"Towards 'a real reunion'?" : Archbishop Aleksi Lehtonen's efforts for closer relations with the Church of England 1945–1951

Mika KT Pajusen väitös "Towards 'a real reunion'?" – Archbishop Aleksi Lehtonen's efforts for closer relations with the Church of England 1945–1951 on yleiseen kirkkohistoriaan lukeutuva tutkimus Englannin kirkon ja Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon välisistä suhteista Aleksi Lehtosen arkkipiispakaudella 1945–1951. Suhteita on tutkittu kolmesta näkökulmasta: ekumeenisesta, poliittisesta ja kirkkopoliittisesta. Tutkimuskausi alkaa pastori H.M. Waddamsin joulukuussa 1944 Suomeen tekemän vierailun jälkimainingeista ja päättyy arkkipiispa Lehtosen kuolemaan pääsiäisenä 1951. Kirkollisten suhteiden kehitystä rytmittivät lukuisat vierailut, jotka osoittivat Englannin kirkon asenteen muuttumisen sodan aikaisesta neuvostomyönteisyydestä kylmän sodan aikaiseen täysin vastakkaiseen kantaan. Englantilaiset vieraat kohtasivat Suomessa sekä kirkon että yhteiskunnan ylimmän johdon. Molemmat maat olivat valmiita tukemaan hyviä kirkollisia suhteita tilanteen niin salliessa, joskaan eivät kovin suunnitelmallisesti. Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko käytti hyviä suhteita Englannin kirkkoon saadakseen tukea ja ymmärrystä omalle kirkolleen ja yhteiskunnalleen kokemaansa Neuvostoliiton uhkaa vastaan erityisesti vaaran vuosina 1944–1948. Englannin kirkko halusi tukea suomalaista sisarkirkkoaan, mutta varoi, ettei tuottaisi tuellaan enemmän haittaa kuin hyötyä suhteessa Neuvostoliittoon. Sodan jälkeinen ekumeeninen jälleenrakentaminen lähensi kirkkoja toisiinsa. Lehtonen pyrki jatkamaan 1930-luvun kirkkojen välisiä, ehtoollisvieraanvaraisuuden saavuttaneita neuvotteluita kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Häntä motivoi sekä evankelis-katolinen teologia että pyrkimys tukea oman maan ja kirkon läntisiä yhteyksiä. Tämä haastoi Englannin kirkon ekumeenisen linjan, joka Suomen kirkon sijasta pyrki jatkamaan neuvotteluja Tanskan, Norjan ja Islannin luterilaisten kirkkojen kanssa, joilla ei vielä ollut virallista ekumeenista sopimusta Englannin kirkon kanssa. Lehtosen pyrkimyksistä huolimatta Englannin kirkko päätyi jättämään Suomen tilanteen hautumaan. Sillä se tarkoitti suhteiden koetinkivenä olleen historiallisen piispuuden leviämistä läpi Suomen kirkon ennen kuin katsoi olevansa valmis jatkamaan kohti täyttä kirkollista yhteyttä. Molemmissa kirkoissa vaikutti pieni, innokkaiden, lähempiä suhteita toivoneiden kirkollisten vaikuttajien ydinjoukko. Englantilaisia Suomen-ystäviä motivoi tarve auttaa Suomea hankalassa poliittisessa tilanteessa. Suomessa arkkipiispa Lehtonen tuki korkeakirkollista liturgista liikettä, jolla oli läheinen yhteys anglikaanisuuteen, mutta joka sai vastaansa vanhoilliset pietistit. Suomen kirkon yleinen mielipide asettui etupäässä pietistiselle kannalle, jolle anglikaanisuus näyttäytyi teologisesti sekä liian katolisena että liian reformoituna. Kirkolliset suhteet tasaantuivat vuoden 1948 Lambeth-konferenssin jälkeen, joka rohkaisi anglikaanisia kirkkoja hyväksymään 1930-luvun neuvottelujen lähempiin kirkollisiin suhteisiin tähtäävät suositukset. Lehtonen näytti tyytyvän tähän. Samaan aikaan lähempää kirkollista kanssakäymistä tukenut ekumeeninen jälleenrakennus tuli tiensä päähän. Lehtonen jatkoi läheisempien suhteiden edistämistä, mutta hänen intonsa hiipui yhdessä heikkenevän terveydentilan kanssa. Osoituksena Lehtosen linjan kapeudesta Suomen evankelis-luterilaisen kirkon piispoista ei löytynyt hänen kuoltuaan ketään, joka olisi jatkanut hänen aktiivista anglikaanimyönteistä linjaansa.

