Religion Explained? : A Philosophical Appraisal of the Cognitive Science of Religion

This study examines philosophically the main theories and methodological assumptions of the field known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR). The study makes a philosophically informed reconstruction of the methodological principles of the CSR, indicates problems with them, and examines possible solutions to these problems. The study focuses on several different CSR writers, namely, Scott Atran, Justin Barrett, Pascal Boyer and Dan Sperber. CSR theorising is done in the intersection between cognitive sciences, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. This multidisciplinary nature makes CSR a fertile ground for philosophical considerations coming from philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. The study begins by spelling out the methodological assumptions and auxiliary theories of CSR writers by situating these theories and assumptions in the nexus of existing approaches to religion. The distinctive feature of CSR is its emphasis on information processing: CSR writers claim that contemporary cognitive sciences can inform anthropological theorising about the human mind and offer tools for producing causal explanations. Further, they claim to explain the prevalence and persistence of religion by cognitive systems that undergird religious thinking. I also examine the core theoretical contributions of the field focusing mainly on the (1) “minimally counter-intuitiveness hypothesis” and (2) the different ways in which supernatural agent representations activate our cognitive systems. Generally speaking, CSR writers argue for the naturalness of religion: religious ideas and practices are widespread and pervasive because human cognition operates in such a way that religious ideas are easy to acquire and transmit. The study raises two philosophical problems, namely, the “problem of scope” and the “problem of religious relevance”. The problem of scope is created by the insistence of several critics of the CSR that CSR explanations are mostly irrelevant for explaining religion. Most CSR writers themselves hold that cognitive explanations can answer most of our questions about religion. I argue that the problem of scope is created by differences in explanation-begging questions: the former group is interested in explaining different things than the latter group. I propose that we should not stick too rigidly to one set of methodological assumptions, but rather acknowledge that different assumptions might help us to answer different questions about religion. Instead of adhering to some robust metaphysics as some strongly naturalistic writers argue, we should adopt a pragmatic and explanatory pluralist approach which would allow different kinds of methodological presuppositions in the study of religion provided that they attempt to answer different kinds of why-questions, since religion appears to be a multi-faceted phenomenon that spans over a variety of fields of special sciences. The problem of religious relevance is created by the insistence of some writers that CSR theories show religious beliefs to be false or irrational, whereas others invoke CSR theories to defend certain religious ideas. The problem is interesting because it reveals the more general philosophical assumptions of those who make such interpretations. CSR theories can (and have been) interpreted in terms of three different philosophical frameworks: strict naturalism, broad naturalism and theism. I argue that CSR theories can be interpreted inside all three frameworks without doing violence to the theories and that these frameworks give different kinds of results regarding the religious relevance of CSR theories.

The Problem of Implementation and its Relation to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

According to certain arguments, computation is observer-relative either in the sense that many physical systems implement many computations (Hilary Putnam), or in the sense that almost all physical systems implement all computations (John Searle). If sound, these arguments have a potentially devastating consequence for the computational theory of mind: if arbitrary physical systems can be seen to implement arbitrary computations, the notion of computation seems to lose all explanatory power as far as brains and minds are concerned. David Chalmers and B. Jack Copeland have attempted to counter these relativist arguments by placing certain constraints on the definition of implementation. In this thesis, I examine their proposals and find both wanting in some respects. During the course of this examination, I give a formal definition of the class of combinatorial-state automata , upon which Chalmers s account of implementation is based. I show that this definition implies two theorems (one an observation due to Curtis Brown) concerning the computational power of combinatorial-state automata, theorems which speak against founding the theory of implementation upon this formalism. Toward the end of the thesis, I sketch a definition of the implementation of Turing machines in dynamical systems, and offer this as an alternative to Chalmers s and Copeland s accounts of implementation. I demonstrate that the definition does not imply Searle s claim for the universal implementation of computations. However, the definition may support claims that are weaker than Searle s, yet still troubling to the computationalist. There remains a kernel of relativity in implementation at any rate, since the interpretation of physical systems seems itself to be an observer-relative matter, to some degree at least. This observation helps clarify the role the notion of computation can play in cognitive science. Specifically, I will argue that the notion should be conceived as an instrumental rather than as a fundamental or foundational one.

