Incarnate Subjectivity : The Constitutive Significance of Embodiment in Husserlian Phenomenology

This work offers a systematic phenomenological investigation of the constitutive significance of embodiment. It provides detailed analyses of subjectivity in relation to itself, to others, and to objective reality, and it argues that these basic structures cannot be made intelligible unless one takes into account how they are correlated with an embodied subject. The methodological and conceptual starting point of the treatise is the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. The investigation employs the phenomenological method and uses the descriptions and analyses provided by Husserl and his successors. The treatise is motivated and outlined systematically, and textual exegesis serves as a means for the systematic phenomenological investigation. The structure of the work conforms to the basic relations of subjectivity. The first part of the thesis explores the intimate relation between lived-body and selfhood, analyzes the phenomena of localization, and argues that self-awareness is necessarily and fundamentally embodied self-awareness. The second part examines the intersubjective dimensions of embodiment, investigates the corporal foundations of empathy, and unravels the bodily aspects of transcendental intersubjectivity. The third part scrutinizes the role of embodiment in the constitution of the surrounding objective reality: it focuses on the complex relationship between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, carefully examines the normative aspects of genetic and generative self-constitution, and argues eventually that what Husserl calls the paradox of subjectivity originates in a tension between primordial and intersubjective normativity. The work thus reinterprets the paradox of subjectivity in terms of a normative tension, and claims that the paradox is ultimately rooted in the structures of embodiment. In this manner, as a whole, the work discloses the constitutive significance of embodiment, and argues that transcendental subjectivity must be fundamentally embodied.

Poetics of Subjectivity : Existence and Expressivity in Simone de Beauvoir's Philosophy

In the last thirty years, primarily feminist scholars have drawn attention to and re-evaluated the philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir (1908 1986). Her philosophical practice has been described as non-systematic, and her literary writing has been viewed as part of her non-systematic mode of philosophising. This dissertation radically deepens the question concerning Beauvoir s philosophical motivations for turning to literature as a mode to express subjectivity. It explicates the central concepts of Beauvoir s philosophy of existence, which are subjectivity, ambiguity, paradox and temporality, and their background in the modern traditions of existential philosophy and phenomenology. It also clarifies Beauvoir s main reason to turn to literature in order to express subjectivity as both singular and universal: as a specific mode of communication, literature is able to make the universality of existence manifest in the concrete, singular and temporal texture of life. In addition, the thesis gives examples of how Beauvoir s literary works contribute to an understanding of the complexity of subjectivity. I use the expression poetics of subjectivity to refer to the systematic relation between Beauvoir s existential and phenomenological notion of subjectivity and her literary works, and to her articulations of a creative mode of using language, especially in the novel. The thesis is divided into five chapters, of which the first three investigate Beauvoir s philosophy of existence at the intersection of the modern traditions of thought that began with René Descartes and Søren Kierkegaard s intuitions about subjectivity. Chapter 1 interprets Beauvoir s notion of ambiguity, as compared to paradox, and argues that both determine her notion of existence. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the phenomenological side of Beauvoir s philosophy through a study of her response to early French interpretations of transcendental subjectivity, especially in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. My analysis shows that Edmund Husserl s distinction between different levels of subjective experience is central to Beauvoir s understanding of subjectivity and to the different ego concepts she uses. Chapter 4 is a study of Beauvoir s reflections on the expression of subjective thought, and, more specifically, her philosophical conceptions of the metaphysical novel and the autobiography as two modes of indirect communication. Chapter 5, finally, compares two modes of investigating concrete subjectivity; Beauvoir s conceptual study of femininity in Le deuxième sexe and her literary expression of subjectivity in the novel L Invitée. My analysis reveals and explicates Beauvoir s original contribution to a comprehensive understanding of the becoming and paradox of human existence: the fundamental insight that these phenomena are sexed, historically as well as imaginatively.

Certainty or Faith? Arendt's and Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Cartesian Foundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism has for centuries attempted to unify all scientific inquiry into the context of one grand science, the first philosophy. One of the most important tasks of this tradition has been to ground all knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. In this master s thesis I ask the following question: To what extent and under what conditions is it possible to achieve absolute certainty in the sense of the attempts of Cartesian foundationalism? By examining how the 20th century philosophers, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) interpret the epistemological methodology of René Descartes, I claim that the Cartesian achievement of absolute certainty rests on the implicit presupposition of an epistemologically prior form of faith in the world and trust (pistis) in other conscious beings. I show that knowledge is possible only within the context of a common world that is inhabited by several conscious beings that share a common linguistic system. This threefold element is shown to be the bedrock condition for any kind of philosophical inquiry. The main literature sources for this thesis are The Life of the Mind by Hannah Arendt, Le Visible et l invisible by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae by René Descartes and Erfahrung und Urteil by Edmund Husserl.

Eläimen tuttuus ja vieraus : Fenomenologisen empatiateorian uudelleentulkinta ja sen sovellus vieraslajisia eläimiä koskevaan kokemukseen

Within the field of philosophy, animals have traditionally been studied from two perspectives: that of self-knowledge and that of ethics. The analysis of the differences between humans and animals has served our desire to understand our own specificity, whereas ethical discussions have ultimately aimed at finding the right way to treat animals. This dissertation proposes a different way of looking at non-human animals: it investigates the question of how non-human animals appear to us humans in our perceptual experience. The analysis focuses on the empathetic, embodied understanding of animals diverse movements and other expressions. The theoretical point of departure for the research is phenomenological philosophy, in particular Maurice Merleau-Ponty s phenomenology of the body. Edmund Husserl s and Edith Stein s analyses of empathy and embodiment are also crucial to the work. In this tradition, empathy means understanding the other s experience through her bodily expressions and seeing the other body as living, as well as motivated and directed towards the surrounding world. The dissertation both explicates and criticizes the earlier phenomenological notions of empathy and human specificity. In order to elucidate the fundamental structures of our experience of non-human animals, it also applies the phenomenological method, which consists of a phenomenological reduction and a free variation of the different aspects of experience. It is shown that our experiences of non-human animals involve a recognition of both similarities and differences. This recognition, however, is not primarily based on intellectual comparisons but is lived as an embodied relationship to another body, and its manifestations vary from one instant to the next. The analysis also reveals that the object of empathy is not the other s experience as such, not even as it is manifested by the other s movements, but rather the other s embodied situation, enriched by elements that remain outside the scope of the other s experience. The dissertation shows that human existence is intertwined with the existence of non-human animals on four levels: those of empathetic sensations, reciprocal communication, experience of the surrounding world and self-definitions. The animals different modes of perception prove to expand our understanding of what is perceivable and how things can be perceived. The presence of non-human animals in our perceptual world is revealed as something that both shows us the limits of our own embodiment and enables us to overcome these limits in empathetic acts. Finally, it is demonstrated that the life of non-human animals is intertwined with ours in a far more complex way than has been presupposed in traditional descriptions of human-animal differences.