“Empire is a state of mind” – Imagining Eurasia in Russia –

Työssäni tarkastelen venäläistä neo-euraasianistista liikettä ja tapoja joilla liikkeen aktivistit rakentavat Euraasiasta yhtenäistä kokonaisuutta ja imperiumia. Keskeisiä tutkimuskysymyksiäni ovat: Mikä imperiumi on ja mitkä ovat sen keskeisiä motivaatioita ja teemoja? Kuinka imperiumin idea rakentuu tai käsitetään ja tämän voi tulkita? Minkälaisia seurauksia voi tulkita heidän tavallaan Euraasia nähdä olevan? Materiaalina käytän haastatteluja, jotka on kerätty Moskovassa keväällä 2008, ja liikkeen kirjallisia tuotoksia (lehdet ja Internet -sivut). Neo-euraasianistisella liikkeellä tarkoitan tässä työssä Kansainvälistä Euraasianistista liikettä (Meždunarodnoe Evrazijskoe Dviženie) ja sen alahaaraa Euraasianistista Nuorisoliittoa (Evrazijskij Sojuz Molodëži). Liike perustettiin virallisesti 2003, mutta rakentaa vahvasti historiallista yhteyttä 1930 -luvun klassiseen eurasianismiin. Tämän lisäksi sen diskurssissa on paljon neuvostoliittolaisia, fasistisia, uuskonservatiivisia ja nationalistisia piirteitä. Liikkeen johtohahmo on filosofi-geopoliitikko Alexandr Dugin. Työn tausta-ajatuksena minua kiinnostaa etenkin nk. älymystön tai intelligenttien vaikutus nationalismiin tai sosiaalisia ryhmiä määrittelevien diskurssien kehitykseen ja muutokseen.Tarkastelen materiaalia diskurssianalyyttisesta näkökulmasta. Näen diskurssianalyysin sen tutkimisena, miten sosiaalista todellisuutta tuotetaan erilaisissa sosiaalisissa käytännöissä. Samalla näiden diskurssien tutkiminen, foucautlaisen perinteen myötä, tarkastelee kriittisesti niiden tuottamia (aktualisoituneita sekä potentiaalisia) valtasuhteita. Käytän työssäni myös Benedict Andersonin kuvitellun yhteisön (imagined communities) käsitettä, joka auttaa hahmottamaan tapaa, jolla tutkimuskohteeni rakentavat imperiumia yhteisönä. Aktivistien puheessa imperiumi (imperiâ) tulee esiin pääasiallisesti positiivisesti ja ”heidän omanaan,” kun taas termi imperialismi (imperializm) pääosin negatiivisena, liittyen etenkin keskeisenä vihollisena pidettyihin Yhdysvaltoihin. Esiin nousee monta toisiinsa liittyvää teemaa, jotka jaottelen viideksi pääteemaksi. Näistä tarkastelen lähemmin imperiumia ”kaikkien kansojen hyväntekijänä (poliittinen puoli)”, ulkoisen voiman lähteenä (historiallis-geopoliittinen puoli) sekä kollektiivisen subjektin luojana (imperialistis-nationalistinen puoli). Pyrin kontekstualisoimaan diskurssin ja tarkastelemaan tapoja, joilla se ammentaa motiiveja myös historiallis-kulttuurisista tavoista hahmottaa aluetta ja sen asukkaita. Käsittelen myös kansan, kansakunnan, etnoksen ja nationalismin käsitteitä ja sitä, miten ne nousevat neo-eurasianistisessa diskursissa esiin. Imperiaalisen nationalismin (imperskij nacionalizm) käsite auttaa ymmärtämään niitä tapoja, jolla liike tekee sekä pesäeroa nationalismiin että samalla hyödyntää monia nationalistisen diskurssin perusteemoja. Eräs liikkeen diskurssin keskeisistä eroista niin sanottuun nationalismin valtavirtaan on ”kansakunnan (naciâ)” käsitteen vahva negatiivinen konnotaatio. Sen vastakohtana esiin nostetaan vahvasti kansan (narod) käsite. Samalla kuitenkin etnisen venäläisen (russkij) käsitettä käytetään tavallista laajemmin ja kattavammin kuin tavallisesti, ja ennen kaikkea Venäjä nousee imperiumin keskeisimmäksi tekijäksi. Euraasialaiseen imperiumiin liitetyistä positiivistista mielikuvista käsittelen tarkemmin monikansallisuuden ja kansojen kodin ideaa, joka nousee mielestäni huomattavaksi retoriseksi taustaksi kaikessa materiaalissa. Tähän liittyy vahvasti myös saman teeman sivujuonne, eli imperiumin ”vapauttava” rooli. Tulkitsen, että liikkeen imperiumi -diskurssilla on instrumentaalinen luonne: se legitimoi aktivistien vaatimuksia varsinkin entisen Neuvostoliiton alueen suhteen. ”Euraasialaisen kansan” ajatus toimii mahdollisena Euraasiaa yhteisenä tekijänä ”Neuvostokansan” tilalla. Sen taustalla materiaalistani päätellen siintävät kuitenkin enemmänkin Venäjä ja venäläis -spesifit vaateet kuin koko Euraasia. Pohdin myös kansakunnan (nation) hyljeksimisen syitä ja käsitteen sopivuutta Venäjälle, kuten myös venäläisyyden käsitteiden kerrostuneisuutta. Kokonaisuudessaan imperiumi tuli esiin abstraktina, utopistisena ja ”totaalisena” kokonaisuutena.

