Small State Cultures of Consensus : State Traditions and Consensus-Seeking in the Neo-Corporatist and Neutrality Policies in Post-1945 Austria and Finland

Austria and Finland are persistently referred to as the “success stories” of post-1945 European history. Notwithstanding their different points of departure, in the course of the Cold War both countries portrayed themselves as small and neutral border-states in the world dictated by superpower politics. By the 1970s, both countries frequently ranked at the top end in various international classifications regarding economic development and well-being in society. This trend continues today. The study takes under scrutiny the concept of consensus which figures centrally in the two national narratives of post-1945 success. Given that the two domestic contexts as such only share few direct links with one another and are more obviously different than similar in terms of their geographical location, historical experiences and politico-cultural traditions, the analogies and variations in the anatomies of the post-1945 “cultures of consensus” provide an interesting topic for a historical comparative and cross-national examination. The main research question concerns the identification and analysis of the conceptual and procedural convergence points of the concepts of the state and consensus. The thesis is divided into six main chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter presents the theoretical framework in more detail by focusing on the key concepts of the study – the state and consensus. Chapter two also introduces the comparative historical and cross-national research angles. Chapter three grounds the key concepts of the state and consensus in the historical contexts of Austria and Finland by discussing the state, the nation and democracy in a longer term comparative perspective. The fourth and fifth chapter present case studies on the two policy fields, the “pillars”, upon which the post-1945 Austrian and Finnish cultures of consensus are argued to have rested. Chapter four deals with neo-corporatist features in the economic policy making and chapter five discusses the building up of domestic consensus regarding the key concepts of neutrality policies in the 1950s and 1960s. The study concludes that it was not consensus as such but the strikingly intense preoccupation with the theme of domestic consensus that cross-cut, in a curiously analogous manner, the policy-making processes studied. The main challenge for the post-1945 architects of Austrian and Finnish cultures of consensus was to find strategies and concepts for consensus-building which would be compatible with the principles of democracy. Discussed at the level of procedures, the most important finding of the study concerns the triangular mechanism of coordination, consultation and cooperation that set into motion and facilitated a new type of search for consensus in both post-war societies. In this triangle, the agency of the state was central, though in varying ways. The new conceptions concerning a small state’s position in the Cold War world also prompted cross-nationally perceivable willingness to reconsider inherited concepts and procedures of the state and the nation. At the same time, the ways of understanding the role of the state and its relation to society remained profoundly different in Austria and Finland and this basic difference was in many ways reflected in the concepts and procedures deployed in the search for consensus and management of domestic conflicts. For more detailed information, please consult the author.