Meillä ei ole ikuisia ystäviä eikä ikuisia vihollisia. Ikuisia ovat meidän omat etumme. : Suomen suhteet Kiinan kansantasavaltaan 1949 - 1989

"We have neither Eternal Friends nor Eternal Enemies. We have only Eternal Interests .Finland's Relations with China 1949-1989 The study focuses on the relations between Finland and the People s Republic of China from 1949-1989 and examines how a small country became embroiled in international politics, and how, at the same time, international politics affected Finnish-Chinese relations and Finland s China policy formulation. The study can be divided into three sections: relations during the early years, 1949-1960, before the Chinese and Soviet rift became public; the relations during the passive period during the 1960s and 1970s; and the impact of China s Open Door policy on Finland s China policy from 1978-1989. The diplomatically challenging events around Tiananmen Square and the reactions which followed in Finland bring the study to a close. Finland was among the first Western countries to recognise the People s Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with her, thereby giving Finland an excellent position from which to further develop good relations. Finland was also the first Western country to sign a trade agreement with China. These two factors meant that Finland was able to enjoy a special status with China during the 1950s. The special status was further strengthened by the systematic support of the government of Finland for China's UN membership. The solid reputation earned in the 1950s had to carry Finland all the way through to the 1980s. For the two decades in between, during the passive policy period of the 1960s and 1970s, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union also determined the state of foreign relations with China. Interestingly, however, it appeared that President Urho Kekkonen was encouraged by Ambassador Joel Toivola to envisage a more proactive policy towards China, but the Cultural Revolution cut short any such plan for nearly twenty years. Because of the Soviet Union, Finland held on to her passive China policy, even though no such message was ever received from the Soviet Union. In fact, closer relationships between Finland and China were encouraged through diplomatic channels. It was not until the presidency of Mauno Koivisto that the first high-level ministerial visit was made to China when, in 1984, Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen visited the People s Republic. Finnish-Chinese relations were lifted to a new level. Foreign Minister Väyrynen, however, was forced to remove the prejudices of the Chinese. In 1985, when the Speaker of the Finnish Parliament, Erkki Pystynen visited China he also discovered that Finland s passive China policy had caused misunderstandings amongst the Chinese politicians. The number of exchanges escalated in the wake of the ground-breaking visit by Foreign Minister Väyrynen: Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa visited China in 1986 and President Koivisto did so in 1988. President Koivisto stuck to practical, China-friendly policies: his correspondence with Li Peng, the attitude taken by the Finnish government after the Tiananmen Square events and the subsequent choices made by his administration all pointed to a new era in relations with China.

Kirkko, Kekkonen ja kommunismi poliittisina kriisivuosina 1958-1962

This study explores the relationship of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland to communism and political power during the period of crises in Finnish foreign relations with the Soviet Union from 1958 to 1962. During this period the USSR repeatedly interfered in Finland´s domestic affairs and limited her foreign political freedom of action. The research subjects for this dissertation are the bishops of the Church of Finland and the newspaper Kotimaa, which can be regarded as the unofficial organ of the church at the time. A typical characteristic of the Church of Finland from the beginning of the twentieth century was patriotism. During the interwar years the church was strongly anti-communist and against the Soviet Union. This tendency was also evident during the Second World War. After the war the Finnish Church feared that the rise of the extreme left would jeopardize its position. The church, however, succeeded in maintaining its status as a state church throughout the critical years immediately following the war. This study indicates that, although the manner of expression altered, the political attitude of the church did not substantially change during the postwar period. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the church was still patriotic and fear of the extreme left was also evident among the leaders of the church. The victory of the Finnish People's Democratic League in the general election of 1958 was an unwelcome surprise to the church. This generated fear in the church that, with Soviet support, the Finnish communists might return to governmental power and the nation could become a people's democracy. Accordingly, the church tried to encourage other parties to set aside their disagreements and act together against the extreme left throughout the period under study. The main characteristics of the church´s political agenda during this period of crisis were to support the Finnish foreign policy led by the president of the republic, Urho Kekkonen, and to resist Finnish communism. The attitude of Finnish bishops and the newspaper Kotimaa to the Cold War in general was generally in agreement with the majority of western Christians. They feared communism, were afraid of the USSR, but supported peaceful co-existence because they did not want an open conflict with the Soviets. Because of uncertainties in Finland's international position the Finnish Church regarded it as necessary to support the Finnish policy of friendship towards the USSR. The Finnish Church considerer it unwise to openly criticize the Soviet Union, tried resist the spread of communism in Finnish domestic policy. This period of foreign policy crises was principally seen by the church as a time when there was a need to strengthen Finland's unstable national position.