Social perception and cognition : processing of gestures, postures and facial expressions in the human brain

Humans are a social species with the internal capability to process social information from other humans. To understand others behavior and to react accordingly, it is necessary to infer their internal states, emotions and aims, which are conveyed by subtle nonverbal bodily cues such as postures, gestures, and facial expressions. This thesis investigates the brain functions underlying the processing of such social information. Studies I and II of this thesis explore the neural basis of perceiving pain from another person s facial expressions by means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magnetoencephalography (MEG). In Study I, observing another s facial expression of pain activated the affective pain system (previously associated with self-experienced pain) in accordance with the intensity of the observed expression. The strength of the response in anterior insula was also linked to the observer s empathic abilities. The cortical processing of facial pain expressions advanced from the visual to temporal-lobe areas at similar latencies (around 300 500 ms) to those previously shown for emotional expressions such as fear or disgust. Study III shows that perceiving a yawning face is associated with middle and posterior STS activity, and the contagiousness of a yawn correlates negatively with amygdalar activity. Study IV explored the brain correlates of interpreting social interaction between two members of the same species, in this case human and canine. Observing interaction engaged brain activity in very similar manner for both species. Moreover, the body and object sensitive brain areas of dog experts differentiated interaction from noninteraction in both humans and dogs whereas in the control subjects, similar differentiation occurred only for humans. Finally, Study V shows the engagement of the brain area associated with biological motion when exposed to the sounds produced by a single human being walking. However, more complex pattern of activation, with the walking sounds of several persons, suggests that as the social situation becomes more complex so does the brain response. Taken together, these studies demonstrate the roles of distinct cortical and subcortical brain regions in the perception and sharing of others internal states via facial and bodily gestures, and the connection of brain responses to behavioral attributes.

Eron aika : Tyttärien kertomuksia ikääntyneen vanhemman kuolemasta

There is a relative absence of sociological and cultural research on how people deal with the death of a family member in the contemporary western societies. Research on this topic has been dominated by the experts of psychology, psychiatry and therapy, who mention the social context only in passing, if at all. This gives an impression that the white westerners bereavement experience is a purely psychological phenomenon, an inner journey, which follows a natural, universal path. Yet, as Tony Walter (1999) states, ignoring the influence of culture not only impoverishes the understanding of those work with bereaved people, but it also impoverishes sociology and cultural studies by excluding from their domain a key social phenomenon. This study explores the cultural dimension of grief through narratives told by fifteen of recently bereaved Finnish women. Focussing on one sex only, the study rests on the assumption of the gendered nature of bereavement experience. However, the aim of the study is not to pinpoint the gender differences in grief and mourning, but to shed light on women s ways of dealing with the loss of a loved one in a social context. Furthermore, the study focuses on a certain kind of loss: the death of an elderly parent. Due to the growth in the life expectancy rate, this has presumably become the most typical type of bereavement in contemporary, ageing societies. Most of population will face the death of a parent as they reach the middle years of the life course. The data of this study is gathered with interviews, in which the interviewees were invited to tell a narrative of their bereavement. Narrative constitutes a central concept in this study. It refers to a particular form of talk, which is organised around consequential events. But there are also other, deeper layers that have been added to this concept. Several scholars see narratives as the most important way in which we make sense of experience. Personal narratives provide rich material for mapping the interconnections between individual and culture. As a form of thought, narrative marries singular circumstances with shared expectations and understandings that are learned through participation in a specific culture (Garro & Mattingly 2000). This study attempts to capture the cultural dimension of narrative with the concept of script , which originates in cognitive science (Schank & Abelson 1977) and has recently been adopted to narratology (Herman 2002). Script refers to a data structure that informs how events usually unfold in certain situations. Scripts are used in interpreting events and representing them verbally to others. They are based on dominant forms of knowledge that vary according to time and place. The questions that were posed in this study are the following. What kind of experiences bereaved daughters narrate? What kind of cultural scripts they employ as they attempt to make sense of these experiences? How these scripts are used in their narratives? It became apparent that for the most of the daughters interviewed in this study the single most important part of the bereavement narrative was to form an account of how and why the parent died. They produced lengthy and detailed descriptions of the last stage of a parent s life in contrast with the rest of the interview. These stories took their start from a turn in the parent s physical condition, from which the dying process could in retrospect be seen to have started, and which often took place several years before the death. In addition, daughters also talked about their grief reactions and how they have adjusted to a life without the deceased parent. The ways in which the last stage of life was told reflect not only the characteristic features of late modernity but also processes of marginalisation and exclusion. Revivalist script and medical script, identified by Clive Seale as the dominant, competing models for dying well in the late modern societies, were not widely utilised in the narratives. They could only be applied in situations in which the parent had died from cancer and at somewhat younger age than the average. Death that took place in deep old age was told in a different way. The lack of positive models for narrating this kind of death was acknowledged in the study. This can be seen as a symptom of the societal devaluing of the deaths of older people and it affects also daughters accounts of their grief. Several daughters told about situations in which their loss, although subjectively experienced, was nonetheless denied by other people.

