26 resultados para Transportation Science
em Helda - Digital Repository of University of Helsinki
Resumo:
The thesis examines rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra's (11096-1064) conceptions of the relationship between religion and science with special focus on his seventh astrological treatise Sefer ha-Olam (The Book of the World). The thesis includes an analysis of medieval arabic astrology and the concepts science and religion in the relevant period. The appendix holds a tentative english translation of the hebrew text.
Resumo:
Kirjallisuuden- ja kulttuurintutkimus on viimeisten kolmen vuosikymmenen aikana tullut yh enenevss mrin tietoiseksi tieteen ja taiteen suhteen monimutkaisesta luonteesta. Nykyn niden kahden kulttuurin tutkimus muodostaa oman kenttns, jolla niiden suhdetta tarkastellaan ennen kaikkea dynaamisena vuorovaikutuksena, joka heijastaa kulttuurimme kielt, arvoja ja ideologisia sisltj. Toisin kuin aiemmat nkemykset, jotka pitvt tiedett ja taidetta toisilleen enemmn tai vhemmn vastakkaisina pyrkimyksin, nykytutkimus lhtee oletuksesta, jonka mukaan ne ovat kulttuurillisesti rakentuneita diskursseja, jotka kohtaavat usein samankaltaisia todellisuuden mallintamiseen liittyvi ongelmia, vaikka niiden kyttmt metodit eroavatkin toisistaan. Vitskirjani keskittyy yll mainitun suhteen osa-alueista popularisoidun tietokirjallisuuden (muun muassa Paul Davies, James Gleick ja Richard Dawkins) kyttmn kielen ja luonnontieteist ideoita ammentavan kaunokirjallisuuden (muun muassa Jeanette Winterson, Tom Stoppard ja Richard Powers) hydyntmien keinojen tarkasteluun nojautuen yli 30 teoksen kattavaa aineistoa koskevaan tyylin ja teemojen tekstianalyysiin. Populaarin tietokirjallisuuden osalta tarkoituksenani on osoittaa, ett sen kyttm kieli rakentuu huomattavassa mrin sellaisille rakenteille, jotka tarjoavat mahdollisuuden esitt todellisuutta koskevia argumentteja mahdollisimman vakuuttavalla tavalla. Tss tehtvss monilla klassisen retoriikan mrittelemill kuvioilla on trke rooli, koska ne auttavat liittmn sanotun sislln ja muodon tiukasti toisiinsa: retoristen kuvioiden kytt ei nin ollen edusta pelkk tyylikeinoa, vaan se mys usein kiteytt argumenttien taustalla olevat tieteenfilosofiset olettamukset ja auttaa vakiinnuttamaan argumentoinnin logiikan. Koska monet aikaisemmin ilmestyneist tutkimuksista ovat keskittyneet pelkstn metaforan rooliin tieteellisiss argumenteissa, tm vitskirja pyrkii laajentamaan tutkimuskentt analysoimalla mys toisenlaisten kuvioiden kytt. Osoitan mys, ett retoristen kuvioiden kytt muodostaa yhtymkohdan tieteellisi ideoita hydyntvn kaunokirjallisuuteen. Siin miss popularisoitu tiede kytt retoriikkaa vahvistaakseen sek argumentatiivisia ett kaunokirjallisia ominaisuuksiaan, kuvaa tllainen sanataide tiedett tavoilla, jotka usein heijastelevat tietokirjallisuuden kielellisi rakenteita. Toisaalta on mys mahdollista nhd, miten kaunokirjallisuuden keinot heijastuvat popularisoidun tieteen kerrontatapoihin ja kieleen todistaen kahden kulttuurin dynaamisesta vuorovaikutuksesta. Nykyaikaisen populaaritieteen retoristen elementtien ja kaunokirjallisuuden keinojen vertailu nytt lisksi, kuinka tiede ja taide osallistuvat keskusteluun kulttuurimme tiettyjen perusksitteiden kuten identiteetin, tiedon ja ajan merkityksest. Tll tavoin on mahdollista nhd, ett molemmat ovat perustavanlaatuisia osia merkityksenantoprosessissa, jonka kautta niin tieteelliset ideat kuin ihmiselmn suuret kysymyksetkin saavat kulttuurillisesti rakentuneen merkityksens.
Resumo:
This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.
Resumo:
Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.
Resumo:
This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the problem of scope and the problem of religious relevance. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.
Resumo:
This thesis focuses on the issue of testing sleepiness quantitatively. The issue is relevant to policymakers concerned with traffic- and occupational safety; such testing provides a tool for safety legislation and -surveillance. The findings of this thesis provide guidelines for a posturographic sleepiness tester. Sleepiness ensuing from staying awake merely 17 h impairs our performance as much as the legally proscribed blood alcohol concentration 0.5 does. Hence, sleepiness is a major risk factor in transportation and occupational accidents. The lack of convenient, commercial sleepiness tests precludes testing impending sleepiness levels contrary to simply breath testing for alcohol intoxication. Posturography is a potential sleepiness test, since clinical diurnal balance testing suggests the hypothesis that time awake could be posturographically estimable. Relying on this hypothesis this thesis examines posturographic sleepiness testing for instrumentation purposes. Empirical results from 63 subjects for whom we tested balance with a force platform during wakefulness for maximum 36 h show that sustained wakefulness impairs balance. The results show that time awake is posturographically estimable with 88% accuracy and 97% precision which validates our hypothesis. Results also show that balance scores tested at 13:30 hours serve as a threshold to detect excessive sleepiness. Analytical results show that the test length has a marked effect on estimation accuracy: 18 s tests suffice to identify sleepiness related balance changes, but trades off some of the accuracy achieved with 30 s tests. The procedure to estimate time awake relies on equating the subject s test score to a reference table (comprising balance scores tested during sustained wakefulness, regressed against time awake). Empirical results showed that sustained wakefulness explains 60% of the diurnal balance variations, whereas the time of day explains 40% of the balance variations. The latter fact implies that time awake estimations also must rely on knowing the local times of both test and reference scores.
