Arvoja näkyvissä : Kaunokirjallisuuden etiikka Ludwig Wittgensteinin filosofian valossa

The goal of this dissertation was to study whether it is possible and meaningful to apply Ludwig Wittgenstein s distinction between saying (Sagen) and showing (Zeigen) to ethically oriented literary criticism. The following questions were used as the primary guidelines: 1. Is it possible, in the context of literary criticism, to put in practice Wittgenstein s ethical conceptions, which are quite theoretical and metaphysical by nature? 2. If so, what practical literary devices do authors use if they want to demonstrate their ethical values within the frame of a fictional work? 3. Does philosophy offer useful ethical consepts that open us new and interesting readings in fiction? The philosophical background of Wittgenstein s distinction is clarified in chapter I. This clarification is based on his main works, Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Philosophishe Untersuchungen, the published correspondence between Wittgenstein and Paul Engelmann, and selected Wittgenstein research and papers. Analyzing ethics and it s expression in Georg Trakl s poetry further elucidates Wittgenstein s concept of showing. The concept that a literary work is an act of an author was used as a starting point. The presumption was that analyzing this act of an author will reveal how ethical values can be demonstrated in literature. Categorizing an author s act at different levels of literary expression provides the structure of this study. In chapters IV - XIII literary devices useful for demonstrating ethics are examined and explained using examples from the works of Joseph Conrad, Charles Dickens, Nikolay Leskov, Ludwig Uhland, Eino Leino, Pentti Haanpää and Maria Jotuni. The concepts and views of researchers and writers such as Mihail Bahtin, Peter Juhl, E. D. Hirsch, Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen are used. The concepts outlined in previous chapters are then applied in three case studies: Aeschylus s Oresteia trilogy, J-L. Runeberg s poem Sven Dufva and Sofi Oksanen s novel Puhdistus (Purge). On the whole, Wittgenstein s idea that ethical values can be demonstrated (shown) by means of literature is revealed as a fruitful point of departure for a more exact ethical reading, offering a new perspective on literary works.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

The Restless Love of Thinking : The Concept Liebe in Hegel's Philosophy

The German philosopher G.W.F.Hegel (1770–1831) is best known for his idealistic system philosophy, his concept of spirit [Geist] and for his dictum that the existing and the rational overlap. This thesis offers a new perspective: it examines the working of the concept ‘love’ in Hegel’s philosophy by looking at the contexts and function he puts it to, from his earliest writings to the very last lectures he gave. The starting point of the inquiry is that he applied the concept Liebe to different contexts for different purposes, but each time to provide an answer to a specific philosophical problem. His formulation, reformulation and use of ‘love’ give possible solutions to problems the solving of which was crucial to the development of his thought as a whole. The study is divided into three parts, each analysing the different problems and solutions to which Hegel applied the concept of love. The first part, "Love, morality and ethical life", examines these interconnected themes in Hegel’s early work. The main questions he addressed during this period concerned how to unite Kant’s philosophy and the Greek ideal of the good life. In this context, the concept ‘love’ did three things. First, it served to formulate his grounding idea of the relation between unity and difference, or the manifold. Secondly, it was the key to his attempt to base an ideal folk religion on Christianity interpreted as a religion of love. Finally, it provided the means to criticise Kant’s moral philosophy. The question of the moral value of love helped Hegel to break away from Kant’s thought and develop his own theory about love and ethical life. The second part of the study, "Love and the political realm", considers the way 'Liebe' functions in connection with questions concerning the community and political life in Hegel’s work. In addition to questioning the universal applicability of the concept of recognition as a key to his theory of social relations, the chapters focus on gender politics and the way he conceptualised the gender category ‘woman’ through the concept ‘love’. Another line of inquiry is the way the figure of Antigone was used to conceptualise the differentiated spheres of action for men and women, and the part ‘love’ played in Hegel’s description of Antigone’s motives. Thirdly, Hegel’s analogy of the family and the state and the way ‘love’ functions in an attempt to promote understanding of the relation between citizens and the state are examined. The third and final part of the study, "Love as absolute spirit", focuses on ‘love’ within Hegel’s systemic thought and the way he continued to characterise Geist through the language of Liebe up until and including his very last works. It is shown how Liebe functions in his hierarchical organisation of the domains of art, religion and philosophy, and how both art and religion end up in similar structural positions with regard to philosophy. One recurrent theme in the third part is Hegel’s complex relation to Romantic thought. Another line of investigation is how he reconstructed Christianity as a religion of love in his mature work. In striking contrast to his early thought, in his last works Hegel introduced a new concept of love that incorporated negativity, and that could also function as the root of political action.

