Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Ministers as strategic political leaders? : Strategic political steering after NPM reforms in Finland

This study explores strategic political steering after the New Public Management (NPM) reforms, with emphasis on the new role assigned to Government ministers in Finland. In the NPM model, politicians concentrate on broad, principal issues, while agencies have discretion within the limits set by politicians. In Finland, strategic steering was introduced with Management by Results (MBR), but the actual tools for strategic political steering have been the Government Programme, the Government Strategy Portfolio (GSP) and Frame Budgeting. This study addresses these tools as means of strategic steering conducted by the Cabinet and individual ministers within their respective ministries. The time frame of the study includes the two Lipponen Cabinets between 1995 and 2003. Interviews with fourteen ministers as well as with fourteen top officials were conducted. In addition, administrative reform documents and documents related to strategic steering tools were analysed. The empirical conclusions of the study can be summarised as follows: There were few signs of strategic political steering in the Lipponen Cabinets. Although the Government Programmes of both Cabinets introduced strategic thinking, the strategic guidelines set forth at the beginning of the Programme were not linked to the GSP or to Frame Budgeting. The GSP could be characterised as the collected strategic agendas of each ministry, while there was neither the will nor the courage among Cabinet members to prioritise the projects and to make selections. The Cabinet used Frame Budgeting mainly in the sense of spending limits, not in making strategic allocation decisions. As for the GSP at the departmental level, projects were suggested by top officials, and ministers only approved the suggested list. Frame Budgeting at the departmental level proved to be the most interesting strategic steering tool from ministers viewpoint: they actively participated in defining which issues would need extra financing. Because the chances for extra financing were minimal, ministers had an effect only on a marginal share of the budget. At the departmental level, the study shows that strategic plans were considered the domain of officials. As for strategies concerning specific substances, there was variation in the interest shown by the ministers. A few ministers emphasised the importance of strategic work and led strategy processes. In most cases, however, officials led the process while ministers offered comments on the drafts of strategy documents. The results of this study together with experiences reported in other countries and local politics show that political decision-makers have difficulty operating at the strategic level. The conclusion is that politicians do not have sufficient incentive to perform the strategic role implied by the NPM type of reforms. Overall, the empirical results of the study indicate the power of politics over management reforms.

Puolustuskykyinen valtio vai Ruotsin hälytyskello? : Suomen sotilasstrateginen asema kylmän sodan alkuvuosien asiantuntija-arvioissa

The doctoral thesis deals with Finnish and foreign expert s analyses of Finland s military strategic position and defence capability, dating back to the early years of the Cold War. Finland s military high command prepared assessments of the country s strategic position and of the capability of the Defence Forces as grounds for defence planning. Since Finland was located on the Cold War dividing line, the foreign powers were also monitoring the development of Finland s situation. The research carried out had access to the armed forces internal assessments, as well as to analyses prepared by the military intelligence services of Sweden, Britain and the United States. One of the working hypotheses was that after the WWII the ability military leadership to estimate the security political needs of the country and the organisation of its defence was severely weakened so that the dangers of the international development were not perceived and the gradual erosion of defence capability was partly unnoticed. This hypothesis proved to be wrong. Even if the Finnish military intelligence was much weaker than during the war, it was able to provide the military leadership with information of the international military development for the most part. The military leadership was also fully aware of the weakening of the defence capability of the country. They faced the difficult task of making the country s political leadership, i.e. President Paasikivi and the government, also understand the gravity of the situation. Only in the last years of his term in office Paasikivi started to believe the warnings of the military. According to another hypothesis, outside observers considered the Finnish armed forces to primarily act as reinforcements for the Soviet Red Army, and they believed that, in the event of a full-scale war, the Finns would not have been able or even willing to resist a Soviet invasion of Sweden and Norway through Finland. The study confirmed that this was approximately the view the Swedes, the British and the Americans had of the Finnish forces. Western and Swedish intelligence assessments did not show confidence in Finland s defence ability and the country was regarded almost as a Soviet satellite. Finland s strategic position was, however, considered slightly different from that of the Soviet-occupied Eastern European countries. Finland had been forced to become part of the Soviet sphere of interest and security system and this was sealed by the Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in 1948. Finland had little importance to the military interests of the Western powers. In Sweden s defence planning, however, Finland played a significant role as an alarm bell of a possible Soviet surprise attack, as well as defensive frontline and buffer zone.

Struggling over subjectivity: A discursive analysis of strategic development in a group

We have seen growing interest in discursive perspectives on strategy. This perspective holds great promise for development of an understanding on how strategy discourse and subjectivity are intertwined. We wish to add to this existing research by outlining a discursive struggle approach to subjectivity. To understand the complex subjectification and empowering/disempowering effects of organizational strategy discourse, this approach focuses on organization-specific discourse mobilizations an various ways of resistance. Drawing on an analysis of the discourses and practices of ‘strategic development’ in an engineering and consulting group we provide an empirical illustration of such struggles over subjectivity. In particular, we report three examples of competing ways of making sense of and giving sense to strategic development, with specific subjectification tendencies. First, we show how corporate management can mobilize and appropriate a specific kind of discourse to attempt to gain control of the organization, which tends to reproduce managerial hegemony, but also trigger discursive and other forms of resistance. Second, we will illustrate how middle managers resist this hegemony by initiating a strategy discourse of their own to create room for manoeuvre in controversial situations. Third, we show how project engineers can distance themselves from managerial-initiated strategy discourses to maintain a viable identity despite all kinds of pressures. Although our examples are case-specific, we believe that similar discursive dynamics also characterize strategizing in other organizations.