Acquisition of focus by normal hearing and Cochlear implanted children

Two experiments investigated the perception of compound vs. phrasal stress and narrow focus in normally hearing children and children with Cochlear Implants (CI). Additionally, we investigated whether musical experience would predict children’s performance in these tasks. The results showed no difference between CI and normal-hearing (NH) children in either experiment. However, whereas we found no clear effect of age in the children’s stress detection, there was a clear age related trajectory in the ability to recognise (narrow) focus. Moreover, this trend was similar to what has been found previously for English children. Importantly, prior music experience was significantly linked to CI children’s perception of focus.

Roman Ingarden’s Objectivity vs. Subjectivity as a problem of Translatability

Ingarden (1962, 1964) postulates that artworks exist in an “Objective purely intentional” way. According to this view, objectivity and subjectivity are opposed forms of existence, parallel to the opposition between realism and idealism. Using arguments of cognitive science, experimental psychology, and semiotics, this lecture proposes that, particularly in the aesthetic phenomena, realism and idealism are not pure oppositions; rather they are aspects of a single process of cognition in different strata. Furthermore, the concept of realism can be conceived as an empirical extreme of idealism, and the concept of idealism can be conceived as a pre-operative extreme of realism. Both kind of systems of knowledge are mutually associated by a synecdoche, performing major tasks of mental order and categorisation. This contribution suggests that the supposed opposition between objectivity and subjectivity, raises, first of all, a problem of translatability, more than a problem of existential categories. Synecdoche seems to be a very basic transaction of the mind, establishing ontologies (in the more Ingardean way of the term). Wegrzecki (1994, 220) defines ontology as “the central domain of philosophy to which other its parts directly or indirectly refer”. Thus, ontology operates within philosophy as the synecdoche does within language, pointing the sense of the general into the particular and/or viceversa. The many affinities and similarities between different sign systems, like those found across the interrelationships of the arts, are embedded into a transversal, synecdochic intersemiosis. An important question, from this view, is whether Ingardean’s pure objectivities lie basically on the impossibility of translation, therefore being absolute self-referential constructions. In such a case, it would be impossible to translate pure intentionality into something else, like acts or products.

Effect of GPS on understanding relationship between mobile map and environment : A field experiment

