Principles of Pitch Organization in Béla Bartók's 'Duke Bluebeard's Castle'

The topic of my doctoral thesis is to demonstrate the usefulness of incorporating tonal and modal elements into a pitch-web square analysis of Béla Bartók's (1881-1945) opera, 'A kékszakállú herceg vára' ('Duke Bluebeard's Castle'). My specific goal is to demonstrate that different musical materials, which exist as foreground melodies or long-term key progressions, are unified by the unordered pitch set {0,1,4}, which becomes prominent in different sections of Bartók's opera. In Bluebeard's Castle, the set {0,1,4} is also found as a subset of several tetrachords: {0,1,4,7}, {0,1,4,8}, and {0,3,4,7}. My claim is that {0,1,4} serves to link music materials between themes, between sections, and also between scenes. This study develops an analytical method, drawn from various theoretical perspectives, for conceiving superposed diatonic spaces within a hybrid pitch-space comprised of diatonic and chromatic features. The integrity of diatonic melodic lines is retained, which allows for a non-reductive understanding of diatonic superposition, without appealing to pitch centers or specifying complete diatonic collections. Through combining various theoretical insights of the Hungarian scholar Ernő Lendvai, and the American theorists Elliott Antokoletz, Paul Wilson and Allen Forte, as well as the composer himself, this study gives a detailed analysis of the opera's pitch material in a way that combines, complements, and expands upon the studies of those scholars. The analyzed pitch sets are represented on Aarre Joutsenvirta's note-web square, which adds a new aspect to the field of Bartók analysis. Keywords: Bartók, Duke Bluebeard's Castle (Op. 11), Ernő Lendvai, axis system, Elliott Antokoletz, intervallic cycles, intervallic cells, Allen Forte, set theory, interval classes, interval vectors, Aarre Joutsenvirta, pitch-web square, pitch-web analysis.

Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

Kysymys esineellisyydestä : Georg Lukácsin esineellistymisteoria ja Martin Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia

Käsilläolevan tutkielman aiheena on esineellistymisen käsite. Sitä tarkastellaan yhtäältä sellaisena kuten se esitetään Georg Lukácsin (1885-1971) teoksessa Historia ja luokkatietoisuus (1923), toisaalta kuten sitä koskeva teoria on luettavissa esiin Martin Heideggerin (1889-1976) läpimurtoteoksesta Oleminen ja aika (1927). Molemmat ajattelijat pyrkivät teoksissaan rakentamaan kokonaisvaltaista tulkintaa länsimaisen ajattelun ja toiminnan taipumuksesta tulkita todellisuus esineellisenä (dinglich), so. eletystä elämästä ja toiminnasta irrallisena olioiden (Dinge) maailmana. Sekä Lukács että Heidegger pyrkivät osoittamaan, että esineellistyneen todellisuuden ontologisena perustana toimii inhimillisen praktisen toiminnan kenttä, josta käsin esineellistävät ja objektivoivat suhtautumistavat todellisuuteen voivat vasta jälkikäteisesti syntyä. Molemmille ajattelijoille esineellisyyden muodostuminen ontologiaa hallitsevaksi tulkinnaksi todellisuuden luonteesta edellyttää myös tietynlaisia sosiaalisen olemisen rakenteita. Tutkielmassa tehdään vertailevaa käsiteanalyysia Lukácsin ja Heideggerin teoreettisten diskurssien välillä. Tavoitteena on rakentaa mahdollisuutta lukea mainittuja filosofeja saman, modernille olemassaololle keskeisen ontologisen sekä eksistentiaalisen ongelman tarkastelijoina. Toisaalta vertaileva lähestymistapa pyrkii myös tuomaan esiin olennaisia ja perustavia eroja Lukácsin marxilaisen ja Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologisen orientaation välillä. Tutkielmassa pyritäänkin osoittamaan, että Heideggerin fundamentaaliontologia ei tarkastele kauppatavaran rakennetta eikä sosiaalisen vaihdon prosesseja marxilaisesta näkökulmasta riittävällä tavalla, kun taas Lukácsin teoreettinen projekti tulee edellyttäneeksi tuottavaan subjektiviteettiin pohjautuvan ontologisen perusasenteen. Tämä ontologinen positio voidaan puolestaan kritisoida hedelmällisesti heideggerilaisesta näkökulmasta. Viime kädessä tutkielma pyrkii avaamaan esineellistymisteorioiden vertailun kautta kysymyksen länsimarxilaisen materialistisen dialektiikan ja Heideggerin fenomenologisen ontologian välisestä suhteesta.

Proofs, Paradoxes, and Probabilities : The Logical Turn of Philosophy in Finland

This monograph describes the emergence of independent research on logic in Finland. The emphasis is placed on three well-known students of Eino Kaila: Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003), Erik Stenius (1911-1990), and Oiva Ketonen (1913-2000), and their research between the early 1930s and the early 1950s. The early academic work of these scholars laid the foundations for today's strong tradition in logic in Finland and also became internationally recognized. However, due attention has not been given to these works later, nor have they been comprehensively presented together. Each chapter of the book focuses on the life and work of one of Kaila's aforementioned students, with a fourth chapter discussing works on logic by authors who would later become known within other disciplines. Through an extensive use of correspondence and other archived material, some insight has been gained into the persons behind the academic personae. Unique and unpublished biographical material has been available for this task. The chapter on Oiva Ketonen focuses primarily on his work on what is today known as proof theory, especially on his proof theoretical system with invertible rules that permits a terminating root-first proof search. The independency of the parallel postulate is proved as an example of the strength of root-first proof search. Ketonen was to our knowledge Gerhard Gentzen's (the 'father' of proof theory) only student. Correspondence and a hitherto unavailable autobiographic manuscript, in addition to an unpublished article on the relationship between logic and epistemology, is presented. The chapter on Erik Stenius discusses his work on paradoxes and set theory, more specifically on how a rigid theory of definitions is employed to avoid these paradoxes. A presentation by Paul Bernays on Stenius' attempt at a proof of the consistency of arithmetic is reconstructed based on Bernays' lecture notes. Stenius correspondence with Paul Bernays, Evert Beth, and Georg Kreisel is discussed. The chapter on Georg Henrik von Wright presents his early work on probability and epistemology, along with his later work on modal logic that made him internationally famous. Correspondence from various archives (especially with Kaila and Charlie Dunbar Broad) further discusses his academic achievements and his experiences during the challenging circumstances of the 1940s.