A Model for Creating Strategic Alliances. A Study of Inter-firm Cooperation in the North European ICT Sector

In this study, it is argued that the view on alliance creation presented in the current academic literature is limited, and that using a learning approach helps to explain the dynamic nature of alliance creation. The cases in this study suggest that a wealth of inefficiency elements can be found in alliance creation. These elements can further be divided into categories, which help explain the dynamics of alliance creation. The categories –combined with two models brought forward by the study– suggest that inefficiency can be avoided through learning during the creation process. Some elements are especially central to this argumentation. First, the elements related to the clarity and acceptance of the strategy of the company, the potential lack of an alliance strategy and the elements related to changes in the strategic context. Second, the elements related to the length of the alliance creation processes and the problems a long process entails. It is further suggested that the different inefficiency elements may create a situation, where the alliance creation process is –sequentially and successfully– followed to the end, but where the different inefficiencies create a situation where the results are not aligned with the strategic intent. The proposed solution is to monitor and assess the risk for inefficiency elements during the alliance creation process. The learning, which occurs during the alliance creation process as a result of the monitoring, can then lead to realignments in the process. This study proposes a model to mitigate the risk related to the inefficiencies. The model emphasizes creating an understanding of the other alliance partner’s business, creating a shared vision, using pilot cooperation and building trust within the process. An analytical approach to assessing the benefits of trust is also central in this view. The alliance creation approach suggested by this study, which emphasizes trust and pilot cooperation, is further critically reviewed against contracting as a way to create alliances.

Strategic Soft Human Resource Management - The Very Idea

On the one hand this thesis attempts to develop and empirically test an ethically defensible theorization of the relationship between human resource management (HRM) and competitive advantage. The specific empirical evidence indicates that at least part of HRM's causal influence on employee performance may operate indirectly through a social architecture and then through psychological empowerment. However, in particular the evidence concerning a potential influence of HRM on organizational performance seems to put in question some of the rhetorics within the HRM research community. On the other hand, the thesis tries to explicate and defend a certain attitude towards the philosophically oriented debates within organization science. This involves suggestions as to how we should understand meaning, reference, truth, justification and knowledge. In this understanding it is not fruitful to see either the problems or the solutions to the problems of empirical social science as fundamentally philosophical ones. It is argued that the notorious problems of social science, in this thesis exemplified by research on HRM, can be seen as related to dynamic complexity in combination with both the ethical and pragmatic difficulty of ”laboratory-like-experiments”. Solutions … can only be sought by informed trials and errors depending on the perceived familiarity with the object(s) of research. The odds are against anybody who hopes for clearly adequate social scientific answers to more complex questions. Social science is in particular unlikely to arrive at largely accepted knowledge of the kind ”if we do this, then that will happen”, or even ”if we do this, then that is likely to happen”. One of the problems probably facing most of the social scientific research communities is to specify and agree upon the ”this ” and the ”that” and provide convincing evidence of how they are (causally) related. On most more complex questions the role of social science seems largely to remain that of contributing to a (critical) conversation, rather than to arrive at more generally accepted knowledge. This is ultimately what is both argued and, in a sense, demonstrated using research on the relationship between HRM and organizational performance as an example.

The Gendered Social Organisation of Defence: Two Ethnographic Case Studies in the Finnish Defence Forces

In Finland the organising of defence is undergoing vast restructuring. Recent legislation has redefined the central tasks of the Finnish Defence Forces. At the same time, international security cooperation, economic pressures and new administrative paradigms have steered the military towards new ways of organising. National defence is not just politics and principles; to a large extent it is also enacted in day-to-day life in organisations. The lens through which these realities of defence are analysed in this study is gender. How is the security sector – and national defence as part of it – organised in the changing security environment? What is the new division of labour between different societal actors in the face of security challenges? What happens ‘at work’ within the military and the defence sector more broadly? How does gender affect the way in which defence is organised and understood, and how do the changes in the organising of security affect gender relations? The thesis searches for answers to these questions in the context of two organisational settings in the male-dominated defence sector. The case study on a Finnish peacekeeping unit in the Balkans opens a critical view on men’s social practices and the everyday life of crisis management organisations. In the second case study, reorganising of provisioning in the Finnish Defence Forces turns out to be a complicated process where different power relations and social divisions intermingle. Tallberg’s extensive ethnographic fieldwork in the two focal organisations has produced a detailed set of data that lays the basis for critical analysis and policy development in terms of defence organising, cooperation around peace and security issues, and gender equality in organisations. Observations and results are provided for understanding social networks, militarisation, authority relations, care, public-private partnerships, personnel policies, career planning, and humour.

Strategic Priorities, Company Performance and Attitudes Towards Management Accounting Techniques: an Empirical Study

The study investigates whether there is an association between different combinations of emphasis on generic strategies (product differentiation and cost efficiency) and perceived usefulness of management accounting techniques. Previous research has found that cost leadership is associated with traditional accounting techniques and product differentiation with a variety of modern management accounting approaches. The present study focuses on the possible existence of a strategy that mixes these generic strategies. The empirical results suggest that (a) there is no difference in the attitudes towards the usefulness of traditional management accounting techniques between companies that adhere either to a single strategy or a mixed strategy; (b) there is no difference in the attitudes towards modern and traditional techniques between companies that adhere to a single strategy, whether this is product differentiation or cost efficiency, and c) companies that favour a mixed strategy seem to have a more positive attitude towards modern techniques than companies adhering to a single strategy