Reinventing Nordic Openness : Transparency and State Information in Finland

The study explores new ideational changes in the information strategy of the Finnish state between 1998 and 2007, after a juncture in Finnish governing in the early 1990s. The study scrutinizes the economic reframing of institutional openness in Finland that comes with significant and often unintended institutional consequences of transparency. Most notably, the constitutional principle of publicity (julkisuusperiaate), a Nordic institutional peculiarity allowing public access to state information, is now becoming an instrument of economic performance and accountability through results. Finland has a long institutional history in the publicity of government information, acknowledged by law since 1951. Nevertheless, access to government information became a policy concern in the mid-1990s, involving a historical narrative of openness as a Nordic tradition of Finnish governing Nordic openness (pohjoismainen avoimuus). International interest in transparency of governance has also marked an opening for institutional re-descriptions in Nordic context. The essential added value, or contradictory term, that transparency has on the Finnish conceptualisation of governing is the innovation that public acts of governing can be economically efficient. This is most apparent in the new attempts at providing standardised information on government and expressing it in numbers. In Finland, the publicity of government information has been a concept of democratic connotations, but new internationally diffusing ideas of performance and national economic competitiveness are discussed under the notion of transparency and its peer concepts openness and public (sector) information, which are also newcomers to Finnish vocabulary of governing. The above concepts often conflict with one another, paving the way to unintended consequences for the reforms conducted in their name. Moreover, the study argues that the policy concerns over openness and public sector information are linked to the new drive for transparency. Drawing on theories of new institutionalism, political economy, and conceptual history, the study argues for a reinvention of Nordic openness in two senses. First, in referring to institutional history, the policy discourse of Nordic openness discovers an administrative tradition in response to new dilemmas of public governance. Moreover, this normatively appealing discourse also legitimizes the new ideational changes. Second, a former mechanism of democratic accountability is being reframed with market and performance ideas, mostly originating from the sphere of transnational governance and governance indices. Mobilizing different research techniques and data (public documents of the Finnish government and international organizations, some 30 interviews of Finnish civil servants, and statistical time series), the study asks how the above ideational changes have been possible, pointing to the importance of nationalistically appealing historical narratives and normative concepts of governing. Concerning institutional developments, the study analyses the ideational changes in central steering mechanisms (political, normative and financial steering) and the introduction of budget transparency and performance management in two cases: census data (Population Register Centre) and foreign political information (Ministry for Foreign Affairs). The new policy domain of governance indices is also explored as a type of transparency. The study further asks what institutional transformations are to be observed in the above cases and in the accountability system. The study concludes that while the information rights of citizens have been reinforced and recalibrated during the period under scrutiny, there has also been a conversion of institutional practices towards economic performance. As the discourse of Nordic openness has been rather unquestioned, the new internationally circulating ideas of transparency and the knowledge economy have entered this discourse without public notice. Since the mid 1990s, state registry data has been perceived as an exploitable economic resource in Finland and in the EU public sector information. This is a parallel development to the new drive for budget transparency in organisations as vital to the state as the Population Register Centre, which has led to marketization of census data in Finland, an international exceptionality. In the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the post-Cold War rhetorical shift from secrecy to performance-driven openness marked a conversion in institutional practices that now see information services with high regards. But this has not necessarily led to the increased publicity of foreign political information. In this context, openness is also defined as sharing information with select actors, as a trust based non-public activity, deemed necessary amid the global economic competition. Regarding accountability system, deliberation and performance now overlap, making it increasingly difficult to identify to whom and for what the public administration is accountable. These evolving institutional practices are characterised by unintended consequences and paradoxes. History is a paradoxical component in the above institutional change, as long-term institutional developments now justify short-term reforms.