The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War : The Finnish Card in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956-1959

From the Soviet point of view the actual substance of Soviet-Finnish relations in the second half of 1950s clearly differed from the contemporary and later public image, based on friendship and confidence rhetoric. As the polarization between the right and the left became more underlined in Finland in the latter half of the 1950s, the criticism towards the Soviet Union became stronger, and the USSR feared that this development would have influence on Finnish foreign policy. From the Soviet point of view, the security commitments of FCMA-treaty needed additional guarantees through control of Finnish domestic politics and economic relations, especially during international crises. In relation to Scandinavia, Finland was, from the Soviet point of view, the model country of friendship or neutrality policy. The influence of the Second Berlin Crisis or the Soviet-Finnish Night Frost Crisis in 1958-1959 to Soviet policy towards Scandinavia needs to be observed from this point of view. The Soviet Union used Finland as a tool, in agreement with Finnish highest political leadership, for weakening of the NATO membership of Norway and Denmark, and for maintaining Swedish non-alliance. The Finnish interest to EFTA membership in the summer of 1959, at the same time with the Scandinavian countries, seems to have caused a panic reaction in the USSR, as the Soviets feared that these economic arrangements would reverse the political advantages the country had received in Finland after the Night Frost Crisis. Together with history of events, this study observes the interaction of practical interests and ideologies, both in individuals and in decision-making organizations. The necessary social and ideological reforms in the Soviet Union after 1956 had influence both on the legitimacy of the regime, and led to contradictions in the argumentation of Soviet foreign policy. This was observed both in the own camp as well as in the West. Also, in Finland a breakthrough took place in the late 1950's: as the so-called counter reaction lost to the K-line, "a special relationship" developed with the Soviet Union. As a consequence of the Night Frost Crisis the Soviet relationship became a factor decisively defining the limits of domestic politics in Finland, a part of Finnish domestic political argumentation. Understood from this basis, finlandization is not, even from the viewpoint of international relations, a special case, but a domestic political culture formed by the relationship between a dominant state, a superpower, and a subordinate state, Finland.

Bridging East and West : The Establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the United States Foreign Policy of Bridge Building, 1964-1972.

The dissertation examines the foreign policies of the United States through the prism of science and technology. In the focal point of scrutiny is the policy establishing the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the development of the multilateral part of bridge building in American foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. After a long and arduous negotiation process, the institute was finally established by twelve national member organizations from the following countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Soviet Union and United States; a few years later Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands also joined. It is said that the goal of the institute was to bring together researchers from East and West to solve pertinent problems caused by the modernization process experienced in industrialized world. It originates from President Lyndon B. Johnson s bridge building policies that were launched in 1964, and was set in a well-contested and crowded domain of other international organizations of environmental and social planning. Since the distinct need for yet another organization was not evident, the process of negotiations in this multinational environment enlightens the foreign policy ambitions of the United States on the road to the Cold War détente. The study places this project within its political era, and juxtaposes it with other international organizations, especially that of the OECD, ECE and NATO. Conventionally, Lyndon Johnson s bridge building policies have been seen as a means to normalize its international relations bilaterally with different East European countries, and the multilateral dimension of the policy has been ignored. This is why IIASA s establishment process in this multilateral environment brings forth new information on US foreign policy goals, the means to achieve these goals, as well as its relations to other advanced industrialized societies before the time of détente, during the 1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, the substance of the institute applied systems analysis illuminates the differences between European and American methodological thinking in social planning. Systems analysis is closely associated with (American) science and technology policies of the 1960s, especially in its military administrative applications, thus analysis within the foreign policy environment of the United States proved particularly fruitful. In the 1960s the institutional structures of European continent with faltering, and the growing tendencies of integration were in flux. One example of this was the long, drawn-out process of British membership in the EEC, another is de Gaulle s withdrawal from NATO s military-political cooperation. On the other hand, however, economic cooperation in Europe between East and West, and especially with the Soviet Union was expanding rapidly. This American initiative to form a new institutional actor has to be seen in that structural context, showing that bridge building was needed not only to the East, but also to the West. The narrative amounts to an analysis of how the United States managed both cooperation and conflict in its hegemonic aspirations in the emerging modern world, and how it used its special relationship with the United Kingdom to achieve its goals. The research is based on the archives of the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, and IIASA. The primary sources have been complemented with both contemporary and present day research literature, periodicals, and interviews.