particularly, in a European setting. Hence, the objective of this doctoral thesis is to provide new insights in this research area by examining banks from 37 different European countries. Each of the three essays included in the doctoral thesis examines a particular aspect of bank corporate governance. In the first essay the interaction between the regulatory environment a bank operates in and its ownership structure is explored. Indicators of the severity of the moral hazard problem induced by the deposit insurance system and implicit too-big-to-fail government guarantee, particular features of deposit insurance systems as well as legal protection of shareholders, legal origin of a country and level of integration to the European community are used in the analysis. The empirical findings confirm previous findings on the link between legal protection of shareholders and ownership structure. Moreover, they show that differences in deposit insurance system features can explain some of the differences in ownership structure across European banks. In the second essay the impact of management and board ownership on the profitability of banks with different strategy is examined. The empirical findings suggest that the efficiency of these two particular corporate governance mechanisms varies with the characteristics of the agency problem faced by the bank. More specifically, management ownership is important in opaque non-traditional banks, whereas board ownership is important in traditional banks, where deposit insurance reduces the monitoring incentives of outsiders. The higher profitability does, however, go together with higher risk. In the third essay the profitability and risk of commercial, savings and cooperative banks are compared. The empirical findings suggest that distinct operational and ownership characteristics rather than only the mere fact that a bank is a commercial, savings or cooperative bank explain the profitability and risk differences. The main insight from the three essays is that a number of different aspects should be addressed simultaneously in order to give the complexity of bank corporate governance justice.

Corporate Governance in China (summary section only)

The negative relationship between economic growth and stock market return is not an anomaly according to evidence documented in many economies. It is argued that future economic growth is largely irrelevant for predicting future equity returns, since long-run equity returns depend mainly on dividend yields and the growth of per share dividends. The economic growth does result in a higher standard of living for consumers, but does not necessarily translate into higher returns for owners of the capital. The divergence in performance between the real sector and stock markets appears to support the above argument. However, this thesis strives to offer an alternative explanation to the apparent divergence within the framework of corporate governance. It argues that weak corporate governance standards in Chinese listed firms exacerbated by poor inventor protection results into a marginalized capital market. Each of the three essays in the thesis addresses one particular aspect of corporate governance on the Chinese stock market in a sequential way through gathering empirical evidence on three distinctive stock market activities. The first essay questions whether significant agency conflicts do exist by building a game on rights issues. It documents significant divergence in interests among shareholders holding different classes of shares. The second essay investigates the level of agency costs by examining value of control through constructing a sample of block transactions. It finds that block transactions that transfer ultimate control entail higher premiums. The third essay looks into possible avenues through which corporate governance standards could be improved by investigating the economic consequences of cross-listing on the Chinese stock market. It finds that, by adopting a higher disclosure standard through cross-listings, firms voluntarily commit themselves to reducing information asymmetry, and consequently command higher valuation than their counterparts.

Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance:Evidence from Finland

This paper examines the association between corporate governance attributes and firm performance of Finnish firms during 1990 – 2000. The empirical results suggest that corporate governance matters for firm performance. First, univariate test results indicate that firms characterized by a high (efficient) level of corporate governance have delivered greater stock returns, are higher valued based on the measure of Tobin’s Q, and exhibit higher ratios of cash flow to assets, on average, in comparison to their counterparts characterized by a low (inefficient) level of corporate governance. Second, controlling for a number of well-known determinants of stock returns, we find evidence that firms categorized by inefficient corporate governance have delivered inferior returns to shareholders during the investigation period. Finally, after controlling for several common determinants of firm value, we find that firms characterized by efficient corporate governance have been valued higher during the investigation period, measured by Tobin’s Q.

Teatterinjohtamisen dramaturgiaa : Keskeiset tehtävät, arjen ongelmat ja rakenteelliset muutostarpeet

DRAMATURGY OF THEATRE MANAGEMENT Essential tasks, everyday problems and the need for structural changes Theatre justifies its existence only through high quality performances. Maintaining the artistic level and organizing performances are the primary tasks of a manager, even though in everyday life this often seems to be overshadowed by all the other tasks of a manager s work. How does a theatre manager design strategies and make everyday decisions if aims are to have artistically meaningful performances, financial success and a socially healthy ensemble, when not only artistic work or leadership of an organization are to be taken into consideration, but also a manpower-based art institution with long traditions? What does theatre management consist of and what kind of dramaturgical movement happens in it? Based on interviews carried out in five different city theatres in Finland in the years 2004-2008, incident stories were written within a continuous comparison theory frame. Social constructionism within a dramaturgic framework enabled versatile dialog on a manager s work and problem areas. The result is an interpretative study, where instead of common regularities, many details are collected that can be taken into consideration when similar situations occur. Based on the interviews and historical data, four factors that influence a manager s work were chosen: ownership, media, work community and programme. Within theatre management, the central problems were 1) the inconsistent use of theatre resources and problems in corporate governance caused by the administrative models; 2) the theatre s image, based on the image of its manager, as presented by the media and its influence on the wellbeing of the staff; 3) unsolved problems between the staff left behind by the previous managers and problems related to casting; 4) knowledge of the audience. These points influence how the manager plans the artistic programme and divides the resources. The theatre manager s job description has remained quite the same since the early days of Kaarlo Bergbom. In the future, special attention should be placed on why managers face fairly similar problems decade after decade. Reducing these problems partly depends on whether structural improvements are made to a theatre s close network of owners, financers and labour unions. During this study clear evidence was seen that structural changes are necessary in the production of performances and in the creation of a more versatile programme. In this process, different kinds of co-operation, experiments, development projects, continuing education and international relations have special importance, especially if the aim is to make it possible for all citizens of Finland to enjoy a vibrant and revitalized theatre.

