Rauhan atomi, sodan koodi : Suomalaisen atomivoimaratkaisun teknopolitiikka 1955-1970

This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.

Modernismens förespråkare : Gösta Stenman och hans konstsalong

This dissertation, based on material from Stenman s vast private archive, examines the role played by Swedish-speaking Finnish art dealer Gösta Stenman (1888-1947) and his art gallery, Stenmans Konstsalong, in the Finnish and Swedish art worlds from 1911 to 1947. This archive is examined here for the first time. The analytical framework used for this empirical study derives from Pierre Bourdieu s sociological theories. An art-sociological approach allows for the inclusion of more mechanisms at work in the art world than are typically embraced in such inquiries. This approach provides a fuller understanding of how Stenman attained his standing and central role in the art world in Finland as well as Sweden; enabling us to appreciate how he came to occupy such a prominent position in current art historical writing. All of these issues constitute new areas of research. Taking his cues from the contemporary art world of Paris, Stenman became the year 1914 a modern art dealer like no other in the Nordic countries. This dissertation represents the first academic investigation into his operations, strategies, and objectives, offering insight into not only the art dealer himself but also the functioning of the art market one of the most vital aspects of the art world. A by-product of this work, is that the modern art market in Finland is portrayed, including essential issues related to its growth and development as well as how it altered the conditions under which art could be produced, exhibited and promoted and what this entailed for the art world at large, artists and patrons alike. This first systematic analysis of the operations of Stenman s Konstsalong offers greater understanding of the art worlds of Sweden and Finland in the early twentieth century. The work also looks at how an agent of the art market could move between the fields of art in Sweden and Finland. The manner in which Stenman promoted individual artists, including his relationships with Tyko Sallinen, Helene Schjerfbeck, Juho Mäkelä, Jalmari Ruokokoski, Siri Derkert, Esther Kjerner, Eva Bagge, and many others, also falls within this purview. Stenman s contract with Sallinen from 1913 stands out as a new phenomenon in Finnish art promotion, whereby an artistic career became established via a far-sighted, strategic promotional program. The case study of Stenman s promotion of Schjerfbeck in Sweden provides evidence of the increasingly advanced nature of Stenman s strategies. The title of the dissertation, The Promoter of Modernism, attempts to convey that Stenman was the consummate modernist, modern in his thoughts, his actions, and his approach to art. Keywords: Gösta Stenman, Stenmans konstsalong, Stenmans dotter, art market, modernism, collecting, Novembergruppen, Helene Schjerfbeck, Tyko Sallinen, Juho Mäkelä, Jalmari Ruokokoski, Wäinö Aaltonen, Siri Derkert, Åke Göransson, Esther Kjerner, Eva Bagge.

Isänmaa ja Ranska : Suomalainen frankofilia 1880-1914

In Finland the period 1880 -1914 constituted an essential phase in the creation of the great national project as well as it was a golden time of Francophilia. With Francophilia, i.e. French-mindedness, is here understood a collectively upheld strong sympathy towards France and French culture. However, the Francophilia of late nineteenth century Finland was free from apparent political intentions and remained a chosen disposition. The strength of its drive was not only based on the older European admiration of everything French, but also on the growing fascination for a novelty emerging besides the traditional influences of the Germanic culture. In Finnish society Francophilia mostly worked as an opposite force to the most confined conceptions of what was considered national ; as a consequence France came to denote more than a country and Francophilia contained an important symbolical meaning in the construction of the Finnish nation. The main tasks of the study are to introduce as the first large historical presentation of the subject a covering examination of the many descriptions of Paris-phases of assorted artists, authors, and intellectuals, to clarify the mental relationship of the Finnish intelligentsia to France prior to national independence, and finally to provide these developments with case studies of certain life paths. However, the examination is not biographical, because the starting point remains within the rhetoric arguments of Francophilia and patriotism as these appeared within the public sphere. Historical persons have thus been dealt with primarily as reflectors of the then-current French-minded mentality. Such Francophiles in Finland were first and foremost Werner Söderhjelm, Juhani Aho, L. Onerva and V. A. Koskenniemi. The networks of the Finnish cultural field are mostly displayed through these examples. In previous research the intensive relationship of Finnish artists and authors with France has not been connected with actual concepts of nationalism. The respective periods of the intellectuals in Paris have simply been viewed as devoid of ideological links with the contemporary advancement of the fatherland, or even as opposites to the patriotic pursuits in Finland. From the viewpoint of this study these now canonized creators of a Finnish culture are primarily seen as patriots and fellow countrymen, and only secondly as artists and artist s colleagues. The dissertation is constructed as both a regional survey of the idealization of France and a study of Finnish history through the mirror of Francophilia. As such France only held an instrumental role for the receiving culture, i.e. for the construction of Finland, as no "objective truths" were sought for in France. Keywords: France, francophilia, Finnishness, national project, Paris

Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

Across the Oceans : Development of Overseas Business Information Transmission, 1815-1875

Earlier studies have shown that the speed of information transmission developed radically during the 19th century. The fast development was mainly due to the change from sailing ships and horse-driven coaches to steamers and railways, as well as the telegraph. Speed of information transmission has normally been measured by calculating the duration between writing and receiving a letter, or between an important event and the time when the news was published elsewhere. As overseas mail was generally carried by ships, the history of communications and maritime history are closely related. This study also brings a postal historical aspect to the academic discussion. Additionally, there is another new aspect included. In business enterprises, information flows generally consisted of multiple transactions. Although fast one-way information was often crucial, e.g. news of a changing market situation, at least equally important was that there was a possibility to react rapidly. To examine the development of business information transmission, the duration of mail transport has been measured by a systematic and commensurable method, using consecutive information circles per year as the principal tool for measurement. The study covers a period of six decades, several of the world's most important trade routes and different mail-carrying systems operated by merchant ships, sailing packets and several nations' steamship services. The main sources have been the sailing data of mail-carrying ships and correspondence of several merchant houses in England. As the world's main trade routes had their specific historical backgrounds with different businesses, interests and needs, the systems for information transmission did not develop similarly or simultaneously. It was a process lasting several decades, initiated by the idea of organizing sailings in a regular line system. The evolution proceeded generally as follows: originally there was a more or less irregular system, then a regular system and finally a more frequent regular system of mail services. The trend was from sail to steam, but both these means of communication improved following the same scheme. Faster sailings alone did not radically improve the number of consecutive information circles per year, if the communication was not frequent enough. Neither did improved frequency advance the information circulation if the trip was very long or if the sailings were overlapping instead of complementing each other. The speed of information transmission could be improved by speeding up the voyage itself (technological improvements, minimizing the waiting time at ports of call, etc.) but especially by organizing sailings so that the recipients had the possibility to reply to arriving mails without unnecessary delay. It took two to three decades before the mail-carrying shipping companies were able to organize their sailings in an optimal way. Strategic shortcuts over isthmuses (e.g. Panama, Suez) together with the cooperation between steamships and railways enabled the most effective improvements in global communications before the introduction of the telegraph.