Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments : A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics

One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established to be true once we expand the formal system with Alfred Tarski s semantical theory of truth, as shown by Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland in their semantical arguments for the substantiality of truth. According to them, in Gödel sentences we have an explicit case of true but unprovable sentences, and hence deflationism is refuted. Against that, Neil Tennant has shown that instead of Tarskian truth we can expand the formal system with a soundness principle, according to which all provable sentences are assertable, and the assertability of Gödel sentences follows. This way, the relevant question is not whether we can establish the truth of Gödel sentences, but whether Tarskian truth is a more plausible expansion than a soundness principle. In this work I will argue that this problem is best approached once we think of mathematics as the full human phenomenon, and not just consisting of formal systems. When pre-formal mathematical thinking is included in our account, we see that Tarskian truth is in fact not an expansion at all. I claim that what proof is to formal mathematics, truth is to pre-formal thinking, and the Tarskian account of semantical truth mirrors this relation accurately. However, the introduction of pre-formal mathematics is vulnerable to the deflationist counterargument that while existing in practice, pre-formal thinking could still be philosophically superfluous if it does not refer to anything objective. Against this, I argue that all truly deflationist philosophical theories lead to arbitrariness of mathematics. In all other philosophical accounts of mathematics there is room for a reference of the pre-formal mathematics, and the expansion of Tarkian truth can be made naturally. Hence, if we reject the arbitrariness of mathematics, I argue in this work, we must accept the substantiality of truth. Related subjects such as neo-Fregeanism will also be covered, and shown not to change the need for Tarskian truth. The only remaining route for the deflationist is to change the underlying logic so that our formal languages can include their own truth predicates, which Tarski showed to be impossible for classical first-order languages. With such logics we would have no need to expand the formal systems, and the above argument would fail. From the alternative approaches, in this work I focus mostly on the Independence Friendly (IF) logic of Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu. Hintikka has claimed that an IF language can include its own adequate truth predicate. I argue that while this is indeed the case, we cannot recognize the truth predicate as such within the same IF language, and the need for Tarskian truth remains. In addition to IF logic, also second-order logic and Saul Kripke s approach using Kleenean logic will be shown to fail in a similar fashion.

Knowledge through Discussion : An Interpretation of Epistemology in Plato's Meno

According to Meno s paradox we cannot inquire into what we do not know because we do not know what we are inquiring into. There are many ways to interpret the paradox but the central issue about our ability to reach truth is a profound one. In the dialogue Meno, Plato presents the paradox and an outline of a solution which enables us to reach knowledge (epistēmē) through philosophical discussion. During the last century Meno has often been considered transitional between Socratic thinking and Plato s own philosophy, and thus the dialogue has not been adequately interpreted as an integrated whole. Therefore the distinctive epistemology of the dialogue has not gained due notice. In this thesis the dialogue is analysed as an integrated whole and the philosophical interpretation also takes into account its dramatic features. The thesis emphasises the role of language and definitions in acquiring knowledge. Among the results concerning these subjects is a new interpretation of Socrates s defintion of shape (schēma). The theory of anamnēsis all learning is recollection in the Meno is argued to answer the paradox philosophically although Plato s presentation also contains playful and ironic elements. The background of the way Plato presents his case is that he appreciated the fact that no argument can plausibly demonstrate that argumentation is able to reach truth. In the Meno, Plato makes the earliest explicit distinction between knowledge and true belief in the history of Western philosophy. He also gives a definition of knowledge which is the basis of the so called classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the Meno, true beliefs become knowledge when someone ties them down by reasoning about the explanation. The analysis of the epistemology of the dialogue from this perspective gives an interpretation which integrates the central concepts of the epistemology in the dialogue elenchos, anamnēsis and hypothetical inquiry into a unified whole which contains a plausible argument according to which the ignorant can reach knowledge through discussion. The conception that emerges by such an analysis is interesting both from the point of view of current interests and that of the history of philosophy. The method of knowledge acquisition in the Meno can, for example, be seen as a predecessor of modern scientific methods. The Meno is the earliest Greek mathematical text that has survived in its original form. The analysis presented in the thesis of the geometric passages in the dialogue provides new results both concerning Socrates s geometry lesson with the slave and the example presenting the hypothetical method. Concerning the latter, a new interpretation is presented. Keywords: anamnēsis, epistēmē, knowledge, Meno s paradox, Plato