Objectives: GPS technology enables the visualisation of a map reader s location on a mobile map. Earlier research on the cognitive aspects of map reading identified that searching for map-environment points is an essential element for the process of determining one s location on a mobile map. Map-environment points refer to objects that are visualized on the map and are recognizable in the environment. However, because the GPS usually adds only one point to the map that has a relation to the environment, it does not provide a sufficient amount of information for self-location. The aim of the present thesis was to assess the effect of GPS on the cognitive processes involved in determining one s location on a map. Methods: The effect of GPS on self-location was studied in a field experiment. The subjects were shown a target on a mobile map, and they were asked to point in the direction of the target. In order for the map reader to be able to deduce the direction of the target, he/she has to locate himself/herself on the map. During the pointing tasks, the subjects were asked to think aloud. The data from the experiment were used to analyze the effect of the GPS on the time needed to perform the task. The subjects verbal data was used to assess the effect of the GPS on the number of landmark concepts mentioned during a task (landmark concepts are words referring to objects that can be recognized both on the map and in the environment). Results and conclusions: The results from the experiment indicate that the GPS reduces the time needed to locate oneself on a map. The analysis of the verbal data revealed that the GPS reduces the number of landmark concepts in the protocols. The findings suggest that the GPS guides the subject s search for the map-environment points and narrows the area on the map that must be searched for self-location.

Neurocognitive processing of inflected and derived words

The representation of morphologically complex words in the mental lexicon and their neurocognitive processing has been a vigorously debated topic in psycholinguistics and the cognitive neuroscience of language. This thesis investigates the effect of stimulus modality on morphological processing, the spatiotemporal dynamics of the neural processing of inflected (e.g., work+ed ) and derived (e.g., work+er ) words and their interaction, using the Finnish language. Overall, the results suggest that the constituent morphemes of isolated written and spoken inflected words are accessed separately, whereas spoken derived words activate both their full form and the constituent morphemes. The processing of both spoken and written inflected words elicited larger N400 responses than monomorphemic words (Study I), whereas the responses to spoken derived words did not differ from those to monomorphemic words (Study IV). Spoken inflected words elicited a larger left-lateralized negativity and greater source strengths in the left temporal cortices than derived words (Study IV). Thus, the results suggest different cortical processing for derived and inflected words. Moreover, the neural mechanisms underlying inflection and derivation seem to be not only different, but also independent as indexed by the linear summation of the responses to derived and inflected stimuli in a combined (derivation+inflection) condition (Study III). Furthermore, the processing of meaningless, spoken derived pseudowords was more difficult than for existing derived words, indexed by a larger N400-type effect for the pseudowords. However, no differences were observed between meaningful derived pseudowords and existing derived words (Study II). The results of Study II suggest that semantic compatibility between morphemes seems to have a crucial role in a successful morphological analysis. As a methodological note, time-locking the auditory event-related potentials/fields (ERP/ERF) to the suffix onset revealed the processes related to morphological analysis more precisely (Studies II and IV), which also enables comparison of the neural processes in different modalities (Study I).

Karl Popper's Philosophy of Science - And the Evolution of the Popperian Worlds

This doctoral thesis in theoretical philosophy is a systematic analysis of Karl Popper's philosophy of science and its relation to his theory of three worlds. The general aim is to study Popper's philosophy of science and to show that Popper's theory of three worlds was a restatement of his earlier positions. As a result, a new reading of Popper's philosophy and development is offered and the theory of three worlds is analysed in a new manner. It is suggested that the theory of three worlds is not purely an ontological theory, but has a profound epistemological motivation. In Part One, Popper's epistemology and philosophy of science is analysed. It is claimed that Popper's thinking was bifurcated: he held two profound positions without noticing the tension between them. Popper adopted the position called the theorist around 1930 and focused on the logical structure of scientific theories. In Logik der Forschung (1935), he attempted to build a logic of science on the grounds that scientific theories may be regarded as universal statements which are not verifiable but can be falsified. Later, Popper emphasized another position, called here the processionalist. Popper focused on the study of science as a process and held that a) philosophy of science should study the growth of knowledge and that b) all cognitive processes are constitutive. Moreover, the constitutive idea that we see the world in the searchlight of our theories was combined with the biological insight that knowledge grows by trial and error. In Part Two, the theory of three worlds is analysed systematically. The theory is discussed as a cluster of theories which originate from Popper's attempt to solve some internal problems in his thinking. Popper adhered to realism and wished to reconcile the theorist and the processionalist. He also stressed the real and active nature of the human mind, and the possibility of objective knowledge. Finally, he wished to create a scientific world view.