Paluu paratiisiin : Polkuja hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen Martti Lutherin ja Friedrich Nietzschen perinteissä

Tutkimukseni tarkoitus on paikallistaa polkuja hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen. Tutkimukseni termit hyvä ja paha määrittyvät moraalisesti. Täten tutkimusaiheeni on ihmisen ja moraalin välinen suhde. Tutkin ihmisen moraalista olotilaa, siinä tapahtuvaa muutosta ja tämän muutoksen ehtoja. Tutkimuksellani on kaksi pääkysymystä: kuinka on mahdollista päästä hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen ja miksi meidän tulisi siirtyä hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen. Polut hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen vievät myös etiikan tuolle puolen. Tutkimukseni pyrkii selvittämään mitä vikaa etiikassa on ja kuinka on mahdollista perustella toimintaa ilman etiikkaa. Tutkimukseni metodi on systemaattinen analyysi. Johdanto-osassa käsittelen yleisesti moraalia, sen vaikutuspiiriä ja niitä syitä, joiden vuoksi se täytyy hylätä. Tarkastelen myös etiikkaa ja selvitän sitä laajempaa kontekstia mihin se liittyy. Ensimmäisessä luvussa käsittelen Martti Lutherin teologiaa. Lutherilla moraalia edustaa Jumalan laki, jonka alaisuudesta kristitty pääsee vapaaksi kun Jeesus ottaa ristinkuolemassaan ihmisten synnin itselleen ja kärsii Jumalan lain mukaisen kuolemanrangaistuksen. Uskon yhteydessä Kristukseen kristitty kohoaa lain ulkopuolelle tekemään rakkauden tekoja. Toinen luku on omistettu Søren Kierkegaardin kristilliselle eksistentialismille. Kierkegaardin eksistenssitasojen filosofiassa uskonnollinen olemisen taso paljastuu korkeammaksi kuin eettinen. Tässä nousee tärkeäksi Kierkegaardin kirja Pelko ja vavistus. Kierkegaard tutkii Raamatun kertomusta Aabrahamista, jolle Jumala antaa käskyn uhrata oma poikansa Iisak. Kierkegaardille tarina on esimerkki eettistä korkeammasta ja sitä tilapäisesti vastustavasta olemisen tavasta. Kolmannessa luvussa käsittelen Dietrich Bonhoefferin teologiaa. Bonhoefferin mukaan Jeesus kutsuu ihmisiä seuraamaan häntä. Tämä on kutsu hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen paratiisin viattomuuteen, joka rikkoo eettisyyden ihmisen ja Jeesuksen välillä. Neljännessä luvussa tarkastelen Friedrich Nietzschen filosofiaa ja pyrin ymmärtämään mitä hänen ohjelmansa hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen tarkoittaa. Nietzschen vallantahdon filosofiassa moraali on heikkojen keino alistaa vahvat. Tarkastelen Nietzschen käsitystä moraalin synnystä ja sen haitallisuudesta ja pyrin selvittämään kuinka herrat elävät hyvän ja pahan tuolla puolen. Viidennessä luvussa tutkin Jaques Derridan grammatologiaa. Derridan mukaan teksti on suljettu tila, jonka ulkopuolelle on mahdoton päästä. Derrida sanoittaa kuitenkin sanoittamatonta tilattomuutta tekstin tuolla puolen. Tästä ei-paikasta käsin hypereettinen dekonstruktio purkaa perinteistä etiikkaa. Kuudennessa luvussa tarkastelen Mark C. Taylorin epä/teologiaa. Taylorille olotilan muutosta kuvaa termi harhautuminen , joka vie ihmisen lainsuojattomuuteen hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen. Selvitän mitä harhautuminen tarkoittaa ja miten se liittyy Taylorin Jumalan kuoleman epä/teologiaan. Johtopäätösluvussa tuon esiin tutkimustuloksia, nostan esille joitain pääluvuissa esiintyviä teemoja ja vertaan tutkimuskohteitteni näkemyksiä toisiinsa. Lutherin ja Nietzschen perinteissä on paljon yhteistä, mutta pohjimmiltaan ne sotivat toisiaan vastaan. Hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen johtaa kaksi polkua. Toinen niistä vie paratiisiin, toinen tuhoon.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