Reading the Texture of Reality : Chaos Theory, Literature and the Humanist Perspective

Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan kaaosteorian vaikutusta kaunokirjallisuudessa ja kirjallisuudentutkimuksessa ja esitetään, että kaaosteorian roolia kirjallisuuden kentällä voidaan parhaiten ymmärtää sen avaamien käsitteiden kautta. Suoran soveltamisen sijaan kaaosteorian avulla on käyty uudenlaisia keskusteluja vanhoista aiheista ja luonnontieteestä ammennetut käsitteet ovat johtaneet aiemmin tukkeutuneiden argumenttien avaamiseen uudesta näkökulmasta käsin. Väitöskirjassa keskitytään kolmeen osa-alueeseen: kaunokirjallisen teoksen rakenteen teoretisointiin, ihmisen (erityisesti tekijän) identiteetin hahmottamiseen ja kuvailemiseen sekä fiktion ja todellisuuden suhteen pohdintaan. Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on osoittaa, kuinka kaaosteorian kautta näitä aiheita on lähestytty niin kirjallisuustieteessä kuin kaunokirjallisissa teoksissakin. Väitöskirjan keskiössä ovat romaanikirjailija John Barthin, dramatisti Tom Stoppardin ja runoilija Jorie Grahamin teosten analyysit. Nämä kirjailijat ammentavat kaaosteoriasta keinoja käsitteellistää rakenteita, jotka ovat yhtä aikaa dynaamisia prosesseja ja hahmotettavia muotoja. Kaunokirjallisina teemoina nousevat esiin myös ihmisen paradoksaalisesti tunnistettava ja aina muuttuva identiteetti sekä lopullista haltuunottoa pakeneva, mutta silti kiehtova ja tavoiteltava todellisuus. Näiden kirjailijoiden teosten analyysin sekä teoreettisen keskustelun kautta väitöskirjassa tuodaan esiin aiemmassa tutkimuksessa varjoon jäänyt, koherenssia, ymmärrettävyyttä ja realismia painottava humanistinen näkökulma kaaosteorian merkityksestä kirjallisuudessa.

Self-love and self-liking in the moral and political philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume

This work offers a novel interpretation of David Hume’s (1711–1776) conception of the conjectural development of civil society and artificial moral institutions. It focuses on the social elements of Hume’s Treatise of human nature (1739–40) and the necessary connection between science of man and politeness, civilised monarchies, social distance and hierarchical structure of civil society. The study incorporates aspects of intellectual history, history of philosophy and book history. In order to understand David Hume’s thinking, the intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733) needs to be accounted for. When put into a historical perspective, the moral, political and social components of Treatise of human nature can be read in the context of a philosophical tradition, in which Mandeville plays a pivotal role. A distinctive character of Mandeville and Hume’s account of human nature and moral institutions was the introduction of a simple distinction between self-love and self-liking. The symmetric passions of self-interest and pride can only be controlled by the corresponding moral institutions. This is also the way in which we can say that moral institutions are drawn from human nature. In the case of self-love or self-interest, the corresponding moral institution is justice. Respectively, concerning self-liking or pride the moral institution is politeness. There is an explicit analogy between these moral institutions. If we do not understand this analogy, we do not understand the nature of either justice or politeness. The present work is divided into two parts. In the first part, ‘Intellectual development of Bernard Mandeville’, it is argued that the relevance of the paradigmatic change in Mandeville’s thinking has been missed. It draws a picture of Mandeville turning from the Hobbism of The Fable of the Bees to an original theory of civil society put forward in his later works. In order to make this change more apparent, Mandeville’s career and the publishing history of The Fable of the Bees are examined comprehensively. This interpretation, based partly on previously unknown sources, challenges F. B. Kaye’s influential decision to publish the two parts of The Fable of the Bees as a uniform work of two volumes. The main relevance, however, of the ‘Intellectual development of Mandeville’ is to function as the context for the young Hume. The second part of the work, ‘David Hume and Greatness of mind’, explores in philosophical detail the social theory of the Treatise and politics and the science of man in his Essays. This part will also reveal the relevance of Greatness of mind as a general concept for David Hume’s moral and political philosophy.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

The One and The Many : In the works of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi

This paper concentrates on Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The focus is on their ideas on change and whether the world is essentially One or if it is composed of many entities. In the first chapter I go over some general tendences in Greek and Chinese philosophy. The differences in the cultural background have an influence in the ways philosophy is made, but the paper aims to show that two questions can be brought up when comparing the philosophies of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Lao Zi. The questions are; is the world essentially One or Many? Is change real and if it is, what is the nature of it and how does it take place? For Heraclitus change is real, and as will be shown later in the chapter, quite essential for the sustainability of the world-order (kosmos). The key-concept in the case of Heraclitus is Logos. Heraclitus uses Logos in several senses, most well known relating to his element-theory. But another important feature of the Logos, the content of real wisdom, is to be able to regard everything as one. This does not mean that world is essentially one for Heraclitus in the ontological sense, but that we should see the underlying unity of multiple phenomena. Heraclitus regards this as hen panta: All from One, One from All. I characterize Heraclitus as epistemic monist and an ontological pluralist. It is plausible that the views of Heraclitus on change were the focus of Parmenides’ severe criticism. Parmenides held the view that the world is essentially one and that to see it as consisting of many entities was the error of mortals, i.e. the common man and his philosophical predecessors. For Parmenides what-is, can be approached by two routes; The Way of Truth (Aletheia) and The Way of Seeming (Doxa). Aletheia essentially sees the world as one, where even time is an illusion. In Doxa Parmenides is giving an explanation of the world seen as consisting of many entities and this is his contribution to the line of thought of his predecessors. It should be noted that a strong emphasis is given to the Aletheia, whereas the world-view given is in Doxa is only probable. I go on to describe Parmenides as ontological monist, who gives some plausibility to pluralistic views. In the work of Lao Zi world can be seen as One or as consisting of Many entities. In my interpretation, Lao Zi uses Dao in two different senses; Dao is the totality of things or the order in change. The wu-aspect (seeing-without-form) attends the world as one, whereas the you-aspect attends the world of many entities. In wu-aspect, Dao refers to the totality of things, when in you-aspect Dao is the order or law in change. There are two insights in Lao Zi regarding the relationship between wu- and- you-apects; in ch.1 it is stated that they are two separate aspects in seeing the world, the other chapters regarding that you comes from wu. This naturally brings in the question whether the One is the peak of seeing the world as many. In other words, is there a way from pluralism to monism. All these considerations make it probable that the work attributed to Lao Zi has been added new material or is a compilation of oral sayings. In the end of the paper I will go on to give some insights on how Logos and Dao can be compared in a relevant manner. I also compare Parmenides holistic monism to Lao Zi’s Dao as nameless totality (i.e. in its wu-aspect). I briefly touch the issues of Heidegger and the future of comparative philosophy.

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

Flow forecasts in general planning of municipal water and sewage works

Vuorokausivirtaaman ennustaminen yhdyskuntien vesi- ja viemärilaitosten yleissuunnittelussa.

Divergencies of Perception : The Possibilities of Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology in Analyses of Contemporary Art

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) has been known as the philosopher of painting. His interest in the theory of perception intertwined with the questions concerning the artist s perception, the experience of an artwork and the possible interpretations of the artwork. For him, aesthetics was not a sub-field of philosophy, and art was not simply a subject matter for the aesthetic experience, but a form of thinking. This study proposes an opening for a dialogue between Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and contemporary art. The thesis examines his phenomenology through certain works of contemporary art and presents readings of these artworks through his phenomenology. The thesis both shows the potentiality of a method, but also engages in the critical task of finding the possible limitations of his approach. The first part lays out the methodological and conceptual points of departure of Merleau-Ponty s phenomenological approach to perception as well as the features that determined his discussion on encountering art. Merleau-Ponty referred to the experience of perceiving art using the notion of seeing with (voir selon). He stressed a correlative reciprocity described in Eye and Mind (1961) as the switching of the roles of the visible and the painter. The choice of artworks is motivated by certain restrictions in the phenomenological readings of visual arts. The examined works include paintings by Tiina Mielonen, a photographic work by Christian Mayer, a film by Douglas Gordon and Philippe Parreno, and an installation by Monika Sosnowska. These works resonate with, and challenge, his phenomenological approach. The chapters with case studies take up different themes that are central to Merleau-Ponty s phenomenology: space, movement, time, and touch. All of the themes are interlinked with the examined artworks. There are also topics that reappear in the thesis, such as the notion of écart and the question of encountering the other. As Merleau-Ponty argued, the sphere of art has a particular capability to address our being in the world. The thesis presents an interpretation that emphasises the notion of écart, which refers to an experience of divergence or dispossession. The sudden dissociation, surprise or rupture that is needed in order for a meeting between the spectator and the artwork, or between two persons, to be possible. Further, the thesis suggests that through artworks it is possible to take into consideration the écart, the divergence, that defines our subjectivity.