Keittiömaailman matkassa 20 vuotta : Tutkimus erään keittiökalustevalmistajan johtavan markkina-aseman rakentamisesta ja säilyttämisestä

A View into the World of Kitchen: Development and retention of a leading position in the market of kitchen interiors - a case study of 20 years. This study focuses on the development of a kitchen interiors company, presently called Novart Inc., into the leading company of the industry from 1980´s to the present. The objective of the study is to describe the effects of strategic choices, the decisions of the management and the owner´s direction and control to the build up and the retaining of the leading position in the market. From theory point of view, strategic choices refer to com-pany purchases as corporate-level strategies, and business and marketing strategies. The empirical research was carried out in two phases and it is based on various company documents and records, and on the intensive interviews of seven key executives in the company. An abductive research design was utilized. The company gained the leading position in the kitchen market in Finland by company purchases, and the company has been able to retain the position. Firstly the goal was to expand to retail market and, secondly, the company has maintained the balance of supply and demand by closing the purchased production units when needed. The simultaneous use of these two strategic goals is a kind of a new observation, and the strategy may be suitable only for market leaders. During the latter part of the research period the strategy of com-pany purchases has been abandoned and the leading position in the market has been main-tained by developing systematically business and marketing capability. In the business and marketing strategies the distribution channels and the brands have been emphasized. During the research period the company has almost totally abandoned the long distribution channels and started to use its own channels built and named after the main brands. These are A la Carte, Parma and Petra. At the moment, in the beginning of the 21st century, a new distribution channel, the concept of the Kitchen World, is being built in addition to the channels mentioned above. The management´s decision making and the implementation the decisions have been well-considered. The executives emphasized the valuing of the importance of the decisions dif-ferently except the two decisions named the most important ones, i.e., the decisions to start own production of the raw material and to concentrate the business only to one company. The executive staff has also succeeded in managing crisis and threats of bankruptcy, and the company has been managed profitable. During all the four terms of ownership: Puolimatka Corporation, the Hankkija/Novera Corporation, the ownership period of the "bank", and the Nobia Corporate the ownership direction and control has been somewhat different. All the owners have paid attention to economic issues. The direction of cash flows and investments was at its strongest during the Hankkija/Novera term. For the last owner Nobia the production and marketing of the kitchen interiors has been the core business, which thus has strengthened the business and marketing capabilities of the target company of this research. A common denominator during all the four terms of ownership has been owners' trust gained by the professional skills of the management of the target company. This has lead to greater independence of the management of the company and less owners´ direction. Keywords: leading position, marketing strategy, management decisions, acquisition, corporate governance

Essays on the Determinants of International Portfolio Investments

Investors significantly overweight domestic assets in their portfolios. This behavior which is commonly called “home bias” contradicts the prescriptions of portfolio theory. This thesis explores potential reasons for the “home bias” by examining the characteristics of the investing and the target countries and features of the interaction between them. A common theme of the four essays is a focus on the importance of information about foreign markets in explaining the share of these markets in investors’ portfolios. The results indicate that the size of the equity ownership in another country strongly relates to the distance to the financial capital of that country, and to trade in goods with and direct investments (FDI) to that country. The first essay empirically investigates the relationship between trade in real goods and portfolio investments. Overall, the evidence indicates a substantial role for trade in reducing the information cost relating to portfolio investments. The second essay examines the implications of the launch of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on international portfolio investments. The evidence on the allocation of Finnish international portfolio investments is more consistent with an information-based than a diversification motive explanation. The third essay employs new data for a large number of countries and further explores the role of trade on international portfolio investments. The results indicate that trade provides important information especially on firms in countries in which the corporate governance structure and the information environment of firms generate less reliable information. The fourth essay examines the relationship between direct investments (FDI) and portfolio investments. In contrast to the predications of portfolio theory, it provides evidence that FDI is a complement rather than a substitute for portfolio investments.