Hyveiden harjoittaminen : edellytykset ja esteet

In the first half of the 20th century, most moral philosophers took the concept of virtue to be secondary to moral principles or emotions, though in various and mutually conflicting ways. In the early 1960s interest in the virtues was restored by the analytic philosophers Elizabeth Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, the younger colleagues and friends of the late Wittgenstein. Later, Alasdair MacIntyre became a leading virtue ethicist. In 1981, MacIntyre introduced in After Virtue the concept of practices, which he based on the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis. This dissertation examines MacIntyre s characterization of the interconnectedness between practices and virtues, especially in relation to skills, education, and certain emotions. The primary position of the virtues is defended against the tendency in modern moral philosophy to overemphasize the role either of principles and rules or of emotions. The view according to which rational action and acting according to the virtues is best conceptualized as following rules or principles is criticized by arguments that are grounded by some Wittgensteinian observations, and that can be characterized as transcendental. Even if the virtues cannot be defined by, and are not based entirely on, emotions, the role of certain emotions on the learning and education of skills and virtues are studied more carefully than by MacIntyre. In the cases of resentment, indignation, and shame, the analysis of Peter Strawson is utilized, and in the case of regret, the analysis of Bernard Williams. Williams analysis of regret and moral conflict concludes in a kind of antirealism, which this study criticizes. Where education of practices and skills and the related reactive emotions are examined as conditions of learning and practicing the virtues, institutions and ideologies are examined as obstacles and threats to the virtues. This theme is studied through Karl Marx s conception of alienation and Karl Polanyi s historical and sociological research concerning the great transformation . The study includes six Finnish-published articles carrying the titles Our negative attitudes towards other persons , Authority and upbringing , Moral conflicts, regret and ethical realism , Practices and institutions , Doing justice as condition to communal action: a transcendental argument for justice as virtue , and Alienation from practices in capitalist society: Alasdair MacIntyre s Marxist Aristotelianism . The introductory essay sums up the themes of the articles and presents some central issues of virtue ethics by relating the classical Socratic questions to Aristotelian practical philosophy, as well as to current controversies in metaethics and moral psychology.

Kysymys esineellisyydestä : Georg Lukácsin esineellistymisteoria ja Martin Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia

Käsilläolevan tutkielman aiheena on esineellistymisen käsite. Sitä tarkastellaan yhtäältä sellaisena kuten se esitetään Georg Lukácsin (1885-1971) teoksessa Historia ja luokkatietoisuus (1923), toisaalta kuten sitä koskeva teoria on luettavissa esiin Martin Heideggerin (1889-1976) läpimurtoteoksesta Oleminen ja aika (1927). Molemmat ajattelijat pyrkivät teoksissaan rakentamaan kokonaisvaltaista tulkintaa länsimaisen ajattelun ja toiminnan taipumuksesta tulkita todellisuus esineellisenä (dinglich), so. eletystä elämästä ja toiminnasta irrallisena olioiden (Dinge) maailmana. Sekä Lukács että Heidegger pyrkivät osoittamaan, että esineellistyneen todellisuuden ontologisena perustana toimii inhimillisen praktisen toiminnan kenttä, josta käsin esineellistävät ja objektivoivat suhtautumistavat todellisuuteen voivat vasta jälkikäteisesti syntyä. Molemmille ajattelijoille esineellisyyden muodostuminen ontologiaa hallitsevaksi tulkinnaksi todellisuuden luonteesta edellyttää myös tietynlaisia sosiaalisen olemisen rakenteita. Tutkielmassa tehdään vertailevaa käsiteanalyysia Lukácsin ja Heideggerin teoreettisten diskurssien välillä. Tavoitteena on rakentaa mahdollisuutta lukea mainittuja filosofeja saman, modernille olemassaololle keskeisen ontologisen sekä eksistentiaalisen ongelman tarkastelijoina. Toisaalta vertaileva lähestymistapa pyrkii myös tuomaan esiin olennaisia ja perustavia eroja Lukácsin marxilaisen ja Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologisen orientaation välillä. Tutkielmassa pyritäänkin osoittamaan, että Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia ei tarkastele kauppatavaran rakennetta eikä sosiaalisen vaihdon prosesseja marxilaisesta näkökulmasta riittävällä tavalla, kun taas Lukácsin teoreettinen projekti tulee edellyttäneeksi tuottavaan subjektiviteettiin pohjautuvan ontologisen perusasenteen. Tämä ontologinen positio voidaan puolestaan kritisoida hedelmällisesti heideggerilaisesta näkökulmasta. Viime kädessä tutkielma pyrkii avaamaan esineellistymisteorioiden vertailun kautta kysymyksen länsimarxilaisen materialistisen dialektiikan ja Heideggerin fenomenologisen ontologian välisestä suhteesta.

Constructions and situations : a constructivist reading of Hegel's System

The object of this work is Hegel's Logic, which comprises the first third of his philosophical System that also includes the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The work is divided into two parts, where the first part investigates Hegel s Logic in itself or without an explicit reference to rest of Hegel's System. It is argued in the first part that Hegel's Logic contains a methodology for constructing examples of basic ontological categories. The starting point on which this construction is based is a structure Hegel calls Nothing, which I argue to be identical with an empty situation, that is, a situation with no objects in it. Examples of further categories are constructed, firstly, by making previous structures objects of new situations. This rule makes it possible for Hegel to introduce examples of ontological structures that contain objects as constituents. Secondly, Hegel takes also the very constructions he uses as constituents of further structures: thus, he is able to exemplify ontological categories involving causal relations. The final result of Hegel's Logic should then be a model of Hegel s Logic itself, or at least of its basic methods. The second part of the work focuses on the relation of Hegel's Logic to the other parts of Hegel's System. My interpretation tries to avoid, firstly, the extreme of taking Hegel's System as a grand metaphysical attempt to deduce what exists through abstract thinking, and secondly, the extreme of seeing Hegel's System as mere diluted Kantianism or a second-order investigation of theories concerning objects instead of actual objects. I suggest a third manner of reading Hegel's System, based on extending the constructivism of Hegel's Logic to the whole of his philosophical System. According to this interpretation, transitions between parts of Hegel's System should not be understood as proofs of any sort, but as constructions of one structure or its model from another structure. Hence, these transitions involve at least, and especially within the Philosophy of Nature, modelling of one type of object or phenomenon through characteristics of an object or phenomenon of another type, and in the best case, and especially within the Philosophy of Spirit, transformations of an object or phenomenon of one type into an object or phenomenon of another type. Thus, the transitions and descriptions within Hegel's System concern actual objects and not mere theories, but they still involve no fallacious deductions.