Resumo:
This research has been prompted by an interest in the atmospheric processes of hydrogen. The sources and sinks of hydrogen are important to know, particularly if hydrogen becomes more common as a replacement for fossil fuel in combustion. Hydrogen deposition velocities (vd) were estimated by applying chamber measurements, a radon tracer method and a two-dimensional model. These three approaches were compared with each other to discover the factors affecting the soil uptake rate. A static-closed chamber technique was introduced to determine the hydrogen deposition velocity values in an urban park in Helsinki, and at a rural site at Loppi. A three-day chamber campaign to carry out soil uptake estimation was held at a remote site at Pallas in 2007 and 2008. The atmospheric mixing ratio of molecular hydrogen has also been measured by a continuous method in Helsinki in 2007 - 2008 and at Pallas from 2006 onwards. The mean vd values measured in the chamber experiments in Helsinki and Loppi were between 0.0 and 0.7 mm s-1. The ranges of the results with the radon tracer method and the two-dimensional model were 0.13 - 0.93 mm s-1 and 0.12 - 0.61 mm s-1, respectively, in Helsinki. The vd values in the three-day campaign at Pallas were 0.06 - 0.52 mm s-1 (chamber) and 0.18 - 0.52 mm s-1 (radon tracer method and two-dimensional model). At Kumpula, the radon tracer method and the chamber measurements produced higher vd values than the two-dimensional model. The results of all three methods were close to each other between November and April, except for the chamber results from January to March, while the soil was frozen. The hydrogen deposition velocity values of all three methods were compared with one-week cumulative rain sums. Precipitation increases the soil moisture, which decreases the soil uptake rate. The measurements made in snow seasons showed that a thick snow layer also hindered gas diffusion, lowering the vd values. The H2 vd values were compared to the snow depth. A decaying exponential fit was obtained as a result. During a prolonged drought in summer 2006, soil moisture values were lower than in other summer months between 2005 and 2008. Such conditions were prevailing in summer 2006 when high chamber vd values were measured. The mixing ratio of molecular hydrogen has a seasonal variation. The lowest atmospheric mixing ratios were found in the late autumn when high deposition velocity values were still being measured. The carbon monoxide (CO) mixing ratio was also measured. Hydrogen and carbon monoxide are highly correlated in an urban environment, due to the emissions originating from traffic. After correction for the soil deposition of H2, the slope was 0.490.07 ppb (H2) / ppb (CO). Using the corrected hydrogen-to-carbon-monoxide ratio, the total hydrogen load emitted by Helsinki traffic in 2007 was 261 t (H2) a-1. Hydrogen, methane and carbon monoxide are connected with each other through the atmospheric methane oxidation process, in which formaldehyde is produced as an important intermediate. The photochemical degradation of formaldehyde produces hydrogen and carbon monoxide as end products. Examination of back-trajectories revealed long-range transportation of carbon monoxide and methane. The trajectories can be grouped by applying cluster and source analysis methods. Thus natural and anthropogenic emission sources can be separated by analyzing trajectory clusters.
Resumo:
According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.
Resumo:
Congestion of traffic is one of the biggest challenges for urban cities in global perspective. Car traffic and traffic jams are causing major problems and the congestion is predicted to worsen in the future. The greenhouse effect has caused a severe threat to the environment globally. On the other hand from the point of view of companies and other economic parties time and money has been lost because of the congestion of traffic. This work studies some possible traffic payment systems for the Helsinki Metropolitan area introducing three optional models and concentrating on the point of view of the economic parties. Central part of this work is formed by a research questionnaire, which was conducted among companies located in the Helsinki area and where more than 1000 responses were gained. The study researches the approaches of the respondents to the area s current traffic system, its development and urban congestion pricing and the answers are analyzed according to the size, industry and location of the companies. The economic aspect is studied by economic theory of industrial location and by emphasizing the meaning of smoothly running traffic for the economic world. Chapter three presents detailed information about traffic congestion, how today s car-centered society has been formed, what concrete things congestion means for economic life and how traffic congestion can be limited. Theoretically it is examined how urban traffic payment systems are working using examples from London and Stockholm where successful traffic payment experiences exist. The literature review analyzes urban development, increasing car traffic and Helsinki Metropolitan area on a structural point of view. The fourth chapter introduces a case study, which concentrates on Helsinki Metropolitan area s different structures, the congestion situation in Helsinki and the introduction of the traffic payment system clarification. Currently the region is experiencing a phase where big changes are happening in the planning of traffic. The traffic systems are being unified to consider the whole region in the future. Also different advices for the increasing traffic congestion problems are needed. Chapter five concentrates on the questionnaire and theme interviews and introduces the research findings. The respondents overall opinion of the traffic payments is quite skeptical. There were some regional differences found and especially taxi, bus and cargo and transit enterprises shared the most negative opinion. Economic parties were worried especially because of the traffic congestion is causing harm for the business travel and the employees traveling to and from work. According to the respondents the best option from the traffic payment models was the ring model where the payment places would be situated inside the Ring Road III. Both the company representatives and other key decision makers see public transportation as a good and powerful tool to decrease traffic congestion. The only question, which remains, is where to find investors willing to invest in public transportation if economic representatives do not believe in pricing the traffic by for example traffic payment systems.