“Empire is a state of mind” – Imagining Eurasia in Russia –

Työssäni tarkastelen venäläistä neo-euraasianistista liikettä ja tapoja joilla liikkeen aktivistit rakentavat Euraasiasta yhtenäistä kokonaisuutta ja imperiumia. Keskeisiä tutkimuskysymyksiäni ovat: Mikä imperiumi on ja mitkä ovat sen keskeisiä motivaatioita ja teemoja? Kuinka imperiumin idea rakentuu tai käsitetään ja tämän voi tulkita? Minkälaisia seurauksia voi tulkita heidän tavallaan Euraasia nähdä olevan? Materiaalina käytän haastatteluja, jotka on kerätty Moskovassa keväällä 2008, ja liikkeen kirjallisia tuotoksia (lehdet ja Internet -sivut). Neo-euraasianistisella liikkeellä tarkoitan tässä työssä Kansainvälistä Euraasianistista liikettä (Meždunarodnoe Evrazijskoe Dviženie) ja sen alahaaraa Euraasianistista Nuorisoliittoa (Evrazijskij Sojuz Molodëži). Liike perustettiin virallisesti 2003, mutta rakentaa vahvasti historiallista yhteyttä 1930 -luvun klassiseen eurasianismiin. Tämän lisäksi sen diskurssissa on paljon neuvostoliittolaisia, fasistisia, uuskonservatiivisia ja nationalistisia piirteitä. Liikkeen johtohahmo on filosofi-geopoliitikko Alexandr Dugin. Työn tausta-ajatuksena minua kiinnostaa etenkin nk. älymystön tai intelligenttien vaikutus nationalismiin tai sosiaalisia ryhmiä määrittelevien diskurssien kehitykseen ja muutokseen.Tarkastelen materiaalia diskurssianalyyttisesta näkökulmasta. Näen diskurssianalyysin sen tutkimisena, miten sosiaalista todellisuutta tuotetaan erilaisissa sosiaalisissa käytännöissä. Samalla näiden diskurssien tutkiminen, foucautlaisen perinteen myötä, tarkastelee kriittisesti niiden tuottamia (aktualisoituneita sekä potentiaalisia) valtasuhteita. Käytän työssäni myös Benedict Andersonin kuvitellun yhteisön (imagined communities) käsitettä, joka auttaa hahmottamaan tapaa, jolla tutkimuskohteeni rakentavat imperiumia yhteisönä. Aktivistien puheessa imperiumi (imperiâ) tulee esiin pääasiallisesti positiivisesti ja ”heidän omanaan,” kun taas termi imperialismi (imperializm) pääosin negatiivisena, liittyen etenkin keskeisenä vihollisena pidettyihin Yhdysvaltoihin. Esiin nousee monta toisiinsa liittyvää teemaa, jotka jaottelen viideksi pääteemaksi. Näistä tarkastelen lähemmin imperiumia ”kaikkien kansojen hyväntekijänä (poliittinen puoli)”, ulkoisen voiman lähteenä (historiallis-geopoliittinen puoli) sekä kollektiivisen subjektin luojana (imperialistis-nationalistinen puoli). Pyrin kontekstualisoimaan diskurssin ja tarkastelemaan tapoja, joilla se ammentaa motiiveja myös historiallis-kulttuurisista tavoista hahmottaa aluetta ja sen asukkaita. Käsittelen myös kansan, kansakunnan, etnoksen ja nationalismin käsitteitä ja sitä, miten ne nousevat neo-eurasianistisessa diskursissa esiin. Imperiaalisen nationalismin (imperskij nacionalizm) käsite auttaa ymmärtämään niitä tapoja, jolla liike tekee sekä pesäeroa nationalismiin että samalla hyödyntää monia nationalistisen diskurssin perusteemoja. Eräs liikkeen diskurssin keskeisistä eroista niin sanottuun nationalismin valtavirtaan on ”kansakunnan (naciâ)” käsitteen vahva negatiivinen konnotaatio. Sen vastakohtana esiin nostetaan vahvasti kansan (narod) käsite. Samalla kuitenkin etnisen venäläisen (russkij) käsitettä käytetään tavallista laajemmin ja kattavammin kuin tavallisesti, ja ennen kaikkea Venäjä nousee imperiumin keskeisimmäksi tekijäksi. Euraasialaiseen imperiumiin liitetyistä positiivistista mielikuvista käsittelen tarkemmin monikansallisuuden ja kansojen kodin ideaa, joka nousee mielestäni huomattavaksi retoriseksi taustaksi kaikessa materiaalissa. Tähän liittyy vahvasti myös saman teeman sivujuonne, eli imperiumin ”vapauttava” rooli. Tulkitsen, että liikkeen imperiumi -diskurssilla on instrumentaalinen luonne: se legitimoi aktivistien vaatimuksia varsinkin entisen Neuvostoliiton alueen suhteen. ”Euraasialaisen kansan” ajatus toimii mahdollisena Euraasiaa yhteisenä tekijänä ”Neuvostokansan” tilalla. Sen taustalla materiaalistani päätellen siintävät kuitenkin enemmänkin Venäjä ja venäläis -spesifit vaateet kuin koko Euraasia. Pohdin myös kansakunnan (nation) hyljeksimisen syitä ja käsitteen sopivuutta Venäjälle, kuten myös venäläisyyden käsitteiden kerrostuneisuutta. Kokonaisuudessaan imperiumi tuli esiin abstraktina, utopistisena ja ”totaalisena” kokonaisuutena.

Common past, divided memories: historical memory of the Polish minority members in Lithuania