Den framställande gesten : Om konstverkets presentation i den moderna konstutställningen

The Gesture of Exposure On the presentation of the work of art in the modern art exhibition The topic of this dissertation is the presentation of art works in the modern art exhibition as being the established and conventionalized form of art encounter. It investigates the possibility of a theorization of the art exhibition as a separate object for research, and attempts to examine the relationship between the art work and its presentation in a modern art exhibition. The study takes its point of departure in the area vaguely defined as exhibition studies, and in the lack of a general problematization of the analytical tools used for closer examination of the modern art exhibition. Another lacking aspect is a closer consideration of what happens to the work of art when it is exposed in an art exhibition. The aim of the dissertation is to find a set of concepts that can be used for further theorization The art exhibition is here treated, on the one hand, as an act of exposure, as a showing gesture. On the other hand, the art exhibition is seen as a spatiality, as a space that is produced in the act of showing. Both aspects are seen to be intimately involved in knowledge production. The dissertation is divided into four parts, in which different aspects of the art exhibition are analyzed using different theoretical approaches. The first part uses the archaeological model of Michel Foucault, and discusses the exhibition as a discursive formation based on communicative activity. The second part analyses the derived concepts of gesture and space. This leads to the proposition of three metaphorical spatialities the frame, the agora and the threshold which are seen as providing a possibility for a further extension of the theory of exhibitions. The third part extends the problematization of the relationship between the individual work of art and its exposure through the ideas of Walter Benjamin and Maurice Blanchot. The fourth part carries out a close reading of three presentations from the modern era in order to further examine the relationship between the work of art and its presentation, using the tools that have been developed during the study. In the concluding section, it is possible to see clearer borderlines and conditions for the development of an exhibition theory. The concepts that have been analysed and developed into tools are shown to be useful, and the examples take the discussion into a consideration of the altered premises for the encounter with the postmodern work of art.

Constructive Perspectives on Inductive Logic

Constructive (intuitionist, anti-realist) semantics has thus far been lacking an adequate concept of truth in infinity concerning factual (i.e., empirical, non-mathematical) sentences. One consequence of this problem is the difficulty of incorporating inductive reasoning in constructive semantics. It is not possible to formulate a notion for probable truth in infinity if there is no adequate notion of what truth in infinity is. One needs a notion of a constructive possible world based on sensory experience. Moreover, a constructive probability measure must be defined over these constructively possible empirical worlds. This study defines a particular kind of approach to the concept of truth in infinity for Rudolf Carnap's inductive logic. The new approach is based on truth in the consecutive finite domains of individuals. This concept will be given a constructive interpretation. What can be verifiably said about an empirical statement with respect to this concept of truth, will be explained, for which purpose a constructive notion of epistemic probability will be introduced. The aim of this study is also to improve Carnap's inductive logic. The study addresses the problem of justifying the use of an "inductivist" method in Carnap's lambda-continuum. A correction rule for adjusting the inductive method itself in the course of obtaining evidence will be introduced. Together with the constructive interpretation of probability, the correction rule yields positive prior probabilities for universal generalizations in infinite domains.

Muusikon mentaaliharjoittelu : Konsertoivan ja opettavan pianistin mentaaliharjoittelu

This research explores the foci, methods and processes of mental training by pianists who are active as performers and teachers. The research is based on the concept of mental training as a solely mental mode of practising. Musician s mental training takes place without an instrument or the physical act of playing. The research seeks answers to questions: 1) What are the foci of a pianist s mental training? 2) How does a pianist carry out the mental training? 3) What does mental training in music entail as a process? The research approach is qualitative, and the materials were gathered from thematic interviews. The aim of practising is always an improved result both in the act of playing and the performance. Mental training by a pianist is collaboration between technical, auditory, visual, kinaesthetic and affective factors. Also interpretation, memory and overcoming stage fright are needed. Technical, cognitive and performance skills are involved. According to the results of this research, mental training is a goal-oriented activity which can have an impact on all of these factors. Without a musical inner ear and its functionality, true musicianship cannot exist. One particular result of this research is the conceptualisation of opening up the inner ear. Auditory exercises and internally playing mental images are essential elements of the mental practice of a musician. Visual images, such as a picture of music notation or a performance event, are the point of focus for musicians who find visual images to be the easiest to realise. When developing technical skills by using mental training, it is important to focus on the technically most difficult sections. It is also necessary to focus on the holistic experiencing of the performance situation. By building on positive energies and strengths, the so-called psyching up may be the most important element in mental training. Based on the results of this research, a synthesis is outlined of the music event as an activity process, built on representations and schemes. Mental training aims at the most ideal possible act of playing and the creation of a musical event; these are achieved by focussing on various mental images produced by the different senses, together with concrete practising. Mental training in sports and in music share common factors. Both modes of practising, mental as well as physical, involve three important elements: planning, realisation and evaluation of the practice. In music, however, the goal is an artistic end result which does not often apply to an athletic event. Keywords: Mental training in music, auditory imagining, visualisation, kinaesthetic-mental experience, mastery of the psyche

On linear order and computation : The expressiveness of interactive computations on linear orders and computations indexed by ordinals

We solve the Dynamic Ehrenfeucht-Fra\"iss\'e Game on linear orders for both players, yielding a normal form for quantifier-rank equivalence classes of linear orders in first-order logic, infinitary logic, and generalized-infinitary logics with linearly ordered clocks. We show that Scott Sentences can be manipulated quickly, classified into local information, and consistency can be decided effectively in the length of the Scott Sentence. We describe a finite set of linked automata moving continuously on a linear order. Running them on ordinals, we compute the ordinal truth predicate and compute truth in the constructible universe of set-theory. Among the corollaries are a study of semi-models as efficient database of both model-theoretic and formulaic information, and a new proof of the atomicity of the Boolean algebra of sentences consistent with the theory of linear order -- i.e., that the finitely axiomatized theories of linear order are dense.

Birth of the European individual : Outline of a theory of legal practice

The modern subject is what we can call a self-subjecting individual. This is someone in whose inner reality has been implanted a more permanent governability, a governability that works inside the agent. Michel Foucault s genealogy of the modern subject is the history of its constitution by power practices. By a flight of imagination, suppose that this history is not an evolving social structure or cultural phenomenon, but one of those insects (moth) whose life cycle consists of three stages or moments: crawling larva, encapsulated pupa, and flying adult. Foucault s history of power-practices presents the same kind of miracle of total metamorphosis. The main forces in the general field of power can be apprehended through a generalisation of three rationalities functioning side-by-side in the plurality of different practices of power: domination, normalisation and the law. Domination is a force functioning by the rationality of reason of state: the state s essence is power, power is firm domination over people, and people are the state s resource by which the state s strength is measured. Normalisation is a force that takes hold on people from the inside of society: it imposes society s own reality its empirical verity as a norm on people through silently working jurisdictional operations that exclude pathological individuals too far from the average of the population as a whole. The law is a counterforce to both domination and normalisation. Accounting for elements of legal practice as omnihistorical is not possible without a view of the general field of power. Without this view, and only in terms of the operations and tactical manoeuvres of the practice of law, nothing of the kind can be seen: the only thing that practice manifests is constant change itself. However, the backdrop of law s tacit dimension that is, the power-relations between law, domination and normalisation allows one to see more. In the general field of power, the function of law is exactly to maintain the constant possibility of change. Whereas domination and normalisation would stabilise society, the law makes it move. The European individual has a reality as a problem. What is a problem? A problem is something that allows entry into the field of thought, said Foucault. To be a problem, it is necessary for certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it . Entering the field of thought through problematisations of the European individual human forms, power and knowledge one is able to glimpse the historical backgrounds of our present being. These were produced, and then again buried, in intersections between practices of power and games of truth. In the problem of the European individual one has suitable circumstances that bring to light forces that have passed through the individual through centuries.