The Master’s thesis examines historical memory of the Polish minority members in Lithuania with regard to how their interpretation of the common Polish-Lithuanian history reiterates or differs from the official Polish and Lithuanian narratives conveyed by the school textbooks. History teaching in high schools carries a crucial state-supported role of “identity building policies” – it maintains a national narrative of memory, which might be exclusive to minorities and their peculiar understanding of history. Lithuanians Poles, in this regard, represent a national minority, which is exposed to two conflicting national narratives of the common past – Polish and Lithuanian. As members of the Polish nation, their understanding of the common Polish-Lithuanian history is conditioned by the Polish historical narrative, acquired as part of the collective memory of the family and/or different minority organizations. On the other hand, they encounter Lithuanian historical narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian past throughout the secondary school history education, where the curriculum, even if taught in Polish, largely represents the Lithuanian point of view. The concept of collective memory is utilized to refer to collective representations of national memory (i.e. publicly articulated narratives and images of collective past in history textbooks) as well as to socially framed individual memories (i.e. historical memory of minority members, where individual remembering is framed by the social context of their identity). The thesis compares the official national historical narratives in Lithuania and Poland, as conveyed by the Polish and Lithuanian history textbooks. The consequent analysis of qualitative interviews with the Polish minority members in Lithuania offers insights into historical memory of Lithuanian Poles and its relation to the official Polish and Lithuanian national narratives of the common past. Qualitative content analysis is applied in both parts of the analysis. The narratives which emerge from the interview data could be broadly grouped into two segments. First, a more pronounced view on the past combines the following elements: i) emphasis on the value of multicultural and diverse past of Lithuania, ii) contestation of “Lithuanocentricity” of the Lithuanian narrative and iii) rejection of the term “occupation”, based on the cultural presuppositions – the dominant position of Polish culture and language in the Vilnius region, symbolic belonging and “Lithuanianness” of the local Poles. While the opposition to the term of “occupation” is in accord with the official Polish narrative conveyed by the textbooks, the former two elements do not neatly adhere to either Polish or Lithuanian textbook narratives. They should rather be considered as an expression of claims for inclusion of plural pasts into Lithuanian collective memory and hence as claims for symbolic enfranchisement into the Lithuanian “imagined community”. The second strand of views, on the other hand, does not exclude assertions about the historically dominant position of Polish culture in Lithuania, but at the same time places more emphasis on the political and historical continuity of the Lithuanian state and highlights a long-standing symbolic connectedness of Vilnius and Lithuania, thus, striking a middle way between the Polish and Lithuanian interpretations of the past.

Rauhan atomi, sodan koodi : Suomalaisen atomivoimaratkaisun teknopolitiikka 1955-1970

This dissertation investigates the atomic power solution in Finland between 1955 - 1970. During these years a national arrangement for atomic energy technology evolved. The foundations of the Finnish atomic energy policy; the creation of basic legislation and the first governmental bodies, were laid between 1955 - 1965. In the late 1960's, the necessary technological and political decisions were made in order to purchase the first commercial nuclear reactor. A historical narration of this process is seen in the international context of "atoms for peace" policies and Cold War history in general. The geopolitical position of Finland made it necessary to become involved in the balanced participation in international scientific-technical exchange and assistive nuclear programs. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 categorically denied Finland acquisition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, from the "Geneva year" of 1955, the emphasis was placed on peaceful purposes for atomic energy as well as on the education of national professionals in Finland. An initiative for the governmental atomic energy commission came from academia but the ultimate motive behind it was an anticipated structural change in the supply of national energy. Economically exploitable hydro power resources were expected to be built within ten years and atomic power was seen as a promising and complementing new energy technology. While importing fuels like coal was out of the question, because of scarce foreign currency, domestic uranium mineral deposits were considered as a potential source of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, even then nuclear energy was regarded as just one of the possible future energy options. In the mid-1960 s a bandwagon effect of light water reactor orders was witnessed in the United States and soon elsewhere in the world. In Finland, two separate invitations for bids for nuclear reactors were initiated. This study explores at length both their preceding grounds and later phases. An explanation is given that the parallel, independent and nearly identical tenders reflected a post-war ideological rivalry between the state-owned utility Imatran Voima and private energy utilities. A private sector nuclear power association Voimayhdistys Ydin represented energy intensive paper and pulp industries and wanted to have free choice instead of being associated themselves with "the state monopoly" in energy pricing. As a background to this, a decisive change had started to happen within Finnish energy policy: private and municipal big thermal power plants became incorporated into the national hydro power production system. A characteristic phenomenon in the later history is the Soviet Union s effort to bid for the tender of Imatran Voima. A nuclear superpower was willing to take part in competition but not on a turnkey basis as Imatran Voima had presumed. As a result of many political turns and four years of negotiations the first Finnish commercial light water reactor was ordered from the East. Soon after this the private nuclear power group ordered its reactors from Sweden. This work interprets this as a reasonable geopolitical balance in choosing politically sensitive technology. Conceptually, social and political dimensions of new technology are emphasised. Negotiations on the Finnish atomic energy program are viewed as a cooperation and a struggle, where state-oriented and private-oriented regimes pose their own macro level views and goals (technopolitical imaginaries) and defend and advance their plans and practical modes of action (schemata). Here, not only technologists but even political actors are seen to contribute to technopolitical realisations.